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Chapter I
Introduction: Stock Option
Compensation and Prospect Theory
1 Overview
This dissertation analyzes existing compensation schemes for executive and non-executive
employees in the light of recent advances in decision sciences and behavioral corporate
nance. The primary object of study are stock options, which give the holder the right
to buy a share of stock during a pre-specied future period of time, at a pre-specied
price (called the "strike price"). Stock options are the predominant device for compen-
sating CEOs and other executive employees. They are also frequently used to remunerate
non-executive employees. The importance of stock options as an economic reality in
compensating employees is undisputed.1 Yet, while nancial researchers have spent a
great amount of time and e¤ort on the subject, there is still considerable uncertainty
with regard to many of the most basic questions, including why executive employees are
compensated with stock options instead of, for example, restricted stock, why important
terms of option grants, such as strike prices, are so uniform across companies, and why
stock options are used to compensate non-executive employees.
The contribution of this dissertation is to show that many of these questions can
be answered by using prospect theory preferences for employees in otherwise standard
1See for example Figures 1.1 and 1.2 in the next section.
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economic models. For non-executive employees, I show in Chapter II that probability
weighting, which is a main component of prospect theory, can explain why a large number
of rms have broad-based stock option plans, and why rms with such a plan tend to have
more volatile stock prices. For CEOs, I nd in Chapter III that loss aversion, which is
another main component of prospect theory, can explain why we see stock options in
almost all executive pay contracts. Chapter IV shows that loss aversion can also explain
why strike prices are so homogenous across rms and why strike prices are usually set
equal to the grant date stock price.
The work presented here is conducted on the basis of Standard and Poors Execu-
Comp database, which collects detailed annual compensation data for the top executive
o¢ cers of more than 2,500 U.S. companies beginning in the year 1992. Apart from data
availability, focusing on the U.S. has the additional benet of making my results compa-
rable to most prior research on stock option compensation.2
In this introductory chapter I will outline and present the main ideas of this disserta-
tion, as well as some institutional background on stock option compensation in the U.S.
A brief introduction to prospect theory will be followed by a synopsis of the main results.
Detailed discussion of the models and the relevant literature is relegated to the respective
Chapters II to IV.
2A comprehensive survey of the vast literature on stock option compensation and executive compen-
sation is far beyond the scope of this chapter. Survey articles on various aspects are Abowd and Kaplan
(1999), Murphy (1999), Prendergast (1999), Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2003), Hall and Murphy (2003)
and Jensen and Murphy (2004). For studies on international comparisons of pay arrangements see Abowd
and Bognanno (1995), Abowd and Kaplan (1999), and Conyon and Schwalbach (2000).
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Figure 1.1: This gure shows the average level and structure of CEO compensation in S&P
500 rms from 1992 to 2005. Salary, bonus, the value of stock option grants (valued using
the Black-Scholes methodology), and the value of restricted stock grants are taken directly
from ExecuComp. Other compensation includes ExecuComp items: "other annual", "all
other total" and payouts from long-term incentive plans. All values are given in 2005
constant dollars using the Bureau of Economic Analysis GDP deator.
2 Stock options as a compensation device for execu-
tive and non-executive employees
This section presents an overview of the use of stock options as a compensation device
in the U.S., reviews the main economic arguments for their use, and extracts three main
questions that this thesis addresses.
I start by looking at executive employees. As a rst remarkable empirical fact, almost
all CEOs of the largest U.S. companies receive stock options as part of their compensation
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package. In 2005, about 96% of S&P 500 companies granted options to their CEO.3
Figure 1.1 shows the average annual CEO compensation in S&P 500 rms, derived on the
basis of the ExecuComp database, over the years 1992 to 2005.4 CEO pay has increased
enormously over this period and the average annual pay for an S&P 500 CEO grew from
$3.6 million in 1992 to over $14 million in 2000.5 ;6 Although, by 2005, CEO compensation
has decreased to the 1998 level at about $10.4 million, it still surpasses the 1992 level by
factor 2.9, which implies growth of 8.5% per annum in real terms over 13 years. Much of
the growth in CEO pay is attributable to growth in stock options grants. Stock options
are also the single most important component in the structure of CEO pay. In 2005, 33%
of the fair value of the pay package awarded to the average S&P 500 CEO came from stock
options, 23% from bonus payments and 16% from xed salaries. The relative importance
of restricted stock has increased from about 7% of pay in 1997 to 15.8% in 2005.7
Figure 1.1 shows that through the use of stock options and restricted stock, a substan-
tial part of CEO pay is tied directly to the performance of the stock price of the company.
The relation between pay and performance is even stronger when one takes into account
that, in addition to the most current grant of stock and options, the CEO usually holds
a portfolio of stock options and restricted stock from previous grants. The value of these
holdings varies systematically with performance, thus amplifying the sensitivity of CEO
3This number is based on the number of S&P 500 CEOs who are recorded in ExecuComp in the year
2005.
4See Jensen and Murphy (2004) for a similar presentation of the S&P 500 compensation data over the
years 1992 to 2002.
5All dollar values here are in 2005 constant dollars, which were computed using the GDP deator of
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov).
6I do not focus on the level of pay in this dissertation. For important contributions to the debate on
the level of pay, see Holmström and Kaplan (2001), who argue that large stock option plans helped to
overcome managerial resistance to e¢ ciency-increasing corporate restructurings in the 1980s and 1990s.
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) and Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) argue strongly for a managerial-power view,
where managers use stock options as a means to extract rents from their companies. Gabaix and Landier
(2008) show that a model of CEO talent, where the most talented CEOs are matched to the largest rms
is consistent with the observed rise in CEO pay.
7The remaining 12% are miscellaneous items such as payouts from long-term incentive plans,
perquisites, signing bonuses, and 401K contributions.
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wealth with respect to corporate performance (Hall and Liebman, 1998).
Why do rms tie pay to performance? The standard economic argument for granting
performance-related pay is the need to mitigate agency problems which stem from the
separation of ownership and control in modern corporations (Berle and Means, 1932,
and Jensen and Meckling, 1976).8 The basic idea is that shareholders (the "principal")
cannot perfectly monitor managers (the "agent"), and that in the absence of monitoring,
managers maximize their own utility rather than the utility of the shareholders. As a
result, CEOs may, for example, not work hard enough, they may spend money on pet
projects, they may buy a new corporate jet, they may engage in empire building, or they
may pay above market-level wages to employees.
The seminal theoretical literature on the principal-agent problem has condensed this
myriad of ways to waste corporate resources into a single variable called "e¤ort." Holm-
ström (1979), for example, considers a static model in which a risk-neutral principal can
make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of a pay contract w to a risk-averse manager.9 The manager
will accept the contract if it provides at least the same expected utility as an exogenous
outside option. If the manager accepts, she can exert costly e¤ort, denoted by e: The
stock price at the end of the period, denoted by P (e; u) ; is assumed to depend on e¤ort
and a random state of nature u: Moreover, by assumption, if the manager exerts more ef-
fort, it is more likely that the end-of-period stock price is high. The central assumption is
that e¤ort is not observable by the principal. Hence, given the pay contract, the manager
8Although the principal-agent motivation outlined here is the most common approach, tying pay to
performance may also help to attain other objectives such as: providing retention incentives for employees
(Oyer, 2004), providing incentives for risk-averse CEOs to choose positive NPV projects even if these are
risky (Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia, 1999, Feltham andWu, 2001), attracting a certain type of employees
(Oyer and Schaefer, 2005, Lazear, 2005), or, at least up to 2005, providing favorable accounting treatment
(Jensen and Murphy, 2004).
9This model will also be the basis for the extension to loss-averse CEOs in Chapters III and IV. The
original Holmström (1979) model is slightly more general in that it allows for risk-averse principals, and
uses "payo¤s" instead of stock prices. I adapt the model to the present context in this exposition. For
other seminal papers on the principal-agent problem see Ross (1973), Mirrlees (1974, 1976), Holmström
(1982), Grossman and Hart (1983), Holmström and Milgrom (1987) and Holmström and Milgrom (1991).
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will choose the level of e¤ort that maximizes her expected utility. If w is a constant, that
is if pay is not tied to the stock price, the manager will choose the least costly level of
e¤ort, and, as a result, the end-of-period stock price will likely be low. The principal can
"incentivize" the manager by making pay contingent on the stock price. Exerting at least
some e¤ort becomes attractive then, since the manager shares in the benets of increasing
company value. However, CEO risk aversion introduces a countervailing e¤ect: the more
pay is tied to performance, the more risk is conferred to the manager (because the stock
price is a random variable). Hence, there is a trade-o¤ between incentivizing the manager
to increase company value and e¢ cient risk sharing.10 Holmström (1979) has shown that
under some technical assumptions the optimal contract will be a monotonically increasing
function of the stock price.11
According to the principal-agent paradigm, stock and stock options are granted to
executives to align their interests with the interests of the shareholders. An important
question is how one can measure incentives from observed pay packages. Following Jensen
and Murphy (1990), a large literature has dened incentives as the dollar change in CEO
wealth for a dollar change in rm value (called the "pay-performance sensitivity"). Jensen
and Murphy (1990) analyze a sample of U.S. rms from 1974 to 1986 and nd a pay-
performance sensitivity of $3.25 for a $1,000 change in rm value, which they regard as
too low. Hall and Liebman (1998) show that pay-performance sensitivities have increased
10There is an ongoing debate about the trade-o¤between risk and incentives in the literature. Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999) nd that pay-performance sensitivities for executives are decreasing in the variance
of the rms performance, thus conrming the predicted trade-o¤. Prendergast (2002) presents evidence
that the trade-o¤ may be more tenuous than commonly assumed.
11In particular, he assumes the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP)
fe (P je)
f (P je) > 0;
where f is the density function of the stock price conditional on e¤ort, and fe is its rst derivative with
respect to e¤ort. Intuitively, MLRP implies that the higher the observed stock price, the more likely it
is that more e¤ort was exerted.
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signicantly over the later period from 1980 to 1994 and that almost all incentives come
from the inuence of the stock price on the holdings (as opposed to the ow) of stock and
stock options. Almost no incentives come from salary and bonus payments.
Another important question is how pay packages should be structured. Specically:
should rms use stock options, or, rather, restricted stock as a compensation device?
On the one hand, stock options are an e¢ cient way to provide incentives, since for the
same dollar outlay, the number of options that can be granted exceeds the number of
shares that can be granted, and total incentives in terms of pay-performance sensitivity
are usually higher for options than for shares (Hall, 1998). Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002)
show that the advantage of options over stock in terms of incentives is robust to endowing
the manager with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function and dening
incentives as the derivative of the expected utility of the pay contract with respect to
the stock price. On the other hand, options are an expensive form of compensating risk-
averse executives since risk aversion drives a wedge between the cost to the company
and the value to the executive. Since stock options are riskier than shares, the company
can save compensation costs and keep expected utility constant by exchanging a given
number of options for restricted stock (Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991, Oyer
and Schaefer, 2005). Dittmann and Maug (2007) bring together these two perspectives
by calibrating the traditional Holmström (1979) model for lognormally distributed stock
prices and CEOs with CRRA utility. They nd that for almost all CEOs in their sample,
stock options are not e¢ cient and that the predicted optimal structure of CEO pay would
be contracts that feature restricted stock, negative base salaries and no options.12
The results by Dittmann and Maug (2007) are intriguing because, taken at face
value, they suggest that either observed pay contracts are not e¢ cient, or that the stan-
dard principal-agent model used in the literature is not the right model to use. Chapter
12Some of these results are already implicit in Hall and Murphy (2002).
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III presents an e¢ cient-contracting model, using prospect theory preferences for CEOs,
that can reconcile the principal-agent model in the spirit of Holmström (1979) with the
observed structure of CEO pay.
A striking feature of stock option compensation is the near uniformity of stock option
design (Hall and Liebman, 1998, Murphy, 1999, Hall and Murphy, 2002). A typical stock
option plan contains options with a maturity of 10 years and stipulates that managers
cannot exercise the options for a certain time. In most cases, options become exercisable
(they "vest") two to three years after the grant date, or they become exercisable in equal
annual increments over the rst two to four years following the grant. The options cannot
be sold and executives are prohibited from diversifying the risk imposed on them by, for
example, short-selling company stock.13
On of the most prominent regularities is that almost all options have a xed strike
price equal to the stock price at the grant date (such options are called "at the money
options"). Hall and Murphy (2002) report that in 1998, 94% of companies in the S&P 500
used at the money options to compensate their executives. This practice has come under
severe scrutiny by some academics who argue that granting at the money options provides
executives with huge windfall prots since, on average, share prices tend to appreciate, and
executives are rewarded for general market movements beyond their control (Rappaport,
1999, Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). These scholars argue that the windfall prots generated
by at the money options are indicative of ine¢ cient pay-setting processes and suggest
that companies should instead use premium options, which have a xed strike price set
above the current stock price, or indexed options, which reward the executive relative to
some benchmark index.14 At the other extreme, Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) argue that
13Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001) provide evidence that by using specically tailored derivative
structures, executives can hedge part of their risk exposure. The small sample size in this study indicates,
however, that these practices are not particularly widespread.
14A theoretical justication for using indexed options comes from the "informativeness principle" in
Holmström (1979, 1982), which holds that contracts should only be written on informative signals of the
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setting at the money strike prices is e¢ cient if one explicitly models the trade-o¤ between
incentives and cost to the company.
A major drawback for the e¢ cient-contracting view is that there is currently no
benchmark e¢ cient-contracting model that can explain stock options in CEO pay con-
tracts and, consequently, no rm basis for investigating stock option design features.
Chapter IV of this dissertation extends the model in Chapter III by endogenizing strike
prices and shows that at the money options are e¢ cient for sensible assumptions about
model parameters.
Figure 1.1 has shown that stock options are important as a compensation device
for executives. Figure 1.2 shows that stock option grants to CEOs are just the tip of
the iceberg.15 The vast majority of options are granted to employees below the top 5
executives reported in ExecuComp ("other employees"). In any year from 1992 to 2005,
more than 85% of options in S&P 500 companies were on average granted to non-top 5
employees. In 2005, these employees have on average been granted stock options worth
$82 million. In 2000 this number has amounted to $227 million. Hall and Murphy (2002)
cite a study by the American Compensation Association which reports that about 45%
of exempt salaried employees, 12% of non-exempt salaried workers and 10% of hourly
employees received stock options in a broad sample of U.S. companies in 1998. The
National Center for Employee Ownership estimates that as of early 2008, there are some
3,000 U.S. companies with a broad-based stock option plan, which is a stock option plan
actions of the agent. Since general market movements are not inuenced by the CEO, compensation
should not be based on them. For a more detailed discussion on (the lack of) relative performance
evaluation see Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2003).
15The ExecuComp database contains only the compensation of the top 5 executives for each rm. Also
reported is the variable "pcttotopt", which reports for each executive stock option grant the percentage
this grant represents of the total number of options granted by the rm in the scal year. Hence, it is
possible to infer the total number of options to other employees from the reported grants. The Black-
Scholes value of option grants to other employees in Figure 1.2 was estimated using the assumption that
the ratio of Black-Scholes value of options granted to the top 5 executives to the Black-Scholes value of
options granted to other employees is equal to the ratio of the respective number of options.
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Figure 1.2: This gure shows the average option grant to CEOs, other top 5 executives,
and other employees in S&P 500 rms from 1992 to 2005. The value of stock option grants
for CEOs and other top 5 executives are taken directly from ExecuComp (valued using the
Black-Scholes methodology). The value of grants to other employees is estimated based
on the ExecuComp variable "pcttotopt". All values are given in 2005 constant dollars
using the Bureau of Economic Analysis GDP deator.
that grants options not only to executives but also to non-executive employees, and that
about 9 million Americans participate in these plans.16 These numbers make it clear that
stock options are of great economic importance not only for CEOs and other executives,
but also for non-executive employees.
The fact that stock options are also used to compensate non-executive employees is
puzzling in the light of the principal-agent paradigm outlined above because the stock
price of a company is a largely uninformative measure of the e¤ort put in by a single
16Data available at: www.nceo.org/library/eo_stat.html
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non-executive employee. Hence, according to the "informativeness principle" of Holm-
ström (1979, 1982), pay to non-executive employees should not be tied to the stock price.
Moreover, compensating lower-level employees based on company performance introduces
a substantial free-rider problem, since all employees will have an incentive to cut back on
e¤ort and let the other employees do the work (Hall and Murphy, 2003, Bergman and
Jenter, 2007). Moreover, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) calibrate a benchmark model to show
that incentives from stock options if they existed would have to be much larger than
what can reasonably be assumed to justify the cost of imposing additional risk on the
employees. Chapter II provides a novel explanation, based on employees with prospect
theory preferences, for the existence of broad-based stock option plans.
To sum up, stock options are one of the most important and widespread compensation
devices. Despite the large literature on compensation, some of the most basic questions
are still not satisfactorily answered. From the previous discussion, there emerge three
important questions, which this dissertation addresses in the following three chapters:
 Why do some rms grant stock options to non-executive employees?
 Why are stock options part of almost all observed CEO pay contracts?
 Are at the money strike prices e¢ cient?
3 Prospect theory as a description of employee pref-
erences
This dissertation takes a behavioral approach to explaining stock option compensation by
assuming that executive and non-executive employees have prospect theory preferences.
Prospect theory was developed on the basis of substantial experimental evidence by Kah-
neman and Tversky (1979) as a descriptive theory of risky choice between gambles with
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Value
Losses                         Gains
Figure 1.3: The prospect theory value function. The reference point is located at the
intersection of the horizontal and vertical axes. Values on the horizontal axis correspond
to the distance of an outcome from the reference point.
a small number of outcomes.17 It was subsequently extended by Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992) to the domain of uncertainty and to risky gambles involving any number of
outcomes. The key features of prospect theory are reference dependence, loss aversion, di-
minishing sensitivity, and probability weighting. All these features will be mathematically
dened in the following chapters so I will only give a brief overview here.
Figure 1.3 shows the "value function", which is the prospect theory equivalent to the
utility function. The particular shape of the function is determined by three principles.
Reference dependence. Individuals evaluate the outcome of a gamble relative to a ref-
erence point. Hence, the carriers of value are gains and losses, not nal wealth positions.
17See Kahneman and Tversky (2000) for a collection of papers that summarizes much of the available
empirical evidence.
12
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p. 277, explain:
Our perceptual apparatus is attuned to evaluation of changes or di¤er-
ences rather than the evaluation of absolute magnitudes. When we respond to
attributes such as brightness, loudness or temperature, the past and present
context of experience denes an adaptation level, or reference point, and stim-
uli are perceived in relation to this reference point. [...] The same principle
applies to non-sensory attributes such as health, prestige, and wealth.
Outcomes below the reference point are labeled losses, while outcomes above the
reference point are labeled gains. In Figure 1.3, the reference point is located at the
intersection of the horizontal and vertical axes.18
Loss aversion. Losses loom larger than gains.
Loss aversion implies that individuals dislike losses more than they are attracted
to equal-sized gains. Loss aversion introduces a kink in the value function. As a result,
individuals are innitely risk averse at the reference point and the value function is steeper
for losses than for gains. There is extensive experimental support for loss aversion in a
large set of contexts.19
Diminishing sensitivity. The marginal value of both losses and gains decreases with
their size.
18Rayo and Becker (2007) have proposed an evolutionary foundation for reference-dependent prefer-
ences.
19For example, Thaler (1980) and Kahneman and Tversky (1984) nd that individuals are more sensi-
tive to out-of-pocket costs than to opportunity costs, and more sensitive to losses than to foregone gains.
Dunn (1996) nds evidence for loss aversion by analyzing labor/leisure choices. Loss aversion explains
asymmetric consumption responses to expected losses or gains in income (Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin,
1997). Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997) analyze hours worked by Taxi drivers in New
York City and nd that the observed pattern of work supply can be readily explained by loss aversion but
not by standard models. For additional evidence see Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and the references
therein. Ashraf, Camerer, and Loewenstein (2005) argue that loss aversion was already recognized by
Adam Smith. Rabin (2000), p. 1288, calls loss aversion the most rmly established feature of risk
preferences.
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Since gains and losses are valued relative to the reference point, diminishing sensi-
tivity implies that the value function is concave over gains and convex over losses. The
convexity over losses introduces risk-loving behavior in the loss domain.
Another key ingredient of prospect theory is probability weighting. Probability
weighting captures the fact that individuals tend to overweight small probabilities, under-
weight medium to large probabilities, and that individuals are more sensitive to changes
in probabilities if these changes are close to certainty or close to impossibility. I present
a detailed mathematical exposition of probability weighting in Chapter II.
There is a large and comprehensive body of experimental evidence that shows that
individuals frequently violate basic tenets of rationality in making decisions under risk
and uncertainty.20 Serious attempts to incorporate the insights of decision scientists and
cognitive psychologists into economics have been made at least since the seminal article
on prospect theory from Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Since then, hardly any eld has
grown so rapidly as the eld of behavioral economics and behavioral nance.21
The literature on behavioral corporate nance is also growing, but existing research
has focused mainly on irrational investors, and the ways in which rational managers can
exploit these investors by, for example, issuing overvalued equity.22 By contrast, the lit-
erature on irrational managers is not as well developed and has so far focused mainly on
managerial optimism and overcondence, but not on alternative preference specications
20Rationality is dened here in the sense of the axioms underlying expected utility theory of von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). One of the earliest criticisms of these axioms comes from Allais (1953)
who shows that individuals frequently violate the independence axiom. Another early demonstration of
individual biases in decision making can be found in Tversky and Kahneman (1974). For an overview
of some of the literature on the limits of, and alternatives to, expected utility theory see for example,
Schoemaker (1982), Starmer (2000) and Fox and See (2003).
21For detailed surveys of the literature in behavioral economics see Rabin (1998, 2002), Camerer,
Loewenstein, and Rabin (2003) and DellaVigna (2007). For a comprehensive overview of research on
behavioral nance see Thaler (1993, 2005).
22The distinction between the irrational-investor and irrational-manager approaches used here is bor-
rowed from the survey article on behavioral corporate nance by Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2006).
Detailed references to the respective approaches can be found there.
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like prospect theory.23 This is surprising for two reasons. First, if deviations from ratio-
nality are relevant for investors, then there is every reason to believe that they are also
relevant for other individuals including managers. Second, limits to arbitrage are likely
to be greater inside organizations. Managers can entrench themselves and there is ample
evidence that takeover threats, proxy ghts and other corporate governance mechanisms
frequently leave some discretion with management (Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, 2006).
Hence, one would expect e¤ects of behavioral biases to show up very prominently in deci-
sions of managers. This dissertation contributes to the literature on irrational managers
in Chapters III and IV. It contributes to an even smaller behavioral corporate nance
literature, which investigates the consequences of employee irrationality, in Chapter II.24
Stock option compensation is an ideal eld to test the relevance of behavioral theories
of decision making for CEO and employee behavior, because CEOs and employees are
prohibited from hedging their exposure to the risk of their equity contracts, and because
there is no close substitute for the 10 year options typically awarded in stock option plans.
Hence, there is some protection from the forces of arbitrage. If preferences matter, they are
likely to matter in such an environment. Although there is a large number of behavioral
biases and alternatives to expected utility theory, I focus exclusively on prospect theory.25
By focusing on prospect theory I can build on a rmly established theoretical framework,
use existing results on functional forms, and experimental results on values for preference
parameters in my numerical work.
23Papers that examine the inuence of optimism and overcondence on manager are, for example,
Heaton (2002), Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008) and Hackbarth (2008).
24Other papers in this category are Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and Bergman and Jenter (2007).
25Examples of alternative theories include Machina (1982), Bell (1982), Loomes and Sugden (1982),
Fishburn (1984), Dekel (1986), Gul (1991), and Neilson (1992). See Starmer (2000), Wu, Zhang, and
Gonzales (2004), and Fox and See (2003) for surveys.
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4 Outline of the dissertation and main results
The questions derived at the end of Section 2 are addressed in the following three chapters
of this dissertation.
Chapter II presents a model which can rationalize the puzzling fact that stock op-
tions are frequently used as a compensation device for non-executive employees. The
model proposes that this can be attributed to the tendency of individuals to overweight
small chances of large payo¤s. A simple model with employees that have prospect theory
preferences including (cumulative) probability weighting is calibrated using standard as-
sumptions on stock price distributions and preference parameters. The calibrated model
predicts that employees in risky rms, which are rms with a high stock price volatility,
attach a value to their stock options in excess of the cost to the rm. Hence, exchanging
base salaries for stock options in contracts for lower-level employees is attractive to risky
rms as long as they can cut back base salaries. The model predicts that stock option
grants to non-executive employees should be concentrated among the most risky rms.
Conversely, the model predicts signicantly less stock option grants to non-executive
employees in low-risk rms. These predictions are strongly supported by results from
regression analyses using a large panel with more than 2,000 rms over the years 1992 to
2005.
Chapter III explains the observed structure of CEO compensation and in particular
the presence of stock options in almost all observed compensation contracts. The chapter
extends the principal-agent model by Holmström (1979) by assuming prospect theory
preferences for the agent. The general optimal contract is established analytically and
the model is calibrated to the observed contracts of 595 CEOs, using parameter values for
the prospect theory value function from the experimental literature. The model explains
the observed structure of executive compensation contracts signicantly better than the
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original model with expected utility preferences for the CEO. This holds especially for
the mix between stock and options. The model predicts convex contracts with substantial
option holdings that provide a strong upside ("carrots"). By contrast, derived optimal
contracts in the standard model with a risk-averse CEO are concave and expose the CEO
to signicant downside risk ("sticks"). The key insight is that a contract that combines
stock options with a higher base salary is attractive to loss-averse CEOs, since such
a contract provides valuable downside protection. The results in Chapter III suggest
that loss aversion is a better paradigm for analyzing the design features of stock options
and for developing preference-based valuation models than the conventional risk-aversion
paradigm used in the literature.
Chapter IV extends the model in Chapter III to analyze optimal strike-price design
of executive stock options. The results show that the absence of premium options is not
as puzzling as it may seem. The extended model is calibrated to a sample of 724 CEOs,
and for each CEO optimal strike prices are endogenously and jointly determined with the
number of granted options, the number of granted shares, and the optimal level of base
salary. For low reference points, at the money options are optimal for the average rm
in the sample. For higher reference points, premium options become optimal, but the
savings rms could realize by switching from at the money options to premium options
would be very small. Hence, the model suggests that optimal strike-price design is a
second-order issue in terms of e¢ ciency.
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Chapter II
Probability Weighting and Employee
Stock Options
In 2004, approximately 99% of the options that Intel granted went to employees other than its
top six most highly compensated executive o¢ cers; for the period 2000 to 2004, only 1.2% of all
options that Intel granted went to its top ve most highly compensated executive o¢ cers.
Intel Corporation, 2005 proxy statement
1 Introduction
The National Center for Employee Ownership estimates that in early 2008, broad-based
stock option plans, which they dene as plans that grant options to 50% or more of their
full-time employees, are used in about 3,000 U.S. companies.1 They also estimate that
approximately 9 million Americans participate in broad-based option plans.2 While the
economic importance of such plans is obvious, the economic rationale for issuing options
to non-executive employees is still a puzzle.
This chapter proposes probability weighting as a novel, preference-based, explana-
tion for why rms use stock options to compensate non-executive employees. Probability
1I thank Aurelien Baillon, Roman Inderst, Elu von Thadden, Martin Weber, David Yermack, seminar
participants at the University of Mannheim, and especially Ingolf Dittmann, Ernst Maug and Christoph
Schneider for helpful comments and discussions. Any errors are my own.
2Data available at: http://www.nceo.org/library/eo_stat.html. The estimates are based on various
sources including the General Social Survey of the National Opinion Research Center and a 2007 Bureau
of Labor Statistics survey.
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weighting captures the well-documented fact that individuals tend to overestimate small
probabilities and underestimate medium to large probabilities in evaluating risky gam-
bles.3
I develop a simple model of e¢ cient pay-setting between a risk-neutral rm and an
employee who is subject to probability weighting. I calibrate the model using standard
parameter estimates from the experimental literature and show that it predicts that (i)
broad-based employee stock option plans are more common among rms with more volatile
stock prices, that (ii) the per employee number of granted stock options increases with
stock price volatility and that (iii) the per employee number of stock options increases at
an increasing rate with the stock price volatility. In the second part of the chapter, these
predictions are tested on the universe of ExecuComp rms from 1992 to 2005. I estimate
the number of options granted to lower-level employees at the individual rm level and
nd that all three predictions are strongly supported by the data, even after controlling
for a large number of variables previously found important in the literature, and after
including industry and rm e¤ects.
Stock options are contracts with an asymmetric payo¤ prole. There is a substantial
chance that they will expire worthless. At the same time, they o¤er a small chance of very
large payo¤s to the option holder. Employees subject to probability weighting overweight
the small probabilities of large gains inherent in their stock options, which makes them
attractive. At the same time, stock options impose risk on employees, which, in the
absence of probability weighting, makes them unattractive. This chapter shows that for
plausible assumptions about preference parameters and the distribution of future stock
3The seminal work on probability weighting is Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992). Gonzales and Wu (1999), Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), and Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and
Weber (2005) conrm the inverse-S-shape of the probability weighting function, which implies over-
weighting of small probabilities and underweighting of medium to large probabilities. Applications of
overweighting small winning probabilities include Thaler and Ziemba (1988), Cook and Clotfelter (1993),
Hausch and Ziemba (1995), and Jullien and Salanie (2000). See also Camerer (2000) for a review of some
of the literature.
19
prices, the certainty equivalent of stock options for employees can exceed the value of
the option to an outside investor if employees are subject to probability weighting, but
not otherwise. This is in accord with a growing body of empirical and survey evidence
which documents that employees frequently value options in excess of the Black-Scholes
value.4 The economic rationale I propose for the use of stock options to compensate non-
executive employees is that rms can reduce their personnel cost by granting overvalued
stock options to their lower-level employees in lieu for reducing base salaries.
As an extension, I show that the model can provide a unied framework for thinking
about both option grants and exercises. In the spirit of Benartzi and Thaler (1995), I
propose a connection between the horizon over which an individual evaluates the option
and the value attached to it. Myopic employees will exercise their option whenever the
value of holding it for another period is less than the intrinsic value obtained by immediate
exercise. The payo¤ distribution of options is less skewed for shorter horizons. Since
overweighting of small probabilities induces an employee preference for skewness, shorter
evaluation horizons increase the relative benet of exercising early. I show in calibrations
that this idea is quantitatively meaningful: employees with short evaluation horizons
(one year and less) tend to exercise their options early and the tendency to exercise early
increases in the moneyness of the options consistent with stylized facts of option exercise
behavior.
This chapter contributes to the compensation literature by providing a preference-
based explanation for employee stock options, and by showing that stock price volatility
is an important, previously neglected, driver of employee stock option grants. This paper
also contributes to the growing body of research on how rms can prot from individual
biases, by suggesting that stock option pay for lower-level employees is used at least in part
4See Lambert and Larcker (2001), Hodge, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2006), Sawers, Wright, and Zamora
(2006), Hallock and Olson (2006), and Devers, Wiseman, and Holmes (2007).
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to take advantage of biased probability assessments.5 Firms may be in a particularly good
position to exploit biased non-executive employees by issuing stock options, since these
employees tend to have no special nancial expertise and since reduction in base salaries
can be accomplished by reducing wage increases, and thus without exposing employees to
perceived losses.
The context of employee stock options is particularly well suited for analyzing the ef-
fects of probability weighting. Employee stock options are asymmetric contracts in which
small probabilities are associated with large gains. Hence, in contrast to analyzing sym-
metric payo¤s, there is a clear prediction for the e¤ect of overweighting small probabilities.
Moreover, employees are prohibited from selling their options, they are only allowed to
exercise them a signicant period of time after the grant date, and there is e¤ectively no
outside market for the 10 year options usually awarded. Hence, in the absence of a mar-
ket price for the options, preferences are likely to matter. Lastly, probability weighting is
particularly relevant in the context of employee stock options because there is no timely,
informative feedback on previous choices which would enable employees to "learn their
way out" of distorting probabilities.6
Probability weighting is a key element of Tversky and Kahnemans (1992) cumulative
prospect theory (CPT), and I use the CPT framework in this chapter. CPT is probably
the most established alternative to expected utility theory and there is a substantial
amount of experimental evidence on preference parameters, which I use in calibrating
the model. Fully-edged prospect theory models that is: models incorporating also the
central feature of probability weighting are still rarely used in economics and nance. A
well known exception is Benartzi and Thaler (1995) who propose a solution to the equity
5For other examples of such contractual arrangements see DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) in the
context of gym contracts and Gabaix and Laibson (2006), who show that exploitation can also survive
in competitive markets.
6For the hypothesis that biases are reduced with experience and timely feedback see Plott (1996). For
some evidence that this is relevant for probability weighting see van de Kuilen (2008).
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premium puzzle based on prospect theory and myopically loss-averse agents. The few
existing papers which explicitly focus on probability weighting include Barberis and Huang
(2008) who show that such preferences can be consistent with the CAPM and explain why
investors may hold underdiversied portfolios and prefer skewness in individual securities.
Polkovnichenko (2005) shows that probability weighting is quantitatively consistent with
observed household investment patterns. To the best of my knowledge, my study is one of
the rst to use a model with prospect theory preferences including probability weighting
in the corporate nance literature.7 It is to my knowledge the rst to apply probability
weighting in the domain of compensation research.
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. The model is developed and solved in
Section 3. Section 4 presents calibrations and derives testable hypotheses on option grant
behavior which are conrmed empirically in a large dataset for U.S. rms in Section
5. The relation between option grants and option exercises is investigated in Section 6.
Section 7 presents arguments why rms may be in a particularly good position to exploit
behavioral biases of employees. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature on stock options for non-executive
employees
A standard argument for the use of stock options for top executives is that they align the
interests of shareholders and managers by providing an incentive for managers to take
actions that maximize shareholder value. In a similar vein, rms might issue options to
incentivize non-executive employees (Core and Guay, 2001, Kedia and Mozumdar, 2002).
A serious caveat with this agency view of equity-based employee compensation is that
7As an illustration, the survey article on behavioral corporate nance by Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler
(2006) does not even contain the term "probability weighting".
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actions of lower-level employees are unlikely to move stock prices at all, let alone sub-
stantially. Stock prices are an uninformative signal of an individual employees e¤ort and
possible free-riding is bound to dwarf any incentive e¤ect of equity-based compensation
for non-executives.8 Incentives will thus play no role in the theoretical model developed in
this chapter. The empirical evidence in this chapter, that stock option grants to employees
are larger for riskier rms is clearly at odds with standard agency-theoretic models.9
Employee stock options could be a way to provide retention incentives, as their value
is high in exactly those states of the world where demand for labor is highest (Oyer,
2004).10 Hence, labor market conditions and industry specic factors may be rst-order
drivers of grant behavior. Oyer and Schaefer (2005) provide some evidence for this view.
However, it is not obvious why risky instruments such as stock options should be the
most e¢ cient mechanism to provide retention incentives to risk-averse employees when
alternatives such as retention bonuses, pension benets as a function of years at the rm
and the possibility of creating level-of-pay paths that benet employees that stay with the
rm, are available alternatives (see Hall and Murphy, 2003, for a more extensive discus-
sion). I incorporate both industry volatility as a measure of labor market competition and
industry xed e¤ects in my empirical analysis below and show that, even after controlling
for these factors, the riskiness of rms still explains a large fraction of the variation of
stock option grants across rms.
Stock options may be used in particular by cash-constrained rms (Yermack, 1995,
Core and Guay, 2001). I include proxies for cash constraints in the empirical part of this
8For related claims on the ine¤ectiveness of incentive provision as a main driver of non-executive
employee compensation, see Hall and Murphy (2003), Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and Bergman and Jenter
(2007).
9For similar results for employee stock options see Oyer and Schaefer (2005). A standard principal-
agent model that predicts less options for riskier rms is, for example, Holmström and Milgrom (1987).
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) provide empirical evidence for this model in the context of CEO stock
option compensation.
10Inderst and Mueller (2007) use a related idea on rm-specic human capital.
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chapter and nd mixed evidence, which is consistent with recent results in the literature
(Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker, 2003, Bergman and Jenter, 2007).
Hall and Murphy (2003) advance the hypothesis that, prior to the new laws on
option expensing which came into e¤ect in 2005, options were perceived by boards as
a cheap way to remunerate employees, since they did not carry an accounting charge.
Analyzing the costs and potential benets of option compensation, Oyer and Schaefer
(2006) conclude that accounting considerations are "not the sole (or even the main) driver
of option grants." Since accounting rules do not di¤er (much) across rms and industries,
the perceived cost hypothesis does not seem to be able to explain why riskier rms grant
more employee stock options.
Options may also be used by some rms to attract employees with the "right mind-
set," which is usually meant to describe more risk-tolerant and optimistic employees. If
optimism leads employees to value their stock options higher than a well-diversied out-
side investor, companies can benet from granting stock options by using the funding
opportunity implicitly provided by the employees. Bergman and Jenter (2007) present
qualitative support by documenting that past stock price performance, which is inter-
preted as a proxy for investor optimism and sentiment, is positively related to employee
stock option grants. On the other hand, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) nd at best limited
support for the quantitative validity of this approach for typical rms in their sample.
Contrary to the model developed in the present chapter and to the empirical ndings pre-
sented below, existing optimism models predict a negative relation between rm volatility
and option grants.11
There is a limited number of empirical studies on factors inuencing the existence or
adoption of broad-based employee stock option plans. For the U.S., using cross-sectional
11This is largely driven by modeling agents with concave utility functions. But even if agents were
risk-neutral, overestimating the mean of future returns does not in itself generate a preference for riskier
rms.
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data for 1998, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) nd that industry volatility is positively related
to broad-based employee stock option grants and that rm volatility is insignicant when
industry volatility is also included as a regressor. Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003),
using survey data from the years 1999 and 2000, document that new economy rms are
particularly likely to grant employee stock options. Krumova and Sesil (2006) nd weak
evidence that broad-based plans are positively associated with sales volatility. Outside
the U.S., Nagaoka (2005) and Jones, Kalmi and Mäkinen (2006) nd some support for a
positive relation between stock price volatility and employee stock option grants in Japan
and Finland, respectively.
The dataset I use in this chapter is considerably larger than the datasets used in
previous studies. Moreover, most of the previous papers have worked only on the basis of
discrete indicators of broad-based stock option plans or used the total number of options
granted to all employees including executives. In this chapter I use rm-specic estimates
of the number of granted employee stock options and exclusively focus on non-executive
employees to rule out any potentially confounding e¤ects in particular incentive e¤ects
which are relevant for executives but not for non-executive employees.
3 The model
3.1 Model set-up
This section presents a simple static model in which a risk-neutral rm makes a take-it-
or-leave-it o¤er of a pay contract, denoted by w; to a representative employee. Contract
negotiations take place in t = 0 and the contract pays o¤ in t = T: The contract is a
function of the time T stock price of the company, denoted by PT :
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Employee preferences. The employee has preferences according to cumulative prospect
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). For continuous probability distributions CPT
preferences imply that an employee evaluates the risky payo¤s from her compensation
contract according to12 ;13
E [v (w (PT ) RP )] =
Z
v (w (PT ) RP ) d (F (PT )) : (1)
Here, F (PT ) is the cumulative distribution function of the stock price PT : The func-
tional in equation (1) combines two separate functions: the "value function" v () and the
"probability weighting function"  ().
The value function is given by
v (w (PT ) RP ) =
8><>: (w (PT ) RP )
 ; if w (PT )  RP
  (  (w (PT ) RP )) ; if w (PT ) < RP
(2)
where 0 <   1; and   1:14 It assigns a value to payo¤s from the pay contract relative
to a reference point RP . If the payo¤ is greater than the reference point, it is called
a "gain", otherwise a "loss." The function is convex over losses and concave over gains,
which captures diminishing sensitivity with respect to outcomes further away from the
reference point. The loss aversion parameter  governs the steepness of the function in
the loss space: If  > 1; then employees dislike losses more than they are attracted by
equal-sized gains.
The probability weighting function transforms cumulative probabilities into decision
12I use the term "value" here instead of the term "utility" to stress the distinction to standard concave
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility.
13See also Barberis and Huang (2008), who use a similar set-up in an asset-pricing context.
14I restrict the slightly more general value function in Tversky and Kahmeman (1992), which uses a
curvature parameter  for the loss space, by setting  = .
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Figure 2.1: The probability weighting function as proposed by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) for di¤erent probability weighting parameters .
weights via the function
 (F (PT )) =
8>><>>:
 (1 F (PT ))
(F (PT )+(1 F (PT )))
1

; if w (PT )  RP
F (PT )

(F (PT )+(1 F (PT )))
1

; if w (PT ) < RP
(3)
where 0:28 <   1 measures the degree of probability weighting.15 ;16 Like the value
function, the probability weighting scheme depends on the sign of w (PT ) RP:
Figure 2.1 shows the probability weighting function over the loss space (lower branch
of equation (3)).17 It is inverse-S-shaped and intersects the 45 degree line from above a
15The lower bound at 0.28 is a technical assumption to keep @ (F (PT ))@PT positive. All experimental
evidence suggests that  is substantially above 0.28. For a more detailed discussion see Ingersoll (2008).
16I do not use di¤erent values of  for gains and losses to keep the exposition of the model tractable.
For a similar approach in the behavioral nance context see Barberis and Huang (2008).
17I only show the loss-part of the function. The intuition presented carries over straightforwardly to
the gain-part as well.
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functional form which has been shown to be empirically relevant in various studies.18 The
lower the weighting parameter , the more will small probabilities be overweighted and
medium to large probabilities underweighted. For  = 1, which is the benchmark case of
no probability weighting, the weighting function approaches the 45 degree line.19
The cost of granting stock options. I assume that there exist externalities from
granting stock options such that the total cost to the rm exceeds the price of the option
to an outside investor and that these external costs from granting options increase with
the size of the grant. There are at least three justications for this assumption.
First, rms engage in repurchases of shares in the open market to fund option exer-
cises, and to counter the impact of stock option exercises on diluted earnings per share
(Kahle, 2002, Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong, 2003). If stock option grants get large,
rms have to repurchase a large number of shares, which gets increasingly di¢ cult and
costly.
Second, there is an ownership issue associated with large employee stock option
grants. For example, Intels CEO Craig Barrett states in a ling to the SEC that: "Intel
stockholders are concerned about their ownership in the company being reduced or
diluted by our stock option program. If we dont take some measured action, the
stockholders will not support our option plan."20 By assuming externalities from granting
stock options I make the assumption that these "measured actions" are costly.
18For example Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Gonzales and Wu (1999), Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000),
and Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber (2005).
19Figure 2.1 shows that the point of intersection of the weighting function with the 45 degree line
shifts with : Thus, strictly speaking, the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) function mixes the logically
distinct features of elevation of the weighting function and the curvature of the function. Prelec (1998)
has proposed a weighting function which is axiomatically founded and which produces a xed intersection
point at 1=e (one-parameter form) and which thus separates the elevation e¤ect from the curvature e¤ect.
Empirically, however, for typical parameter values the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Prelec (1998)
functions are almost indistinguishable. I have recalculated all results presented with the Prelec (1998)
function. All results presented continue to hold qualitatively and quantitatively when the Prelec (1998)
function is used with the best t for  = 0:7 (one-parameter specication).
20Available as part of a ling with the SEC at: http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.12dJc.htm.
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Third, if a large part of employee pay is tied to stock options, underwater options
may foster employee discontent and thus impair rm productivity. There is evidence that
employees regard large wage reductions brought about by low payo¤s from variable pay
components like stock options as breach of an implicit agreement of mutual trust between
company and employee, and that employees partly blame the company for their losses
(Bewley, 1999). Employees may reciprocate in a variety of ways such as not putting in
extra e¤ort, spreading rumors, lowering morale of fellow workers, or even committing
sabotage (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). All this lowers rm productivity. Ex post, taking
costly measures to keep morale up, for example bailing out underwater options, may be
necessary. I assume that the rm will already anticipate this cost ex ante when designing
a stock option program.21
The problem of the rm. The problem of the rm is to o¤er a compensation contract
w such that the cost to the rm is minimized while providing the employee at least with
her reservation value. The pay contract w consists of a xed salary  and no options with
maturity T and strike price K on the company stock with random stock price PT :
w (PT ) = + nomax (PT  K; 0) :
The rm wants to minimize compensation costs subject to the standard participation
constraint of the employee and thus o¤ers the combination of salary and options to the
21This argument is likely to a¤ect larger companies more: e¤ective pay reductions are correlated among
the rms workers and larger rms cannot easily substitute a large number of discontent or disappointed
workers in the labor market because labor supply is likely limited in most industries. My empirical results
will show that this reasoning is consistent with the data: smaller rms grant more options per employee.
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employee that solves:
min
no;
E[+ nomax (PT  K; 0)] + c (no)
s:t: E [v (w (PT ) RP )]  v
 
V  RP
no  0:
(4)
Here E is the standard expectation operator, and E are expectations with respect to
the weighted probabilities according to equation (1).22 V denotes the outside opportunity
of the employee.23 I assume that employees cannot write options on the rm and hence
no  0: Externalities from granting stock options are captured by a standard increasing
and convex cost function c (no) with c (0) = 0:
Reference point. We need to make an assumption about the reference point RP of the
employee. Unfortunately, prospect theory is largely silent on this parameter, and while
the status quo has often been used in simple settings, Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
themselves note that "[...] there are situations in which gains and losses are coded relative
to an expectation or aspiration level that di¤ers from the status quo." In the absence of
clear guidance from previous research, I make the following general assumption:
22The interest rate is set to zero in this section to simplify notation but it is included in the numerical
work below.
23For tractability, V is assumed to be independent of the proposed contract. This is defendable if V is
determined some time before the actual contract negotiations and thus predetermined. Alternatively V
can be taken to be a pure cash payment. In reality, it seems plausible that employees get an idea about
competitive salaries in cash equivalents from statements like: "Typically employees in industry X (and
position Y etc.) can expect to get a pay package worth V dollars."
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Assumption 1. The reference point RP, over a pay-package of no options and a xed
salary of  is linear in no and  and has the functional form:
RP = no + ; (5)
where  is a constant with   0:
Assumption 1 is intuitive:  represents any payo¤ expectation or aspiration level
the employee holds for one option. This could be, for example, the Black-Scholes value,
or the intrinsic option value for her best-guess future stock price. Since she gets no of
these options, no represents the expectations on the risky part of the portfolio. Since
the xed wage  is non-random, it is simply added to any expectation the employee
holds on the risky part of the pay package. Consider, for example, an employee who
receives 10,000 options and $200,000 base salary over a planning horizon of four years.
She anticipates that her options pay o¤ $5 per option in T: Hence her reference point is
10; 000 $5 + $200; 000 = $250; 000:
There is also empirical support for Assumption 1. Hodge, Rajgopal, and Shevlin
(2006) conduct a survey among 77 current mid-level managers and 111 future entry-
level managers to analyze how employees value their stock options. Their results provide
evidence that employees use simple heuristics, like subtracting the strike price from the
best guess of the future stock price, as a basis for attaching a value to options. Such a
reference point is a special case of Assumption 1, and I will use it as a candidate reference
point in the calibrations in the next section.
3.2 Theoretical results
The model from the previous section admits an intuitive solution, which is summarized
in the following proposition. I prove it in the appendix.
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Proposition 1. The optimal contract (; no) from program (4) and a reference point of
the form (5) is given by
(i) no = 0 and 
 = V ;
if CE  E[max (PT  K; 0)]; and
(ii) c0 (no) = CE   E[max (PT  K; 0)] and  = V   noCE;
if CE > E[max (PT  K; 0)]: The certainty equivalent the employee holds for one stock
option, denoted by CE; is implicitly dened as
E [v (max (PT  K; 0)  )] = v (CE   ) :
Proposition 1 states that rms grant stock options to non-executive employees if
and only if the certainty equivalent of the employee for options exceeds the value of
the options to an outside investor. Under risk-neutral valuation this value is the Black-
Scholes value of the option. If the certainty equivalent of an option is lower, the company
is better o¤ paying the reservation wage in cash and not issuing options at all (Part (i)).
Part (ii) shows that employee stock option plans are driven by employees who, in line
with recent survey and empirical evidence, subjectively value options higher than outside
investors.24 Firms can exploit the biased probability assessments by replacing xed salary
worth noCE by stock options which are worth less, n

oE[max (PT  K; 0)], to an unbiased
investor. Hence, lower-level employees in companies with broad-based employee stock
option plans essentially allow rms to lower their overall personnel cost. It follows from
Part (ii) that the predicted number of granted stock options increases with the di¤erence
in option value to employees and to outside investors, and that rms will grant options
24See references in the Introduction.
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as long as the benet from granting options exceeds option-related negative externalities
captured by the cost function c (no). The cost function thus a¤ects how much options
are granted. For the existence of stock option plans, which depends only on the sign of
CE   E[max (PT  K; 0)]; the cost function is irrelevant.
Proposition 1 is stated in terms of one single option only. By virtue of the power form
of the value function and the linear specication of the reference point, a scale invariance
result applies (shown in the appendix). In analyzing the implications from the model,
it is thus su¢ cient to look at the value of one single stock option for employees and
outside investors, respectively. In addition, both, the optimal number of options granted,
and the existence of stock option plans, are not dependent on the outside option V :
These properties are extremely convenient for calibrating the model and for numerically
developing the predictive content of Proposition 1 in the next section.
A direct implication of the modeling assumptions as reected in Proposition 1 is
that employee stock option grants are only limited by the rms willingness to supply
more options.25 This is consistent with anecdotal evidence of employees "clamoring" for
stock options during the internet boom (Hall and Murphy, 2003) and with Bergman and
Jenter (2007) who propose that equity compensation of employees is driven by "exuberant
employees who demand to be paid in options".26 ;27
25Direct empirical evidence on this conjecture is scarce. The closest empirical nding to my knowledge
is Sautner and Weber (2005). They analyze the behavior in an employee stock option plan of 70 high-
ranking employees of a large German company between 2003 and 2004. They nd that the median
individual demands 100% of the options she is eligible to consistent with the conjecture that option
grants are limited by rmssupply.
26Bergman and Jenter (2007), p.672 (emphasis added).
27It is possible to model explicitly the unwillingness of employees to hold a very large number of options
or similarly the unwillingness to accept pay cuts by altering the preferences or constraints imposed on
the employee. Examples in the literature include augmenting the value function by a term which makes
marginal utility decline as employee wealth gets su¢ ciently small (Gomes, 2005) or augmenting a standard
concave utility function with a loss-aversion term (Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001). However, this
would make the model less tractable and less focused, without altering anything substantial.
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4 Calibration of the model
Proposition 1 predicts stock options for non-executive employees whenever the certainty
equivalent for employees exceeds the value of the options to an outside investor. An ad-
vantage of modeling the underlying preferences explicitly is that it allows me to calibrate
the model and investigate whether it predicts options under reasonable assumptions about
preference parameters and rm characteristics. Because the experimental literature pro-
vides some guidance on values to parameterize CPT preferences, the calibration exercise
below is a comparatively strict test of the validity of the model. Moreover, I can derive
hypotheses on which rms are likely to grant options to non-executive employees.
4.1 Parameterizing the model
I calibrate the model by calculating, for di¤erent combinations of rm volatility and
probability weighting, the ratio of the certainty equivalent of one option for an employee,
to the value of the option for an outside investor. For the stock price PT ; I assume a
lognormal distribution, which depends on the risk-free rate of interest r; the length of the
period T; rm volatility  and a standard normally distributed random variable u:28 ;29
PT = P0 exp

r   
2
2

T + u
p
T

:
I set r to 5% and T to 4 years:30 Setting T to 4 years is motivated by the observation
that most employees exercise most of their options shortly after they become exercisable
28The median dividend yield in the sample of companies analyzed below is 0.25%. I thus set dividend
yields to zero in what follows. Incorporating sensible dividend yields would be straightforward and does
not alter the main results.
29Following Dittmann and Maug (2007), I assume risk-neutral pricing throughout. This ensures that
if the preferences of the employee approach risk-neutrality ( = 1; RP = 0 or  =  = 1 and  = 1) the
certainty equivalent of one option approaches the Black-Scholes value. This implies that all risk in the
model is rm specic.
30These values for r and T are also used by Oyer and Schaefer (2005, 2006). Setting T = 7 does not
alter the main results presented here.
34
(Huddard and Lang, 1996). In addition, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that in evalu-
ating equity portfolios, individuals routinely use a one year horizon. Since employee stock
options cannot be exercised in the vesting period, it seems natural to assume that the
evaluation period is extended until options become exercisable.31 The strike price of the
option, K; is equal to the grant date stock price, P0: In this set-up, the value of one option
to an outside investor is equal to the Black-Scholes value.
To parameterize the value function, I set the curvature parameter  and the coe¢ cient
of loss aversion  to the standard values of 0.88 and 2.25, respectively. As indicated above,
there is to date little research on how people set reference points for complex distributions
like payo¤s from stock options. I propose two candidate reference points, which are special
cases of Assumption 1. The rst assumes a simplied intrinsic option value calculation
and is based on interview evidence reported by Hodge, Rajogopal, and Shevlin (2006).
This approach suggests the reference point to be the expected future stock price less the
strike price of the option. To focus on the impact of probability weighting, I assume that
the stock price expectation of the employee is equal to the statistical expectation. As an
alternative reference point I also consider the Black-Scholes option value with maturity
equal to T .
The remaining two parameters are the volatility of the rms stock price and the
degree of probability weighting, which is captured by the parameter  in the weighting
function. Table 2.1 presents experimental results on the value of the weighting parameter
. These estimates are relatively homogenous and suggest that values at about  = 0:65
are plausible.32 I analyze the t of the model for a grid of values for  which encompasses
31Other common vesting schedules which stipulate the right to exercise a maximum of 25% of the
options per annum over the rst four years of the options life are thus assumed here to be evaluated as if
all of options would become exercisable at T = 4: A more complex model with di¤erent time periods would
have to specify an aggregation rule across time. It is thus doubtful that this would be an improvement
over the current tractable model.
32In a large study on individual decision making, Gonzales and Wu (1999) document that there is
considerable heterogeneity in probability weighting across individuals. They conclude, however, that
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Table 2.1: Estimates of the parameter  in the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability
weighting function.
Study Parameter estimate
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) δ = 0.61 (gains), δ = 0.69 (losses)
Camerer and Ho (1994) δ = 0.56 (gains)
Wu and Gonzales (1996) δ = 0.71 (gains)
Abdellaoui (2000) δ = 0.60 (gains), δ = 0.70 (losses)
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) δ = 0.67 (gains)
the most plausible values, as well as the case of no probability weighting,  = 1: I also use
a grid for the volatility of the rm.
4.2 Calibration results
It is the key idea of this paper that overweighting small probabilities of large gains makes
options attractive. Thus, for a given degree of probability weighting, we would expect
higher evaluations of options if the underlying stock price distribution is more skewed,
which is captured by rm volatility given our lognormal distributional assumption. Like-
wise, for a given level of rm volatility, we would expect option valuations to increase in
the degree of probability weighting.
Table 2.2 shows the ratio of certainty equivalent to Black-Scholes value for a reference
point equal to the Black-Scholes value (Panel A) and for the simplied intrinsic value
calculation (Panel B). The certainty equivalent is calculated according to the denition
in Proposition 1. In both panels, the results conrm the intuition: the more individuals
overweight small probabilities (captured by ) and the more small chances of large gains
there are (captured by rm volatility), the more attractive options become. For all but
the highest values of ; the ratio of certainty equivalent to Black-Scholes value increases
the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) weighting function "...provide[s] an excellent, parsimonious t to the
median data."
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Table 2.2: Calibration results. The table shows the ratio of certainty equivalent and
Black-Scholes value for one option for di¤erent combinations of probability weighting and
rm volatility. The model predicts employee stock option plans if this ratio exceeds one
(shaded elds in the table). The calculations assume a lognormal stock price distribution
with T = 4 years and r = 5%. The strike price of the option K is set equal to the grant
date stock price P0. Preference parameters are  = 0.88 and  = 2.25.
20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 80%
0.40 1.37 1.62 1.91 2.27 2.70 3.24 3.90 5.73 8.57 12.98
0.50 1.10 1.24 1.40 1.58 1.80 2.05 2.35 3.12 4.20 5.73
0.60 0.89 0.96 1.03 1.12 1.22 1.33 1.46 1.77 2.19 2.73
0.63 0.85 0.90 0.96 1.03 1.11 1.20 1.30 1.55 1.86 2.28
0.65 0.82 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.01 1.08 1.16 1.35 1.59 1.90
0.68 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.93 0.98 1.04 1.18 1.36 1.59
0.70 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.89 0.93 1.03 1.17 1.33
0.75 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.87 0.94
0.80 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.77
0.90 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.60
1.00 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.50 0.47
20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 80%
0.40 1.35 1.60 1.90 2.27 2.72 3.27 3.95 5.83 8.73 13.22
0.50 1.10 1.26 1.45 1.66 1.91 2.19 2.53 3.36 4.52 6.13
0.60 0.90 1.00 1.11 1.24 1.37 1.53 1.69 2.09 2.58 3.20
0.63 0.86 0.95 1.04 1.15 1.27 1.40 1.54 1.87 2.26 2.76
0.65 0.83 0.90 0.98 1.07 1.17 1.28 1.40 1.67 2.00 2.39
0.68 0.79 0.85 0.92 1.00 1.09 1.18 1.28 1.50 1.76 2.07
0.70 0.76 0.81 0.87 0.93 1.01 1.08 1.17 1.35 1.56 1.80
0.75 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.82 0.87 0.92 0.98 1.10 1.23 1.38
0.80 0.70 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.90 0.97 1.06
0.90 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.63
1.00 0.64 0.58 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.38
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 w
ei
gh
tin
g
(δ
 =
 1
 im
pl
ie
s n
o 
we
ig
ht
in
g)
Panel A: Ratio of certainty equivalent to Black-Scholes value for one option when the reference point equals the
Black-Scholes value.
Firm volatility
Firm volatility
Panel B: Ratio of certainty equivalent to Black-Scholes value for one option when the reference point equals the
expected intrinsic value P 0 e
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at an increasing rate in the rm volatility, which, by Proposition 1 implies more options
at high-volatility rms, as long as the ratio is greater than 1.
In Panel A, for  = 0:65; if the reference point equals the Black-Scholes value, no
options are predicted for rms with stock price volatility less than 40%. In Panel B, when
the reference point is based on the expected intrinsic value, the predicted volatility cut-o¤
is only slightly lower. There is nothing in the model that would ex ante guarantee that
it can produce any quantitatively reasonable prediction as to which rms should grant
options. Its ability to produce such predictions which can be directly tested on the data
is a clear strength. A cut-o¤ level of about 40% is what I nd in analyzing the universe
of ExecuComp rms below.
For all specications considered, the importance of probability weighting is striking.
Without it ( = 1); the certainty equivalent is never high enough for the model to predict
options, irrespective of rm volatility. To understand this, note that if the employee
were risk neutral, her certainty equivalent would equal the Black-Scholes value. Hence,
the values for  = 1 in Table 2.2 show that without probability weighting the employee
is e¤ectively risk averse, despite the convex part in the value function over losses. As
a consequence, the relation between volatility and stock options reverses: if there is no
probability weighting, the scaled certainty equivalent decreases in rm volatility, just as
standard concave utility models would predict. I will show in the next section that this is
actually counterfactual, which further strengthens the case for the probability weighting
model.
The argument presented so far implies that the bias of overweighting small probabil-
ities can be exploited by rms. To get an idea of the magnitude of this benet in dollar
terms, assume a typical company with 20,000 non-executive employees, which grants op-
tions with a Black-Scholes value of $5,000 per employee annually.33 For  = 0:65 and rm
33These values are the mean values for rms in the ExecuComp universe over the years 1992 to 2005
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volatility of 40% the value by which reduced base salaries exceed the Black-Scholes cost of
options can be calculated from Panel A of Table 2.2 to be $1 million.34 For the reference
point in Panel B, benets are slightly higher ($17 million). Hence, for typical rms, bene-
ts from options are small, although maybe sizeable enough to cover for expenses related
with setting up and administering a broad-based plan. This changes quickly for rms
with higher stock price volatility. A rm with volatility of 60% can reduce base salaries
by about $50 million more than what it grants to employees in Black-Scholes value. For
the largest granters of employee stock options, this value-cost di¤erential can become
enormous. Over the last decade, a company like Cisco has roughly granted per annum on
average $50,000 worth of options per employee for 20,000 employees at a rm volatility
of 50%. Depending on the reference point this implies a value-cost gap of between $160
and $400 million per year. To be sure, these are back-of-the-envelope calculations and
have to be treated as such. They suggest clearly, however, that individual biases can have
important economic consequences.
4.3 Hypotheses
The results in Table 2.2 deliver testable predictions regarding employee stock option plans.
I summarize these predictions in the following three hypotheses, under the maintained
assumption that employees are subject to probability weighting.
Hypothesis 1. Firms are more likely to have a broad-based stock option plan in place if
the volatility of their stock price is high.
as shown in Table 2.3.
34This is calculated as
20; 000 $5; 000

CE
BS
  1

:
This calculation disregards externalities from granting options because I have no good way of specifying
the cost function. The benets reported are thus upper bounds for the net "prot" from granting options
to employees.
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Hypothesis 2. If a rm has a broad-based employee stock option plan, then per employee
stock option grants are higher for higher volatility rms.
Hypothesis 3. If a rm has a broad-based employee stock option plan, then per employee
stock option grants increase at an increasing rate with rm volatility.
I test these hypotheses on the universe of ExecuComp rms in the next section.
5 Empirical tests of the model
5.1 Dataset
Firms do not have to disclose details about their stock option programs to non-executive
employees, which poses a challenge for empirical research in the eld. Following Desai
(2003) and Bergman and Jenter (2007) I estimate the number of options granted to non-
executive employees based on the ExecuComp variable "pcttotopt", which provides for
each executive option grant the percentage this grant represents of the total number of
options granted to all employees of the rm in the scal year. I average the estimates
for all executives in one rm-year and eliminate outliers by dropping all rm-years for
which the standard deviation of the estimates is greater than 10% of the mean. The total
number of options granted by the rm in a given scal year thus derived is denoted by
ntotalo :
Some papers have used what I label a "broad" denition of employees (Core and Guay,
2001, Bergman and Jenter, 2007). Under this broad denition, all individuals employed
by the company, except for the top executives reported in ExecuComp, are counted as
employees.35 For typical companies, employees dened in such a way almost certainly
35The median company reports equity compensation for the top 5 executives (min: 1, max: 9).
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include a number of employees for which incentive motives for equity compensation cannot
be dismissed easily (I call them "high executives"). As I want to focus exclusively on non-
executive employees for which incentive considerations are negligible, I essentially follow
Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and use what I label a "narrow" denition of employees, which
requires an additional assumption about how far options are spread into the organization.
I assume that the number of executives increases for larger rms at a decreasing rate and I
take the square root of the total number of employees as an estimate of the number of high
and top executives in the rm. Hence, a company with 100 employees has an estimated 10
executives for which options could have an incentive e¤ect, whereas for a company with
10.000 employees this is the case for 100 executives.36 To be able to quantify the number
of options to high executives I further assume, following Oyer and Schaefer (2005), that
10% of the average number of options to the top executives in the ExecuComp database
excluding the CEO is awarded to the average high executive not listed in the ExecuComp
database.37 The number of options to top executives can be obtained from ExecuComp
directly by summing over individual grants in the rm-year. The number of options to
non-executive employees is then calculated by subtracting the number of options to top
executives and the number of options to high executives from the total number of options.
I dene a variable ESOplan which indicates whether there exists a broad-based em-
ployee stock option plan for a given rm-year. ESOplan is 1 if the number of non-executive
employee stock options is positive and greater than 0.5% of the number of shares out-
standing, and zero otherwise.
My initial sample consists of all companies in the ExecuComp database for the years
36Oyer and Schaefer (2005) use an estimate of the number of executives within a rm which is linear
in the total number of employees. Since the total number of employees in my sample is much more
dispersed, this linear estimate is likely to overstate the number of executives in large rms. For a large
rm with 100,000 employees, the original Oyer and Schaefer (2005) estimate of high executives would be
10,000, whereas under the approach taken here, the estimate of high executives is 316. All results are
qualitatively unchanged when using the linear estimate.
37All results continue to hold if this percentage is set to 5% or 20%.
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1992 to 2005. All balance sheet data is taken from Compustat. I drop all companies with
less than 40 employees or less than two reported executives, and winsorize rm volatility
(calculated by ExecuComp based on 60 month prior stock returns), the dividend yield, and
Tobins Q (calculated as book assets minus book equity plus market value of equity all over
assets) at the 1% and the 99% level. I further drop all companies in the nancial sector
(SIC codes 6000 to 6999) and all company-years where one of the relevant parameters
for the baseline specication (Table 2.5) was missing. The resulting dataset has in total
15,005 rm-years for 2,238 unique rms. Options to non-executives were granted in 8,670
rm-years. For Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, Black-Scholes values are calculated based on the
average of the grant date stock price reported in ExecuComp for all grants in a given
rm-year. Option maturity and risk-free rate of interest are uniformly set to 7 years
and 5%, respectively. Since my analysis is based on the number of options and not their
Black-Scholes value, these assumptions are not substantial for what follows.
Table 2.3 shows descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. The median rm has
5,175 employees, a market capitalization of $1.02 billion and sales of $1.09 billion (Panel
A). Median (mean) rm volatility is 39.0 (44.4)% and Tobins Q is 1.60 (2.10). Panel B
shows stock option plan characteristics. The majority of companies (57.8%) have a broad-
based employee stock option plan in place and, for the median rm, 44.7 (74.0)% of all
options granted go to employees if employee is narrowly (broadly) dened.38 In each scal
year, companies in the sample grant options on 1.9% to 3.2% of their shares outstand-
ing. For the typical company, the Black-Scholes value of option grants to non-executive
employees is modest, with a median per employee value of $155. Again, the distributions
are highly skewed and the per employee mean value at $5,793 is substantially higher.39
38Hall and Murphy (2000) report that 45% of U.S. rms grant options to their exempt salaried em-
ployees in 1998. This lends some additional credibility to the estimate of 44.7% employed here using the
narrow employee denition.
39Note, however, that there is a downward bias in these numbers if not all employees but only a subset
of them receive options.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics. Original dataset includes all rms with more than 40
employees listed in ExecuComp over the period from 1992 to 2005. All inputs are based
on ExecuComp and Compustat data. Firms in the nancial sector are excluded (SIC
codes 6000 to 6999). Also excluded are rm-years for which any relevant items were
missing. Employees are dened "broadly" as all employees of the rm except those listed
in ExecuComp. Employees are dened "narrowly" by correcting the total number of
employees by the executives listed in ExecuComp and other high ranking executives. The
correction is based on estimating the total number of executives in a rm by taking the
square root of the total number of employees. Black-Scholes values are calculated based
on the average of the grant date stock price reported in ExecuComp for all grants in a
given rm-year. Maturity of the options and risk-free rate of interest is uniformly set to
7 years and 5%, respectively.
Time period
Number of firms
Number of firm-year observations
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Panel A: Firm characteristics
Number of employees 19,087 5,175 54,885
Market value of equity (millions) $4,050 $1,020 $12,000
Sales (millions) $5,510 $1,090 $18,900
Firm volatility 44.4% 39.0% 21.4%
Tobin's Q 2.10 1.60 1.48
Total return 1 year 20.5% 11.2% 58.8%
Total return 3 years 13.2% 10.8% 28.0%
Total return 5 years 11.9% 10.9% 19.6%
Dividend yield 1.2% 0.2% 1.6%
Cash flowt-1 / Assetst-2 10.6% 10.9% 12.7%
Cash dividendst-1 / Assetst-2 1.3% 0.4% 1.9%
Cash balancest-1 / Assetst-2 18.5% 6.6% 29.5%
Leveraget-1 32.8% 32.5% 25.8%
Panel B: Stock option plan characteristics
Total granted options to shares outstanding 3.2% 1.9% 16.7%
Percentage of firms with ESO plan 57.8% 100.0% 49.4%
Percent of options to CEO 14.1% 10.9% 11.8%
Percent of options to other reported executives 15.6% 13.4% 10.6%
Percent of options to employees (broad definition) 70.3% 74.0% 19.1%
Percent of options to employees (narrow definition) 42.2% 44.7% 28.6%
BS-value of options to CEO $1,740,182 $548,521 $7,046,374
Per capita BS-value to other reported executives $503,492 $185,059 $1,395,249
Per employee BS-value to employees (broad definition) $6,351 $534 $50,077
Per employee BS-value to employees (narrow definition) $5,793 $155 $50,206
15,004
2,238
1992 - 2005
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For some companies, stock option grants to non-executive employees are anything but
modest. For example, one of the largest granters of employee stock options in the sample,
Cisco, is estimated to grant options worth on average about $50,000 per employee, with
a total annual value of option grants to non-executive employees in excess of $1 billion.
5.2 Empirical results
According to Hypotheses 1 to 3, the model predicts that employee stock option plans are
more common among high volatility rms, that higher volatility rms grant more options
per employee and that per employee stock option grants increase at an increasing rate.
Sorting rms into volatility quintiles strongly conrms all these predictions (Table
2.4). The median rm in the two lowest volatility quintiles does not have a broad-based
plan, while the median rm in quintiles 3 to 5 does. Firm volatility of the median rm
in quintile 3 is 39.0% and thus surprisingly close to the cut-o¤ levels predicted by the
calibration results for plausible degrees of probability weighting in Table 2.2. Moving
to quintiles with higher volatility, the average per employee Black-Scholes options value
increases monotonically and at an increasing rate from $255 in the bottom quintile to
$19,472 in the top quintile. The number of options per employee increases likewise. If I
do not correct for other high executives and use the broad denition of employees, I nd
the same monotonic relation between rm volatility, per employee Black-Scholes value
and number of options, which shows that the results are not an artefact of introducing a
narrow employee denition. The proportion of rms with broad-based plan increases at
an increasing rate from 36.1% to 82.0%. The di¤erences between means (and medians)
of the distribution of the ESOplan variable between adjacent quintiles are all statistically
signicant at the 1% level.
Note that the increase in per employee Black-Scholes value is not mechanically caused
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Table 2.4: Employee stock options grants sorted by rm volatility. Original dataset
includes all rms with more than 40 employees listed in ExecuComp over the period from
1992 to 2005. All inputs are based on ExecuComp and Compustat data. Firms in the
nancial sector are excluded (SIC codes 6000 to 6999). Also excluded are rm-years for
which any relevant items were missing. Employees are dened "broadly" as all employees
of the rm except those listed in ExecuComp. Employees are dened "narrowly" by
correcting the total number of employees by the executives listed in ExecuComp and
other high ranking executives. The correction is based on estimating the total number of
executives in a rm by taking the square root of the total number of employees. Black-
Scholes values are calculated based on the average of the grant date stock price reported
in ExecuComp for all grants in a given rm-year. Maturity of the options and risk-free
rate of interest is uniformly set to 7 years and 5%, respectively.
Firm Firm Percentage T-test Sales Tobin's
volatility Volatility of firms with for equality with (million) Q
quintile ESO plan previous quintile BS-value nO BS-value nO
[P-value]
1 21.8% 36.1% [-] $255 57 $425 103 $7,600 1.87
2 30.9% 47.1% 0.00 $646 97 $959 147 $5,650 1.88
3 39.3% 55.2% 0.00 $2,136 260 $2,599 325 $3,680 2.01
4 51.2% 68.8% 0.00 $6,579 751 $7,310 847 $2,130 2.23
5 79.2% 82.0% 0.00 $19,472 3,188 $20,591 3,353 $1,140 2.53
Firm Firm ESO plan Wilcoxon rank-sum Sales Tobin's
volatility Volatility at median test for equality with (million) Q
quintile firm in previous quintile BS-value nO BS-value nO
quintile [P-value]
1 22.1% no [-] $0 0 $138 48 $2,790 1.55
2 30.8% no 0.00 $0 0 $298 58 $1,580 1.53
3 39.0% yes 0.00 $97 23 $487 81 $1,020 1.53
4 50.8% yes 0.00 $652 107 $1,230 194 $619 1.67
5 74.5% yes 0.00 $4,633 750 $5,461 926 $325 1.82
Mean
Median
Broad definition:
Per employee: Per employee:
Broad definition:
Per employee
Narrow definition:
Narrow definition:
Per employee
by using higher volatilities in the Black-Scholes formula, because together with the Black-
Scholes value, the number of options per employee increases with the volatility quintiles.
This is not easily reconciled with any standard concave utility model. In such a model,
higher volatility would decrease the value of options to the employee since she has to be
compensated for bearing additional risk. As a consequence, it would likely be optimal for
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the rm to substitute some of the options with cash. This would inconsistent with the
data presented here lead to fewer options, not more.40
Table 2.4 shows also that high volatility rms are smaller, have a higher Tobins
Q and compensate their employees more often with stock options. This is in line with
anecdotal evidence that many high-tech and new-economy rms were using stock options
heavily in the dot.com era.
These insights carry over also to the multivariate case. The rst set of regressions I
run are OLS regressions on the subsample of rms with broad-based employee stock option
plans in place according to the ESOplan variable. (Potential concerns about selection bias
are addressed in section 5.3.) I estimate various specications of the regression equation
ln (1 + no;ikt) = +   ikt +   Xikt + t + k + i + "ikt;
which predicts the log of the number of options per non-executive employee in rm i,
in industry k at time t.41 For each rm-year, rm volatility is denoted by ikt and Xikt
is a vector of controls, which includes at least the log of sales to proxy for rm size
and Tobins Q to control for investment opportunities in all regressions. All else equal,
rms with lower stock prices have to grant more options to grant an option package with
the same Black-Scholes value. I thus use the log of the average grant-date stock prices
reported in ExecuComp for all grants in a respective rm-year as an additional control.
t is a year dummy, k is an industry dummy based on the rms three digit SIC code
and i is a xed or, depending on the specication, random rm e¤ect. All regressions
use robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the rm level.
40See for example Holmström and Milgrom (1987).
41I have also run the regressions using the log of per employee Black-Scholes value as dependent variable.
The results remain basically unchanged and, if anything, get even stronger. Hence, riskier companies grant
more options both on a per-employee-number-of-options basis and on a per-employee-Black-Scholes-value
basis.
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Table 2.5: Regressions of the log of the number of employee stock options on rm volatility
and control variables. Dataset is based on all rms with more than 40 employees listed in
ExecuComp over the period from 1992 to 2005. Regressions consider only the subsample
of rms with employee stock option plan. Firm volatility is the 60 month stock price
volatility reported by ExecuComp. Log of grant-date stock price is the log of the average
grant-date stock prices reported in ExecuComp for all grants to reported executives in
a given rm-year. Industry dummies are based on the three digit SIC code. Robust
standard errors with clustering at the rm level are reported in parentheses. Number of
observations: 8,669.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm volatility 2.88 *** 1.84 *** 1.01 *** 0.56 ***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13)
Volatility quintile 1 - -
Volatility quintile 2 0.12 ** 0.06 *
(0.05) (0.04)
Volatility quintile 3 0.25 *** 0.10 **
(0.06) (0.05)
Volatility quintile 4 0.51 *** 0.19 ***
(0.07) (0.06)
Volatility quintile 5 0.97 *** 0.32 ***
(0.08) (0.07)
Log of grant-date stock price -0.13 *** -0.30 *** -0.28 *** -0.29 *** -0.35 *** -0.30 ***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Log of sales -0.27 *** -0.22 *** -0.24 *** -0.19 *** -0.23 *** -0.19 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Tobin's Q 0.28 *** 0.24 *** 0.10 *** 0.07 *** 0.25 *** 0.07 ***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm random effects Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Adjusted) R2 0.484 0.689 0.672 0.219 0.684 0.219
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Dependent variable:
Log of employee stock options per employee for firms with ESO plan
Results are presented in Table 2.5. All coe¢ cients have the expected signs and
are highly statistically signicant. The impact of rm volatility on option grants is also
economically signicant: increasing rm volatility by one standard deviation increases the
number of options granted per non-executive employee by about 40% when controlling for
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year and industry e¤ects (three digit SIC code). The positive relation between volatility
and options is weaker, but still highly signicant in specications with random and xed
e¤ects (specications (3) and (4)). Specications (5) and (6) replace rm volatility by
rm volatility quintiles. As predicted, employee stock options increase at an increasing
rate and the e¤ect of moving from quintile four to quintile ve is almost as large as moving
from quintile one to quintile four.
To make sure my results are robust, I include additional control variables that have
been shown to be related to employee stock option grants. I include total returns to
shareholders over one, three and ve rm-years as reported by ExecuComp. I also include
a dummy for new economy rms (SIC codes 3570-3579, 3661, 3674, 5045, 5961 and 7370-
7379), since there is evidence that options are used to a larger extent in new economy
rms (Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker, 2003). Following Oyer and Schaefer (2005), I use the
average volatility of rms in the same three digit SIC industry, weighted by rm assets,
as a proxy for labor market conditions. I also include the three year average dividend
yield as reported in ExecuComp. I control for cash constraints by including cash ow
(Compustat data items 14 + 18), cash dividends (data items 19 + 21), cash balances
(data item 1), all over lagged assets, and leverage ((data items 9 + 34) / (data items 9 +
34 + 216)).42 All of these controls for cash constraints are winsorized at the 1% and 99%
level.43
Table 2.6 shows that the results for rm volatility are qualitatively unchanged when
adding these additional controls. There is strong support for higher option grants in new
42These are the constituents of a measure of cash constraints based on work by Kaplan and Zingales
(1997), Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requiejo (2001) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) which is also used
in Bergman and Jenter (2007). Using the Kaplan-Zingales-index instead of the constituents leaves all
main results unchanged.
43I have also used cash ow and capital expenditure over lagged assets (as in Oyer and Schaefer,
2005), as well as interest burden and cash ow shortfall (as in Core and Guay, 2001) as measures of cash
constraints. Results concerning the inuence of cash constraints on option grants are weaker under these
measures, while the main results relating to rm volatility remain basically unchanged.
48
Table 2.6: Regressions of the log of the number of employee stock options on rm volatility
and enlarged set of control variables. Total returns to shareholders include the monthly
reinvestment of dividends and are based on the scal year. Some observations are lost
because "Total return 5 years" is not available. New economy rms are rms in industries
with SIC codes 3570-3579, 3661, 3674, 5045, 5961 and 7370-7379. Dividend yield is a three
year average. Industry volatility is calculated based on the average rm volatilities for
rms within the same three digit SIC industry, weighted by rm assets. Cash ow, cash
dividends and cash balances are scaled by lagged assets. All other variables as in Table
2.5. Industry dummies are based on the three digit SIC code. Robust standard errors
with clustering at the rm level are reported in parentheses. All regressions include year
dummies. Number of observations: 7,112.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm volatility 1.79 *** 1.24 *** 0.89 *** 0.57 ***
(0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
Volatility quintile 2 0.10 ** 0.03
(0.05) (0.04)
Volatility quintile 3 0.23 *** 0.06
(0.06) (0.05)
Volatility quintile 4 0.34 *** 0.14 **
(0.07) (0.06)
Volatility quintile 5 0.59 *** 0.33 ***
(0.08) (0.07)
Log of grant-date stock price -0.18 *** -0.43 *** -0.34 *** -0.40 *** -0.46 *** -0.36 ***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Log of sales -0.21 *** -0.11 *** -0.22 *** -0.15 *** -0.11 *** -0.24 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Tobin's Q 0.27 *** 0.28 *** 0.16 *** 0.12 *** 0.28 *** 0.16 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Total return 1 year -0.10 *** -0.15 *** -0.14 *** -0.14 *** -0.15 *** -0.15 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Total return 3 years -0.66 *** -0.48 *** -0.30 *** -0.20 *** -0.46 *** -0.28 ***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Total return 5 years 0.12 0.13 0.26 *** 0.30 *** 0.11 0.25 ***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07)
New economy (dummy) 0.90 *** 0.93 *** 1.20 *** 0.92 *** 1.24 ***
(0.08) (0.16) (0.08) (0.16) (0.08)
Dividend yield -8.17 *** -13.16 *** -4.74 *** -4.63 ** -13.54 *** -5.15 ***
(2.38) (1.90) (1.55) (1.87) (1.89) (1.57)
Industry volatility -1.52 *** -0.13 -0.16 0.33 0.12 -0.02
(0.27) (0.26) (0.19) (0.21) (0.25) (0.18)
Cash flowt-1 / Assetst-2 -0.67 *** -0.52 *** -0.30 *** -0.12 -0.65 *** -0.33 ***
(0.21) (0.16) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10)
Cash dividendst-1 / Assetst-2 4.87 *** 4.06 *** 3.98 *** 3.86 *** 4.70 *** 4.12 ***
(1.80) (1.33) (1.02) (1.14) (1.37) (1.03)
Cash balancest-1 / Assetst-2 1.13 *** 1.03 *** 0.44 *** 0.29 *** 1.08 *** 0.46 ***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
Leveraget-1 -0.07 -0.63 *** -0.25 *** -0.25 *** -0.61 *** -0.23 ***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Firm effects R.E. F.E. R.E.
Industry dummies Yes Yes
(Adjusted) R2 0.557 0.734 0.517 0.290 0.731 0.512
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Dependent variable: Log of employee stock options per employee for firms with ESO plan
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economy rms as the new economy dummy variable is highly signicant in all specica-
tions. There is no clear evidence of the relevance of cash constraints. On the one hand,
cash ow is negatively related to options grants, which is expected under the cash con-
straint hypothesis. On the other hand, rms with high cash dividends, high cash balances
and low leverage (and hence low interest payments) grant more options, which seems to
contradict the view that rms grant options when they are short of cash.
The ndings on industry volatility are mixed and support the predictions of the
retention model only when rm xed e¤ects are included and industry is not otherwise
controlled for. The reduction in the coe¢ cient of volatility after including industry e¤ects
may, however, capture e¤ects related to labor market conditions within the industry. The
coe¢ cient on past one and three year stock returns are all highly signicant and negative.
This contrasts explanations for employee stock option use based on employee sentiment,
because these models usually assume trend extrapolation, which would predict a positive
coe¢ cient on past returns (Bergman and Jenter, 2007).
In sum, the results in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 strongly support Hypotheses 2 and 3 and
show that riskier rms grant more employee stock options.44
To investigate whether higher rm volatility increases the probability of broad-based
employee stock option plans at rms (Hypothesis 1), I estimate a linear probability model
of the form
Pr(ESOplan = 1) = +   ikt +   Xikt + t + k + i + "ikt;
where i is a random rm e¤ect. The dependent variable is now ESOplan, an indicator
variable which is one if there is a broad-based plan (see section 5.1 for the construction
44In untabulated results I also nd evidence that stock option grants were more sensitive to rm risk in
the years up to and including 2000 a period where success stories of rms and investors were everywhere
and where the desire to "get rich quick" and therefore the tendency to overweight small probabilities of
large gains seems particularly plausible.
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Table 2.7: Regressions of an indicator variable for the existence of a broad-based employee
stock option plan on rm volatility and control variables. ESOplan is equal to one if
there is a broad-based stock option plan at the rm in the respective rm-year. Industry
dummies are based on the three digit SIC code. For the probit model, marginal e¤ects
computed at the mean are reported. Some observations for the probit model are lost
because of no within-industry variation in the ESOplan variable. For the random e¤ects
probit model, McFaddens R2 is reported. Robust standard errors with clustering at the
rm level are given in parentheses.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm volatility 0.47 *** 0.18 *** 0.25 *** 0.31 *** 1.28 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.13)
Log of sales -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.06 *** -0.04 *** -0.26 ***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
Tobin's Q 0.05 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.03 *** 0.10 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
Firm random effects Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percent correctly predicted 0.670 0.734 0.647 0.638 0.638
(Adjusted or Pseudo) R2 0.141 0.266 0.127 0.228 0.175
N 15,004 15,004 15,004 14,881 15,004
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Linear Probability Model
Dependent variable: ESOplan (dummy variable)
Probit Model
of this variable). The covariates I consider are the same as in the previous regressions,
except for the stock price, which I drop from the set of control variables since it only
determines the number of options granted but not whether or not any options are granted
at all.
Table 2.7 shows that Hypothesis 1 is borne out by the data: high volatility rms are
more likely to have a broad employee stock option plan. This nding is robust to including
year, industry and rm e¤ects. The signs on the control variables are as expected and
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robust across specications. To provide additional support to my linear specication, I
also report results from a corresponding (random e¤ects) probit model.45 The marginal
e¤ect of an increase in rm volatility is lower using the linear framework: increasing rm
volatility by one standard deviation increases the probability of a broad-based plan by
between 3.5% and 10% in the linear probability model, while the probit model predicts
changes of between 6.5% and 27%.
Table 2.8 shows the results for the larger set of control variables. The coe¢ cients and
signicance levels of rm volatility, log of sales and Tobins Q are qualitatively unchanged.
Again, rms with larger past returns grant fewer employee stock options. New economy
rms grant signicantly more options. There is no support for cash constraints inuencing
grant behavior and the only signicant coe¢ cient among the variables to proxy for cash
constraints is on cash balances. This coe¢ cient is positive, which implies more options at
rms with higher cash balances.
Overall, the results of this section show that the simple model of pay negotiations
between a rm and an employee with CPT preferences generates predictions that are
consistent with observed patterns of employees stock option plans.
5.3 Robustness checks
The strong support for Hypotheses 2 and 3 in the data is based on OLS regressions on
the subsample of rms that grant employee stock options. This may introduce sample
selection bias. To investigate how severe this bias is, I run two alternative regressions. The
rst is a Tobit model on the full sample of rms and the second is a Heckman two-stage
selection model.46 Results are presented in Table 2.9. For both models, the impact of
45The probit model might potentially su¤er from the incidental parameter problem, which is why I
compute the linear specication as a benchmark. The results here suggest, however, that the incidental
parameter problem is not severe.
46The rst stage probit regressions in the Heckman model includes all variables used in Table 2.6 with
industry Q (weighted average (by assets) of Tobins Q for rms in the same three digit SIC industry) as
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Table 2.8: Regressions of an indicator variable for the existence of a broad-based employee
stock option plan on rm volatility and enlarged set of control variables. All variables are
dened as in Table 2.7. For the probit model, marginal e¤ects computed at the mean are
reported. Some observations for the probit model are lost because of no within-industry
variation in the ESOplan variable. For the random e¤ects probit model, McFaddens R2 is
reported. Robust standard errors with clustering at the rm level are given in parentheses.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm volatility 0.16 *** 0.15 *** 0.10 ** 0.22 *** 0.56 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.17)
Log of sales -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.04 *** -0.02 *** -0.17 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
Tobin's Q 0.04 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.11 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
Total return 1 year 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Total return 3 years -0.08 *** -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.09 *** -0.27 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10)
Total return 5 years -0.12 *** -0.11 *** -0.12 *** -0.13 *** -0.49 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.14)
New economy (dummy) 0.24 *** 0.17 *** 0.27 *** 0.31 *** 1.50 ***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.12)
Dividend yield -3.71 *** -1.86 *** -2.43 *** -1.76 ** -8.16 ***
(0.58) (0.66) (0.51) (0.78) (1.88)
Industry volatility -0.05 -0.16 * -0.08 -0.17 -0.28
(0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.25)
Cash flowt-1 / Assetst-2 -0.01 0.10 ** 0.03 0.04 -0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.23)
Cash dividendst-1 / Assetst-2 0.48 -0.51 -0.51 -0.80 -1.91
(0.52) (0.47) (0.41) (0.62) (1.61)
Cash balancest-1 / Assetst-2 0.16 *** 0.08 *** 0.08 *** 0.23 *** 0.68 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.14)
Leveraget-1 -0.05 * -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.16 *
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10)
Firm random effects Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percent correctly predicted 0.672 0.731 0.668 0.697 0.638
(Adjusted or Pseudo) R2 0.177 0.270 0.171 0.233 0.161
N 12,843 12,843 12,843 12,719 12,843
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Linear Probability Model Probit Model
Dependent variable: ESOplan (dummy variable)
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rm volatility is larger than under the OLS specication based on the subsample and the
Heckman selection model shows that the OLS results presented earlier tend to understate
the positive relation between rm volatility and broad-based stock option plans.
A clear limitation of this analysis is that the characteristics of employee stock option
plans are estimated and not actually observed. Moreover, companies that do not issue
options to the top ve executives are not in the ExecuComp database and thus not part of
the sample, which could lead to biased results. Bergman and Jenter (2007) who also use
the estimation based on "pcttotopt" in ExecuComp perform a robustness-check of their
results based on a hand-collected dataset by Core and Guay (2001). They nd no evidence
for systematic biases and their results are usually even stronger using the hand-collected
employee stock option data.
6 The relation between stock option grants and ex-
ercises
So far I have documented that a simple model based on employees who have CPT prefer-
ences generates predictions which are surprisingly consistent with the data. In this section
I argue that such a model has the potential to provide a unied framework for thinking
about both stock option grants and exercises.
The key idea is that, as a default, individuals evaluate investment decisions over short
horizons (they are "myopic"). This builds on the work by Benartzi and Thaler (1995),
who argue that for a typical portfolio of stocks and bonds the relevant horizon is about
one year. Heath, Huddard, and Lang (1999) and Odean (1998) nd that option exercises
are signicantly related to short-term stock price run-ups, which suggests that for stock
options even shorter horizons than one year may be relevant. Typical vesting schedules
an additional regressor.
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Table 2.9: Robustness checks. Specications (1) and (2) show the results from a Tobit
regression of the log of the number of stock options per employee on the set of control
variables used in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Specications (3) and (4) show the results from the
second stage regression of the Heckman selection model. The rst stage probit regression
in the Heckman selection model includes as additional regressor the industry Q as a
weighted average (by assets) of Tobins Q for rms in the same three digit SIC industry.
Industry dummies are based on the three digit SIC code. Robust standard errors with
clustering at the rm level are given in parentheses.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm volatility 2.90 *** 2.24 *** 1.94 *** 1.67 ***
(0.36) (0.45) (0.17) (0.18)
Log of grant-date stock price -0.25 *** -0.30 *** -0.19 *** -0.18 ***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Log of sales -0.41 *** -0.20 *** -0.20 *** -0.21 ***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Tobin's Q 0.30 *** 0.35 *** 0.25 *** 0.25 ***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Total return 1 year -0.04 -0.09 ***
(0.07) (0.03)
Total return 3 years -0.83 *** -0.64 ***
(0.18) (0.08)
Total return 5 years -0.85 *** 0.16
(0.28) (0.12)
New economy (dummy) 2.13 *** 0.86 ***
(0.37) (0.09)
Dividend yield -25.68 *** -7.76 ***
(6.40) (2.55)
Industry volatility -1.55 ** -1.32 ***
(0.73) (0.27)
Cash flowt-1 / Assetst-2 0.13 -0.67 ***
(0.44) (0.21)
Cash dividendst-1 / Assetst-2 -1.35 4.99 ***
(4.29) (1.77)
Cash balancest-1 / Assetst-2 1.61 *** 1.12 ***
(0.20) (0.10)
Leveraget-1 -0.75 *** -0.07
(0.25) (0.12)
Inverse Mills ratio -0.96 *** -0.07
(0.05) (0.12)
ρ -0.69 *** -0.06
(0.03) (0.10)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Pseudo) R2 0.129 0.252 0.296 0.354
N 15,004 12,843 12,843 12,843
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Dependent variable:
Log of employee stock options per employee
Tobit Heckman Selection
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preclude exercising options for a period of several years and it thus seems reasonable
to assume that the evaluation horizon is extended accordingly. Once the options are
vested, however, the shorter "default"-horizon becomes relevant again. I argue that the
shorter this horizon, the more likely is an option exercise, consistent with empirical studies
that nd that employee stock options are usually exercised quickly after the vesting date
(Huddard and Lang, 1996).
To x ideas let the grant date be T = 0; let T1 be the vesting date and T2 be called
the horizon date. In T1 the employee decides on whether or not to exercise the options.
If she is myopic in the sense of Benartzi and Thaler (1995), she will base this decision on
the possible payo¤s from exercising the stock options in T2, which are dependent on the
stock price PT2 given by
PT2 = PT1 exp

r   
2
2

(T2   T1) + u
p
T2   T1

:
She will exercise in T1 if the payo¤ from exercising, PT1  K; is positive and greater than
the certainty equivalent for holding the options until T2; which is implicitly dened by
E [v (max (PT2  K; 0) RP )] = v (CE  RP ) :
The intuition is now that the longer the option is held, the more skewed the payo¤
distribution will become. Since the employee overweights small probabilities of large
gains, this tends to increase the certainty equivalent and hence decreases the probability
of an option exercise in T1.
I again test the intuition by calibrating a simple benchmark model. I assume that
T1 = 4 and that the stock price at P0 has increased to PT1 = P0e
rT1 ; the expected value.
The option is thus in the money as K = P0 and so P0erT1 K > 0: The reference point of
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the employee is denoted, without loss of generality, by RP = PT1  K + ; where  is any
number with  > K   PT1 : I assume  = PT1
 
erT2   1 in the calibrations which implies
that the employees best guess about the stock price in T2 is the expected value as seen
from time T1: I report results only for a degree of probability weighting of  = 0:65: All
other parameters are the same as in Section 4.
Table 2.10 Panel A shows that the intuition is borne out by the model. For all levels
of rm volatility the ratio of certainty equivalent to intrinsic value at time T1 is strictly
increasing in T2. A ratio smaller than one indicates option exercise. Hence, for evaluation
horizons smaller than a year, the model predicts exercises for all volatilities. The model
also generates another plausible result: the more the options are in the money in T1; i.e.
the higher PT1 relative to the strike price, the more likely is an exercise decision (Panel B).
Intuitively, a higher stock price at the vesting date ceteris paribus increases the reference
point for the option payo¤ at the horizon date, which implies that more option payo¤s
fall into the loss space. Hence, a lower ratio of actual stock price to strike price tends to
make options unattractive to employees with CPT preferences.
Heath, Huddard, and Lang (1999) have documented that empirical exercise behavior
of employees is sensitive to reference points, most notably whether or not the stock price
exceeds the 52-week high stock price. They also argue that prospect theory is largely
consistent with their ndings. While a truly dynamic CPT model that could integrate
such reference point e¤ects is yet unavailable, the results presented here on stock option
grants and exercises and the complementary work by Heath, Huddard, and Lang (1999)
suggest that prospect theory has the potential to explain individual behavior in stock
option programs in a unied framework.
The CPT model predicts that employees from riskier rms should be less likely to
exercise their options early. This appears to be in contrast to ndings from Bettis, Bizjak,
and Lemmon (2005) and Huddard and Lang (1996). The study by Bettis, Bizjak, and
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Table 2.10: The inuence of the evaluation horizon and the moneyness of options on
exercise decisions. Panels A and B show the ratio of certainty equivalent when holding
the option to the intrinsic value obtained by exercising. The option is not exercised if
this value is greater than one (shaded cells). The evaluation horizon is T2   T1. Panel
A assumes PT1 = P0e
rT1. For Panel B an evaluation horizon of 6 months is assumed.
The calculations use a lognormal stock price distribution with T1 = 4 years and r = 5%.
The strike price of the option K is set equal to the grant date stock price P0. Preference
parameters are  = 0.88,  = 2.25 and  = 0:65. The reference point is taken to be equal
to the statistically expected value of PT2.
20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 80%
0.10 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.48 0.54 0.59 0.63
0.25 0.37 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.71 0.77 0.83
0.50 0.51 0.57 0.63 0.68 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.89 0.97 1.05
0.75 0.60 0.67 0.73 0.78 0.84 0.89 0.94 1.03 1.12 1.25
1.00 0.68 0.75 0.81 0.87 0.93 0.99 1.05 1.15 1.28 1.56
2.00 0.93 1.01 1.09 1.17 1.25 1.33 1.40 1.72 2.23 2.86
4.00 1.32 1.43 1.54 1.65 1.77 1.93 2.25 3.11 4.25 5.70
20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 60% 70% 80%
105 1.30 1.42 1.55 1.84 2.17 2.51 2.88 3.67 4.53 5.46
110 0.84 0.92 1.00 1.08 1.15 1.21 1.29 1.61 2.01 2.44
120 0.54 0.61 0.67 0.72 0.77 0.82 0.86 0.95 1.03 1.10
130 0.40 0.47 0.52 0.57 0.61 0.65 0.68 0.75 0.82 0.89
150 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.66
200 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.44R
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Lemmon (2005), however, focuses on executives, which are explicitly not the focus of
this study. Since it is likely that top executives and rank-and-le employees di¤er along
many dimensions (nancial literacy, expertise in assessing risks etc.), it is not clear that
the results for executives carry over to non-executives. Huddard and Lang (1996) nd
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that across their seven rms, exercises are positively related to rm volatility. Closer
inspection reveals, however, that four out of seven rms in their sample have coe¢ cients
in regressions which predict a negative relation, as suggested by the present model. These
coe¢ cients are signicant for two of these companies companies which also happen to
be the most volatile in the sample. It would be valuable to see results for non-executive
employees on a large sample basis to accurately assess the predictions of the CPT model
with respect to exercises.
7 Are rms in a special position to exploit the bias?
Firms that grant stock options do so because as employees overvalue small probabilities
of large gains they can reduce base salaries by more than one for one. Of course, in prin-
ciple, anybody can o¤er skewed payo¤s to individuals. Indeed, lottery tickets, long-shot
race-track betting or individual investments into risky option portfolios at online brokers
are examples of lottery companies, bookmakers and brokers proting from individuals
desire to "hit the jackpot".47 There are good reasons to believe, however, that rms are
in a particularly good position to exploit the bias of probability weighting.
First, there is ample evidence that individuals are greatly overinvested in their own
company stock in their retirement savings plans. Some authors attribute this to a default
bias (Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2005). In the present case, if the
default setting in a pay contract is that it includes options, individuals are likely to be
reluctant to exchange the default (options) against an alternative (no options).
A second reason lies in the well-documented psychological phenomenon that individu-
als like to bet on things they feel condent and knowledgeable about (Heath and Tversky,
1991, Keppe and Weber, 1995). Moreover, they may adopt the so called "insider-view"
47For literature that links probability weighting with these phenomena, see for example, Cook and
Clotfelter (1993), Hausch and Ziemba (1995) and Jullien and Salanie (2000).
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(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993), which is a tendency to favorably judge the likely success
of a project if one is directly involved in it. In the present context, an employee may
overweight the possibility of her stock options paying of a large amount because she is
an insider in the rm, and she may focus on her employers stock options as opposed to
other skewed gambles, since she feels especially knowledgeable about her own company.
Lastly, rms have the opportunity to exchange stock options for future pay increases.
While from a classical economic perspective reducing salary increases and cutting base
salary by the same amount are the same thing, there is evidence that individuals are much
more sensitive to the latter (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986, Bewley, 1999). This
can also explain why it may be hard for an investment bank to step in and o¤er stock
options on a companys stock to the companys employees: the employees would have to
pay cash to the bank and thus su¤er a nominal loss of cash. The rm, on the other hand,
can cut real wages by reducing nominal pay increases a small procedural change that
can have profound impact on the perceived attractiveness of an o¤ered prospect.
8 Conclusion
In this chapter I show empirically, using a sample of over 2,200 U.S. rms over the years
1992 to 2005, that rms that are small, have good growth opportunities and high stock
price volatility grant more stock options to their non-executive employees. The nding
that higher rm volatility is associated with more options is at odds with standard agency
models of compensation. The results are robust to including industry e¤ects, showing that
labor market competition or special circumstances in new economy rms are not su¢ cient
to explain broad-based employee stock option compensation.
A model in which risk-neutral rms bargain with employees with cumulative prospect
theory preferences can explain the empirical ndings remarkably well. The key intuition
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is that probability weighting, and in particular the tendency of individuals to overweight
small probabilities of large gains, makes options attractive since they come with a highly
skewed payo¤ distribution of bounded losses and unbounded low-probability upside. This
intuition is shown to be consistent with the data when the model is calibrated using
parameter values from the experimental literature. The bargaining model with CPT
employees predicts that (i) riskier rms are more likely to have a broad-based employee
stock option plan in place (ii) per employee number of granted stock options increases
with rm volatility and (iii) the rate of this increase is increasing. All hypotheses are
strongly supported in the data. An attractive feature of the model is that it avoids
specifying an ad hoc bias to explain a perceived empirical anomaly. Instead, it is a
straightforward application of cumulative prospect theory, the most rmly established
alternative to expected utility models to date.
There are two major implications: rst, the model implies that rms can use em-
ployees as a source of funds. This constitutes another example of rms contractually
exploiting an individual bias in decision making. Given the importance of pay contracts
to basically anyone, and given the estimates of transfers of funds from employees to some
rms in the range of tens of millions of dollars annually, this example shows that exploit-
ing behavioral biases may be more widely spread and more economically protable than
commonly thought. Second, I show that the model can provide a unied framework for
thinking about both employee stock option grants and stock option exercises. The impact
of probability weighting is positively correlated with the evaluation horizon of individuals.
The vesting period articially lengthens the evaluation period. After options vest, indi-
viduals are likely to resort to default evaluation horizons which are usually short. Over
short horizons the impact of reference points increases relative to the impact of probabil-
ity weighting. As a result, for typical parameter values the model predicts early exercise
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consistent with existing empirical evidence.
The model and results in this paper suggest a number of promising avenues for future
research. It may be interesting, for example, to explore whether employees sort into
companies based on their degree of probability weighting, and investigate the strategic
implications of such a sorting mechanism. On a more general level, probability weighting
could have a profound impact on rm policies if CEOs are also subject to the bias.
Investigating the relevance and implications of probability weighting for the interaction
of rms and markets is an important task for future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
In the main text, the interest rate was set to zero to simplify the exposition. In this
appendix, I incorporate interest rates. In order to prove Proposition 1, the following two
Lemmas will be useful.
Lemma 1. The prospect value of the contract (no; o) does not depend on the base salary
received and is homogenous of degree  in the number of options no if the reference point
is given by RP = no + erT (Assumption 1).
Proof.
E (no; )  E 

v
 
nomax (PT  K; 0) + erT  RP

= E [v (no (max (PT  K; 0)  ))]
= E (no) ;
where the second equality follows from using the denition of the reference point in As-
sumption 1. This proves the rst part of the Lemma. To prove the second part note
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that
E (no) =  
Z +K
0
(  (no (max (PT  K; 0)  ))) d (F (PT ))
+
Z 1
+K
(no (max (PT  K; 0)  )) d (F (PT ))
= no 

 
Z +K
0
(  (max (PT  K; 0)  )) d (F (PT ))
+
Z 1
+K
(max (PT  K; 0)  ) d (F (PT ))

= no  E (1) :
Lemma 2. There does not exist an optimal contract
 
n
0
o; 
0
such that the participation
constraint does not hold as an equality.
Proof. The proof will proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists an optimal contract 
n
0
o; 
0
such that
E 
h
v

n
0
omax (PT  K; 0) + 
0
erT  RP
i
> E 

v
 
V erT  RP : (6)
Using the denition of the reference point in Assumption 1 and noting that the outside
option V is received with certainty, we get
E 
h
v

n
0
o (max (PT  K; 0)  )
i
> v

V erT   n0o   
0
erT

: (7)
The left-hand side does not depend on the xed wage 
0
; while
@
@
v

V erT   n0o   
0
erT

< 0:
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Since the RHS of (7) is continuous in , the value function has unbounded support and
since there are no restrictions on ; there exists 
00
< 
0
; such that
E 
h
v

n
0
o (max (PT  K; 0)  )
i
= v

V erT   n0o   
00

:
Since the number of options is unchanged and since 
00
< 
0
; the rm pays strictly less for
the contract
 
n
0
o; 
00 ; while still satisfying the participation constraint. Hence,  n0o; 0
cannot be optimal.
It follows immediately from Lemma 2 that for any optimal contract (no; 
) it must
be true that
E 

v
 
n

o (max (PT  K; 0)  )
  v  V erT   no   erT   0: (8)
Hence we have to consider two cases:
Case 1: E 

v
 
n

o (max (PT  K; 0)  )
  0:
The the certainty equivalent CE, which depends on both no and 
; is implicitly
dened by
E 

v
 
n

o (max (PT  K; 0)  )
  E (no) =  CE (no; ) erT   no   erT  : (9)
Rewriting the participation constraint using (9) gives
 
CE (no; 
) erT   no   erT

=
 
V erT   no   erT

which implies
CE (no; 
) = V : (10)
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From (9) we get for the certainty equivalent
CE (no; 
) = E (no)
1=  e rT + no  e rT + ;
and since prospect value is homogenous of degree ; we have
CE (no; 
) = no  E (1)
1=  e rT + no  e rT + 
= no  CE (1; 0) + :
Thus, any contract that satises the original participation constraint must also satisfy
no  CE (1; 0) +  = V : (11)
Case 2: E 

v
 
n

o (max (PT  K; 0)  )

< 0:
The certainty equivalent CE, which depends on both no and 
; is implicitly dened
by
E 

v
 
n

o (max (PT  K; 0)  )
  E (no) =       CE (no; )  erT   no     erT  :
(12)
Rewriting the participation constraint using (12) and (8) gives
      CE (no; )  erT   no     erT  =       V  erT   no     erT 
and thus analogous to (10),
CE (no; 
) = V : (13)
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From (12) we get for the certainty equivalent
CE (no; 
) =  

  1  E (no)
1=
 e rT + no  e rT + ;
and since the subjective value is homogenous of degree ; we have
CE (no; 
) = no 

 

  1  E (1)
1=
+ 

 e rT + 
= no  CE (1; 0) + ;
which together with equation (13) leads to the formulation for the participation constraint
as given in equation (11).
Replacing the participation constraint in (4) with (11) and solving this maximiza-
tion problem in the usual way gives the optimal contract parameters (no; 
) stated in
Proposition 1. 
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Chapter III
Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO
Compensation when Managers are
Loss Averse
1 Introduction
In this chapter we explain salient features of observed compensation contracts with a
simple contracting model where the manager is loss averse.1 We parameterize this model
using standard assumptions and then compare the contracts generated by the model
with those actually observed for a large sample of U.S. CEOs. Our main conclusion is
that a principal-agent model with loss-averse agents can approximate observed contracts
far better than the standard model based on risk aversion used in the literature. In
particular, the loss-aversion model can explain the prevalence of stock options, a feature
that is inconsistent with the standard risk-aversion model.
The theoretical literature on executive compensation contracts is largely based on
contracting models where shareholders (principal) are risk neutral and where the man-
ager (agent) is risk averse, which is modeled with a concave utility function. Some highly
1This chapter is based on joint work with Ingolf Dittmann and Ernst Maug. I therefore retain the
personal pronoun "we", used in the original paper, throughout this chapter. We are grateful to seminar
participants at the University of Cologne, Frankfurt, Georgia State, Humboldt, Mannheim, Maryland,
Tilburg, the DGF-conference in Dresden, the GEABA-conference in Tübingen, the JFI-conference on
"Financial Contracting", the 6th Oxford Finance Symposium, the European Finance Association meeting
in Ljubljana, and to Bo Becker, Axel Börsch-Supan, Xavier Gabaix, Gerard Hoberg, Andreas Knabe,
Matjaz Koman, Roy Kouwenberg, David Larcker, Christian Laux, David De Meza, and Werner Neus for
their feedback. We also thank the collaborative research centers SFB 649 on "Economic Risk" in Berlin
and the SFB 504 "Rationality Concepts, Decision Making and Economic Modeling" for nancial support.
Ingolf Dittmann acknowledges nancial support from NWO through a VIDI grant.
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stylized models can explain option-type features, but quantitative approaches rely more
or less entirely on a standard model with constant relative risk aversion, lognormally
distributed stock prices, and e¤ort aversion.2 However, Hall and Murphy (2002) and
Dittmann and Maug (2007) show that the standard CRRA-lognormal model cannot ex-
plain observed compensation practice if companies and managers can bargain over all
components of CEO compensation packages.3 Dittmann and Maug nd that the optimal
predicted contract almost never contains any options and typically features negative base
salaries. These results raise a concern for the widespread application of the model to
the valuation of executive stock options and to the analysis of their design (strike price,
indexing, reloading, and repricing).4
In this chapter we suggest a di¤erent approach to explaining the almost universal
presence of stock options by assuming that managerspreferences exhibit loss aversion as
described by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991, 1992).
On the basis of experimental evidence they argue that choices under risk exhibit three
features: (i) reference dependence, where agents do not value their nal wealth levels, but
evaluate outcomes relative to some benchmark or reference level; (ii) loss aversion, which
adds the notion that losses (measured relative to the reference level) loom larger than
gains; (iii) diminishing sensitivity, so that individuals become progressively less sensitive
2A model that can explain the use of options is Feltham and Wu (2001) who assume that the e¤ort of
the agent a¤ects the risk of the rm, and Oyer (2004), who models options as a device to retain employees
when recontracting is expensive. Inderst and Müller (2005) explain options as instruments that provide
outside shareholders with better liquidation incentives. In Oyer (2004) and Inderst and Müller (2005),
options do not provide incentives to exert e¤ort. The applications by Haubrich (1994), Haubrich and
Popova (1998), and by Margiotta and Miller (2000) use constant absolute risk aversion when calibrating
a principal-agent model. Calibration exercises with CRRA preferences and lognormal distributed stock
prices include Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002), Hall and Knox
(2004), and Lambert and Larcker (2004).
3Hall and Murphy (2002) establish this for the case with adjustable base salaries, where the optimal
strike price of stock options becomes zero. Then the optimal contract features only restricted stock but
no options.
4Examples on design features include Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) on the strike price, Meulbroek
(2001) on the indexing of strike prices relative to benchmark variables, and Hemmer, Matsunaga, and
Shevlin (1998) and Dybvig and Loewenstein (2003) on reloading.
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to incremental gains and incremental losses. These assumptions accord well with a large
body of experimental literature, which shows that the standard expected utility paradigm
based on maximizing concave utility functions cannot explain a number of prominent
patterns of behavior.5
The main drawback of risk-aversion approaches in explaining the prevalent use of
stock options in compensation contracts is the fact that risk-averse managers gain little
utility from payo¤s when the value of the rm is high.6 Whenever rm value is high,
managers become wealthier and their marginal utility becomes small. This blunts any
instrument for providing incentives that pays o¤ only when rm value is high. Contracts
that rely less on rewards for good outcomes ("carrots") and more on penalties for bad
outcomes ("sticks") are more benecial as they provide the same level of incentives at a
lower cost. The risk-aversion model therefore predicts contracts with much higher stock
holdings combined with zero or even negative salaries and option holdings. However,
these predictions are at odds with observed compensation practice, where managers are
paid with options, have guaranteed base salaries and entitlements to severance payments,
which protect them even in case of dismissal. By comparison, loss aversion implies that
managers are more averse to losses than they are attracted by gains, so they demand
a premium for being exposed to losses and value the downside protection provided by
options. Shareholders will therefore o¤er a contract that pays at least the reference wage
5Experimental support for loss aversion is provided by Thaler (1980), Kahneman and Tversky (1984),
Knetsch and Sinden (1984), Knetsch (1989), Dunn (1996), and Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and
Thaler (1997). This list is not exhaustive. Recently Rabin (2000) has demonstrated that concave utility
functions cannot account for risk aversion over small-stakes gambles, a feature readily explained by
loss aversion. There are also some papers that take a more critical stance. Myagkov and Plott (1997)
document that risk seeking implied by prospect theory diminishes with experience, a result also supported
by List (2004). Plott and Zeiler (2005) call into question the general interpretation of gaps between the
willingness to pay and the willingness to accept as evidence for loss aversion.
6This assessment relies on the standard implementation of the risk-aversion model, see Footnote 2
for the relevant literature. Other authors have pursued larger deviations from the Risk Aversionmodel,
which can accommodate options in a stylized setup, see for example Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia (1999)
and the approaches by Feltham and Wu (2001) and Oyer (2004) cited above.
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most of the time in order to avoid paying this premium. The loss-aversion model therefore
suggests contracts that reward good outcomes rather than penalize bad outcomes and
combine positive option holdings with positive xed salaries.
We develop this argument in two steps. The rst step provides a standard analytic
derivation of the optimal contract. We show that under standard assumptions the optimal
contract features two parts: above a certain critical stock price the optimal contract always
pays o¤ the reference wage of the CEO plus a performance-related part that is represented
by an increasing and (mostly) convex function of the stock price. Below this critical stock
price compensation falls discontinuously to some lower bound.
In the second step of our analysis we parameterize both models using assumptions
that are based on available compensation data and on prior research, especially experi-
mental evidence on preference-parameter values. Then we calibrate the models for 595
CEOs for whom we have complete data. We rst restrict contracts to be piecewise-linear
and represent them as consisting of base salary, stock, and stock options. We compute
the optimal contract for each CEO for the loss-aversion model and for the risk-aversion
model for a range of plausible parameterizations and assess how well each model predicts
the observed contract. We consider two specications of the risk-aversion model  the
constant-absolute-risk-aversion model and the constant-relative-risk-aversion model as
these cover virtually the entire literature on compensation.
It turns out that the performance of the loss-aversion model depends critically on
the assumed reference wage. If the reference wage is not far above last years base salary
(which in our stylized representation also includes most bonus components), then this
model predicts observed contracts well. In particular, it can rationalize the use of stock
options. If the reference wage is higher and close to the total value of the contract,
including all options and restricted stock at market values, then the loss-aversion model
performs poorly. The risk-aversion model always performs poorly and never predicts
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options and positive base salaries. Overall, we nd that the loss-aversion model predicts
observed contracts better than the risk-aversion model.
We also drop the simplifying assumption that the contract is piecewise linear and cal-
culate the optimal non-linear contracts for each CEO in our sample. This approach allows
us to perform a robustness check on our stylized representation of contracts. Above some
threshold level, the general non-linear contracts are mostly convex, and at the threshold
level they feature a discontinuous drop to the lowest feasible wage, which is reminiscent of
a dismissal of the CEO. For plausible parameterizations of the loss-aversion model we es-
timate that shareholders would save an additional 0.4% to 4.6% of current compensation
costs if they would replace the optimal piecewise-linear contract with the optimal non-
linear contract, including the discontinuous drop below a critical stock price. We therefore
suggest that the governance costs of incentive provision through CEO dismissals (with
big drops in compensation, i.e. without severance pay) rather than through high-powered
wage functions is probably not worth the additional costs for most companies. The ability
to quantify these e¤ects based on data is the strength of our approach, which calibrates
the model to each individual CEO.
Many authors apply loss aversion successfully to other questions in nance. Benartzi
and Thaler (1995, 1999) develop the notion of myopic loss aversion and use it to explain
the equity-premium puzzle. Gomes (2005) and Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004)
apply the model to portfolio choice. Barberis and Huang (2001) and Barberis, Huang, and
Santos (2001) apply loss aversion to the explanation of the value premium. Haigh and List
(2005) nd that CBOT-traders are loss averse, and more so than inexperienced students,
contradicting the e¤ect List (2004) found earlier for consumers. Coval and Shumway
(2005) support the same conclusion in their study of intraday risk taking of CBOT-
traders. Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2008) study the incentives and investment decisions
of hedge-fund managers, and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005) base their measure of issuer
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satisfaction in initial public o¤erings on loss aversion. The only application that fails to
support loss aversion to the best of our knowledge is Massa and Simonov (2005) in their
study of individual investor behavior. Despite the usefulness of loss aversion to analyze
risk-taking incentives in many areas of nance, the only paper so far that rigorously applies
loss aversion to principal-agent theory is de Meza and Webb (2007). However, they do
not apply their argument to executive compensation contracts and explore a di¤erent
specication from ours. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst study that explores
empirically the potential of loss aversion to explain observed compensation contracts.
In the following Section 2 we develop the model and discuss the main assumptions.
In Section 3 we characterize the optimal contract analytically. Section 4 develops our em-
pirical methodology in detail. Section 5 analyzes contracts that consist of xed salaries,
stock, and options. Section 6 extends this analysis to general non-linear contracts. Sec-
tion 7 documents the robustness of our approach. Section 8 concludes. All proofs and
derivations are deferred to the appendix.
2 The model
We consider a standard principal-agent model where shareholders (the principal) make a
take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to a CEO (the agent) who then provides e¤ort that enhances the
value of the rm. Shareholders can only observe the stock market value of the rm but
not the CEOs e¤ort (hidden action).
Contracts and technology. The contract is a wage function w (PT ) that species the
wage of the manager for a given realization of the company value PT at time T . Contract
negotiations take place at time 0: At the end of the contracting period, T , the value of
the rm PT is commonly observed and the wage is paid according to w (PT ). PT depends
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on the CEOs e¤ort e and the state of nature.
The agents e¤ort e is either high or low, e 2 fe; eg so that PT is distributed with
density f (PT je). Later we will also allow for continuous e¤ort. For notational convenience
we write e = e   e, and f (PT je) = f (PT je)   f (PT je). We require the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP) to hold for f , so f (PT je) =f (PT je) is monotonically
increasing in PT .
Preferences and outside options. Throughout we assume that shareholders are risk
neutral. The managers preferences are additively separable in income and e¤ort and can
be represented by
V (w (PT ))  C (e) ; (1)
where C (e) is an increasing and convex cost function. The assumption of additive sepa-
rability in e¤ort and income is conventional in the literature, and our strategy is to follow
conventions in the literature for all aspects other than the modeling of preferences.7 For
this we assume preferences over wage income, w (PT ) ; of the form8
V (w (PT )) =
8><>:
 
w (PT )  wR

if w (PT )  wR
   wR   w (PT ) if w (PT ) < wR ; where 0 < ;  < 1 and   1:
(2)
Here, wR denotes the reference wage. If the payo¤ of the contract at time T exceeds
the reference wage, then the manager codes this as a gain, whereas a payo¤ lower than
wR is coded as a loss. We will refer to the range of the wage above wR as the gain
space and to the range below wR as the loss space. There are three aspects that set this
7Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2007) argue for multiplicative preferences, which makes an important
di¤erence for their calibrations of the optimal level of incentives.
8This preference specication was originally proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It has been
introduced into the nance literature by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and was used by Langer and Weber
(2001), Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004), and Barberis and Huang (2008).
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specication apart from standard concave utility specications. First, the parameter  > 1
gives a higher weight to payo¤s below the reference wage. This reects the observation
from psychology that losses loom larger than gains of comparable size.9 Formally, this
introduces a kink in the value function at wR and thus locally innite risk-aversion.10
Second, the manager treats her income from the rm separately from income from other
sources, a phenomenon that is often referred to as "framing" or "mental accounting"
(Thaler, 1999). Third, while V (w (PT )) is concave over gains, it is convex over losses.
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we will refer to a CEO with preferences of
the form (2) as loss averse and to the corresponding principal-agent model as the loss-
aversion model or, for brevity, as the LA-model. We will often compare the LA-model to
the risk-aversion model (RA-model).
The standard implementation in the literature on executive compensation features
preferences with constant relative risk aversion, but some papers also use constant absolute
risk aversion:
V CRRA (w (PT )) =
(W0 + w (PT ))
1 
1   ; (3)
V CARA (w (PT )) =   exp (  (W0 + w (PT ))) ; (4)
where W0 denotes wealth,  represents the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and  the
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. Our theoretical analysis focuses on the LA-model
only as the RA-model has been analyzed in many places in the literature (see Footnote 2
in the Introduction). In the empirical part we calibrate both models to the data.
9Rabin (2000) calls loss aversion the most rmly established feature of risk preferences.For experi-
mental evidence see Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and their references as well as McNeil, Pauker, Sox
and Tversky (1982), Knetsch and Sinden (1984), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), Tversky and
Kahneman (1986), Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), Knetsch (1989), Loewenstein and Adler (1995),
Post et al. (2007). For applications in nance see also the papers cited at the end of the Introduction.
10This characteristic is also called "rst-order risk aversion" (Segal and Spivak, 1990).
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We assume that the reference point wR is exogenous in two respects. First, the
reference point does not depend on any of the parameters of the contract. Alternative
assumptions would relate the reference point to the median or the mean payo¤ of the
contract w (PT ), which would increase the mathematical complexity of the argument
substantially. De Meza and Webb (2007) focus on this aspect of applying loss aversion
to principal-agent theory. Second, the reference point is also independent of the level
of e¤ort. This is defensible if the cost of e¤ort is non-pecuniary and if the manager
separates the costs of e¤ort from the pecuniary wage. However, this is potentially a
strong assumption if the costs are pecuniary and the manager frames the problem so that
she feels a loss if her payo¤ does not exceed wR plus any additional expenses for exerting
e¤ort. In the second case, C (e) should simply be added to the reference point wR. We
do not pursue this route here for mathematical tractability. With an exogenous reference
point the distinguishing feature of the loss-aversion model is that the attitude to risk is
not a global property but is di¤erent for wage distributions centered around the reference
point compared to distributions where most of the probability mass is far away from the
reference point.
The manager has some outside employment opportunity that provides her with a
value net of e¤ort costs V , so any feasible contract must satisfy the ex ante participation
constraint E [V (w (PT ))]  C (e)  V . We assume that the principal cannot pay a wage
below some lower bound w on the wage function such that w  w (PT ) for all PT , where
w < wR. If the manager would be required to invest all her private wealth in the securities
of the rm, then her total payo¤ cannot fall below  W0 in any state of the world, and
this would happen only if these securities expired worthless at the end of the period. This
makes w =  W0 a natural choice, but higher values of w may also be plausible.
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3 Analysis
3.1 Discrete e¤ort
We characterize the optimal contract w (PT ) under the assumption that e¤ort e is either
high or low, e 2 fe; eg ; and that shareholders want to implement the higher level of
e¤ort e. Following the standard principal agent approach as in Holmström (1979), the
shareholdersproblem can then be written as:
min
w(PT )w
Z
w (PT ) f(PT je)dPT (5)
s:t:
Z
V (w (PT )) f(PT je)dPT  V + C (e) ; (6)Z
V (w (PT ))f(PT je)dPT  C ; (7)
where C = C (e)  C (e). We denote the Lagrange multiplier on the participation con-
straint (6) by PC and the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint
(7) by IC and can now characterize the optimal contract.
Proposition 1. (Optimal contract): Given the preference structure in (1) and (2)
and assuming that the monotone likelihood ratio property holds for f (PT je) the optimal
contract w (PT ) for the principal-agent problem (5) to (7), is:
w (PT ) =
8><>: w
R +
h


PC + IC
f(PT je )
f(PT je )
i 1
1 
if PT > bP
w if PT  bP ; (8)
where bP is a uniquely dened cut-o¤ value.
The details of the proof of Proposition 1 and an implicit denition of bP are deferred
to Appendix A. The proof involves three steps. The rst step shows that the optimal
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contract can never pay o¤ in the interior of the loss space, so w (PT ) cannot lie strictly
between w and wR. The reason is that the agent is risk loving in the loss space, so any
payment in the loss space can be improved upon by replacing it with a lottery between
the lowest possible wage w and a payo¤ for some wage w  wR in the gain space. The
second step shows that such lotteries are not optimal. Instead, incentives are improved if
the contract always pays w if the stock price falls below some critical value bP , and pays
o¤ in the gain space otherwise. The third step derives the Lagrangian and maximizes
it pointwise with respect to w (PT ). Equation (8) shows that for the gain space, where
PT > bP , we obtain a result very similar to the familiar Holmström condition (Holmström,
1979, equation (7)) for optimal contracts in the standard concave utility model. This
is intuitive, since the problem in the gain space, where preferences are concave, is not
fundamentally di¤erent from a standard utility-maximizing framework.
Proposition 1 provides us with a general characterization of the optimal contract with
a loss-averse manager. Figure 3.1 illustrates this contract for a typical parametrization
and contrasts it with the corresponding RA-contract. For some region PT > bP the optimal
contract is continuous, monotonically increasing, and pays o¤ only in the gain space. For
PT  bP the optimal contract pays o¤ the lowest possible wage w: The contract features
a discontinuity at bP where the managers wage jumps discretely from w to some value
w (PT )  wR > w.11
Under the assumption that stock prices are lognormal the LA-contract is convex
above bP but has an inection point above which it becomes concave. The RA-contract is
always concave for a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion greater than 1. Hence, the optimal
11De Meza and Webb (2007) nd a similar discontinuity in a principal-agent model with loss aversion.
In their specication, however, the payo¤ jumps from w to wR and is at at wR before it possibly increases
continuously. A at payout at the reference wage wR occurs if the slope of the line that connects (0; w)
and ( bP;wR) is steeper than the slope of the utility function entering the gain space. With the Kahneman
and Tversky (1992) value function, this cannot occur because the slope entering the gain space is innite,
so that the agent prefers a fair gamble over w and wR + " to wR for " su¢ ciently small.
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Figure 3.1: The Figure plots the loss-aversion contract (equation (8)), the risk-aversion
contract, and the observed contract for a representative CEO in our sample, assuming a
lognormal distribution of the terminal stock price PT .
LA-contract (8) provides the manager with signicant downside protection, punishments
for extreme declines in the stock price, and increasing marginal rewards as the stock price
increases. By contrast, the RA-contract provides high-powered incentives for low and
intermediate stock prices and decreasing marginal rewards as the stock price increases.
These qualitative features drive our empirical results for the general non-linear contracts
as well as for the piecewise-linear contracts that can be implemented with stock and
options.
3.2 Continuous e¤ort
We now extend our analysis to the case where e¤ort is continuous, so e 2 [0;1). In
order to be able to solve this problem analogously to the discrete case, we have to apply
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the rst-order approach, i.e., we replace the agents incentive compatibility constraint
(7) (more precisely, its analogue for continuous e¤ort) with the rst order condition for
(7). It is always legitimate to do this if we can ensure that the managers maximization
problem when choosing her e¤ort level is globally concave, so that the rst order condition
uniquely identies the maximum of her objective function.12 In our case, this requires
that
@2E (V (w (P )) je)
@e2
=
Z
V (w (PT ))
@2f (PT je)
@e2
dPT   @
2C (e)
@e2
< 0 . (9)
This condition will not hold generally. In our setting, one issue is the convexity of the
function V (PT ) over the loss space. Moreover, the optimal contract w (PT )may be convex
over some regions of the gain space. However, we can ensure that condition (9) holds for
some cost functions C and some density functions in two ways. Firstly, equation (9)
shows that this condition will be satised for su¢ ciently convex cost functions, so that
@2C (e) =@e2 is bounded from below such that (9) holds. Secondly, if the production
function PT (e) is su¢ ciently concave (such that @2PT (e) =@e2 is su¢ ciently small for all
e¤ort levels), then (9) will also be satised. In the remainder of this paper we will assume
that equation (9) holds. The following proposition shows that under this assumption the
whole argument of the previous subsection goes through with the same implications for
the optimal contract.
Proposition 2. (Continuous e¤ort): Assume that the agents e¤ort is continuous,
e 2 [0;1) and condition (9) holds for each e¤ort level. Then, the results from Proposition
1 continue to hold when the likelihood ratio for the discrete case, f (PT je) =f (PT je) ; is
replaced by its continuous equivalent, fe(PT je)=f(PT je).
12The literature on the principal-agent model has identied conditions where this "rst-order approach"
is valid in a risk-aversion framework. See, for example, Jewitt (1988) and Rogerson (1985).
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4 Implementation and data
4.1 Implementation
The general loss-aversion contract. In our empirical implementation, we assume
that the stock price is lognormally distributed:13
PT (u; e) = P0 (e) exp

rf   
2
2

T + u
p
T

; u  N (0; 1) ; (10)
where rf is the risk-free rate of interest, 2 is the variance of the returns on the stock, T the
time horizon, u is a standard normal random variate and P0 (e) is a strictly increasing and
concave function. The expected present value of PT (u; e) under the risk-neutral density
is equal to P0 = E [PT exp f rfTg].14 Note that in any rational expectations equilibrium,
P0 is equal to the market value of equity at the e¤ort level e chosen by the manager
under the observed contract, so P0 (e) is equal to the observed market capitalization.
We show in Appendix B that the optimal contract w (PT ) for the problem in (5) to
(7) can then be written as:
w (PT ) =
8><>: w
R + (0 + 1 lnPT )
1
1  if PT > bP
w if PT  bP ; (11)
where 0 and 1 depend on the two Lagrange multipliers, the production function P0 (e),
and the cost function C(e). bP is uniquely dened by:

 
wR   w = 0 + 1 ln bP  wR   w + (1  )0 + 1 ln bP 11  : (12)
13This specication ignores dividends for simplicity of exposition. We include dividends in our numerical
analysis.
14Here and in the following all expectations are taken with respect to the probability distribution of
u  N (0; 1). Instead of writing PT (u; e) and w (PT (u; e)) as functions of u we submerge reference to u
for ease of exposition.
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Hence, we can represent the non-linear LA-contract by the coe¢ cients 0 and 1 and
write it as CLA = f0; 1g. This specication implies that the contract predicted by the
model is strictly increasing in PT and that it is convex as long as
PT  exp f= (1  )  0=1g :
Above this value w (PT ) is concave. It is therefore an empirical question whether the
contract described in equation (11) can explain option contracts, because the concave
region may or may not be empirically relevant.
All parameters of the model given by equations (11) and (12) except 0 and 1 can
be determined from standard data sources and from experimental results in the literature
(see Section 4.2). We determine the remaining two parameters 0 and 1 numerically as
described in the following paragraph.
Finding optimal contracts. Our null hypothesis is that the observed contract wd (PT )
is an optimal contract. Here and in the following we use the superscript "d" in order to
refer to observed values or "data." Since wd (PT ) is optimal under the null, it can be
rationalized as the outcome of an optimization program, where we assume that prefer-
ences are parameterized as in equation (1) and that the technology is parameterized as
in (10). (The program is specied in equations (46) to (48) in Appendix A.) If wd (PT ) is
indeed optimal, then it should not be possible to nd another contract that (i) provides
the same incentives as the observed contract, (ii) provides the same utility to the CEO as
the observed contract, and (iii) costs less to shareholders compared to the observed con-
tract. We therefore determine the contract parameters by solving the following program
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numerically:
min
C
 (w(PT jC )) 
Z
w(PT jC )f(PT )dPT (13)
s:t:
Z
V (w(PT jC )) f(PT )dPT 
Z
V (wd (PT ))f(PT )dPT ; (14)Z
V (w(PT jC )) @f(PT )
@P0
dPT 
Z
V (wd (PT ))
@f(PT )
@P0
dPT : (15)
This program uses a slightly more general notation as we write the wage function as
w(PT jC ), where C can refer to di¤erent types of contracts. For the time being, we only
consider C = CLA = f0; 1g.15 By writing PT as in equation (10) and setting P0 (e) equal
to the observed value of the rm, we treat the (unknown) e¤ort level of the CEO as given.
We can then write the density without reference to the level of e¤ort as f(PT ).
E¤ectively, we follow Grossman and Hart (1983) and divide the solution to the op-
timal contracting problem into two stages, where the rst stage solves for the optimal
contract for a given level of e¤ort and determines the cost of implementing this e¤ort
level. The second stage solves for the optimal contract by trading o¤ the costs and ben-
ets of contracts that are optimal at the rst stage. We focus only on the rst stage by
solving program (13) to (15) as it does not depend on knowledge of the cost function C (e)
or of the production function P0 (e). We therefore do not consider the second stage. This
implies also that we cannot analyze the optimal level of incentives (pay for performance
sensitivity) for a compensation contract, which would inevitably depend on this informa-
tion. However, with our approach we can analyze the optimal structure of compensation
contracts for any given level of incentives.
Proposition 1 provides only necessary but not su¢ cient conditions. We therefore
15The optimal contract (11) is completely determined by the two parameters 0 and 1. As the
constraints (14) and (15) always bind in the optimum, these constraints uniquely dene the optimal
contract, and no further optimization is necessary. Hence, the optimal general contract can be calculated
with a system of two equations (14) and (15) in two unknowns 0 and 1. The piecewise-linear contract
(16) has three parameters, so for this contract we solve the complete problem (13) to (15).
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solve the optimization problem for di¤erent starting values in order to nd the global
optimum.16 For none of the CEOs in our sample and none of the parameter constellations
considered did we nd any indication that there is more than one local optimum.
Program (13) to (15) generates a new contract w (PT ) that is less costly to share-
holders. Condition (15) ensures that the CEO has at least the same incentives under the
new contract as she had under the observed contract, so that the contract found by the
program will not result in a reduced level of e¤ort (assuming the validity of condition (9)).
Similarly, condition (14) ensures that the contract found by the program provides at least
the same value to the CEO as the observed contract, so it should also be acceptable to
the CEO. We can then compare the observed contract wd (PT ) with the optimal contract
w (PT ) generated by program (13) to (15).
Piecewise-linear contracts Observed contracts consist of salaries, bonus payments,
and holdings of corporate securities in addition to many other provisions and perquisites.
We simplify observed contracts by assuming that they only consist of a xed salary d
that is paid at time zero, ndS shares and n
d
O options, where the total number of shares the
company has outstanding is normalized to one. Hence, we write
wd (PT ) = 
derfT + ndSPT + n
d
Omax (PT  K; 0) ; (16)
where K is the strike price of the option. We abstract from other details of observed con-
tracts and consolidate each CEOs portfolio of options into one representative option (see
Section 4.2 for details). The main reason is that di¤erent option grants have di¤erent ma-
turities and can therefore not be modeled within the standard one-period principal-agent
model. We comment on the restrictions imposed by this simplication in the conclusion.
16We calculate all our results for three di¤erent starting values and have experimented with six di¤erent
starting values for a subset of our dataset.
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Since the observed contract is piecewise linear and expressed as a tuple of the xed
salary , the number of shares nS, and the number of options nO, we also calculate
optimal contracts that are restricted to be piecewise linear. We will compute the piecewise
linear LA-contract as the solution to program (13) to (15) and denote this contract by
CLALin =

LA; nLAS ; n
LA
O
	
. Here the strike price K and the maturity T of the option grant
are set equal to the strike price and maturity of the representative option that is estimated
from the data. We also compare the LA-model with the RA-model and calculate optimal
piecewise-linear RA-contracts, which we denote by CRALin =

RA; nRAS ; n
RA
O
	
. This is the
solution to program (13) to (15) with C = CRALin, where the wage function is again piecewise
linear as in (16) and preferences are given by (3) or (4).
Comparing model contracts with observed contracts. We use metrics that mea-
sure the average distance between optimal contracts and observed contracts. We want
to analyze to what extent the model predicts the observed composition of the contract
between stock and options, so we dene the metric DLin as:
DiLin =
26664
0@n;iS   nd;iS
S| {z }
1A2
error(nS)
+
0@n;iO   nd;iO
O| {z }
1A2
error(nO)
37775
1=2
; (17)
where : S =
vuut 1
N
NX
i=1

nd;iS   nd
2
; O =
vuut 1
N
NX
i=1

nd;iO   ndO
2
:
Here summation is over all N CEOs in the sample. Arithmetic means over all CEOs
are denoted by a bar. This metric measures the distance between the observed contract
and the model contract and gives more weight to those parameters that have lower cross-
sectional dispersion. DLin does not take into account xed salaries, because these may
be determined by considerations outside the model, in particular the CEOs bargaining
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power. In our formalization of the game shareholders have all the bargaining power,
but this assumption does not a¤ect the shape of the optimal contract.17 If the CEO
had some or all of the bargaining power then the shape of the optimal contract would
still be dictated by optimal risk sharing considerations and the CEO would extract a
bargaining rent through a higher base salary. For these reasons the accurate prediction
of base salaries is a less important feature of the model than the prediction of the mix of
stock and options. Still, we want to investigate to what extent both models predict base
salaries correctly and therefore dene a second metric DLinS analogous to DLin, where
DLinS also includes the squared deviations of the base salary, error() =
i di

, where 
is the cross-sectional standard deviation of base salaries in the sample.
A similar approach to ours was used in Carpenter (1998) and Bettis, Bizjak, and
Lemmon (2005).18 To check the robustness of this approach, we experimented with alter-
native metrics obtained by di¤erent weighting schemes and di¤erent approaches to scaling
the squared or absolute di¤erences between model parameters and observed parameters.
We found that all plausible approaches yield qualitatively similar results. This is not
surprising because the incentive compatibility constraint (15) and the participation con-
straint (14) ensure that deviations from the observed value for one parameter result in
deviations for the other two parameters as well. For example, an increase in the number
of options increases incentives and therefore generates a lower number of shares. Hence,
large deviations for one parameter result in similarly large deviations for the other pa-
rameter (or one of the other two parameters in case of DLinS), so that the scaling and
weighting of any single parameter relative to the other is largely inconsequential.
17This statement is strictly true for preferences with constant absolute risk aversion. With constant
relative risk aversion, bargaining power a¤ects CEOswealth, and thereby their attitude to risk as well
as the shape of the contract. This e¤ect is ignored in the discussion above.
18The main di¤erence between their approach and ours is that we calibrate our model to individual
observations, whereas they calibrate their models to sample averages.
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4.2 Data
We identify all CEOs in the ExecuComp database who are CEO for the entire scal years
2004 and 2005. We also delete all CEOs who where executives in more than one company
in either 2004 or 2005 and separately estimate CEOscontracts in 2004 and in 2005. The
2004 contracts are only needed to construct the reference wage for 2005. We set P0 equal
to the market capitalization at the end of 2004 and take the dividend rate d, the stock
price volatility , and the proportion of shares owned by the CEO ndS from the 2004 data,
while the xed salary d is calculated from 2005 data.19
Option portfolios. We estimate the option portfolio held by the CEO from 2004 data
using the procedure proposed by Core and Guay (2002). We then map this option portfolio
into one representative option by rst setting the number of options nO equal to the sum of
the options in the option portfolio. Then we determine the strike priceK and the maturity
T of the representative option such that nO representative options have the same market
value and the same Black-Scholes option delta as the estimated option portfolio. We take
into account the fact that most CEOs exercise their stock options before maturity by
multiplying the maturity of the individual options in the estimated portfolio by 0.7 before
calculating the representative option (see also Huddart and Lang, 1996, and Carpenter,
1998). The maturity T determines the contracting period and the risk-free rate rf is the
U.S. government bond rate from January 2005 with maturity closest to T .
Minimum wage. For the minimum wage we rely on the argument above that the
CEOs wage cannot drop below  W0. Such a contract requires that the CEO invests all
her non-rm wealth in securities of her rm. There is anecdotal evidence that newly hired
19This reects the fact that stock and options are stock variables measured at the end of the period
whereas base salary is a ow measured during the period.  is the sum of the following four ExecuComp
data types: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, and All Other Total. We do not include LTIP (long-term
incentive pay), as these are typically not awarded annually.
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executives are asked to invest some of their private wealth into their new company. In our
base case, we therefore set the minimum wage w equal to  W0. We argue that we should
not exclude contracts with negative payouts just because we rarely observe them. Instead,
a good model should generate contracts with non-negative payouts. Nevertheless, we also
repeat our analysis with the minimum wage set equal to zero, an assumption that is more
commonly made in the literature.
Wealth. We need an estimate of the CEOs non-rm wealth to evaluate relative risk
aversion for the RA-model and the lower bound w on the wage function for both models.
We estimate the portion of each CEOs wealth that is not tied up in securities of his or her
company from historical data. We cumulate the CEOs income from salary, bonus, and
other compensation payments, add the proceeds from sales of securities, and subtract the
costs from exercising options. In order to obtain meaningful wealth estimates, we delete
all CEOs with less than ve years history as executive of any rm in the database. After
deleting 4 CEOs of rms with stock volatility exceeding 250%, our data set contains 595
CEOs.
Table 3.1 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for all variables in our data set. The
median CEO receives a xed salary of $1.7m, owns 0.3% of the rms equity and has
options on another 1% of the rms equity. The median rm value is $2.3bn and the
median moneyness K=P0 is 0.7, so most options are clearly in the money. The median
maturity is 4.4 years. The distributions of the contract parameters are highly skewed, so
their means are substantially larger than their medians. We also provide the same data
for 576 CEOs in 1997 in order to show that the observed parameters are broadly similar to
those observed in 2005. Apart from lower rm values and lower xed salaries we see that
volatility was lower, moneyness higher and option maturities somewhat longer compared
to the 2005 data set. Option holdings have almost doubled over the interval from 1997 to
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Table 3.1: Description of the dataset. This table displays mean, standard deviation, and
the 10%, 50% and 90% quantiles of eleven variables for our main sample of 595 CEOs
from 2005 (Panel A) and a second sample of 576 CEOs from 1997 (Panel B). "Value of
Contract" is the market value of the compensation package  = +nSP0+nOBS, where
BS is the Black-Scholes option value. All dollar amounts are given in thousands.
Mean Std. Dev. 10% Quantile Median 90% Quantile
Panel A: Sample for 2005
Stock n S 1.87% 5.18% 0.04% 0.31% 3.78%
Options n O 1.44% 1.42% 0.15% 1.03% 3.24%
Fixed Salary Φ $2,496 $3,107 $594 $1,675 $4,694
Value of Contract π $178,966 $1,887,655 $5,523 $29,837 $157,961
Non-firm Wealth W 0 $33,285 $113,239 $2,268 $10,298 $60,858
Firm Value P 0 $10,650,934 $30,260,334 $342,422 $2,274,781 $19,810,415
Strike Price K $8,243,201 $26,213,423 $242,240 $1,479,528 $13,915,001
Moneyness K /P 0 70.06% 20.54% 40.26% 70.81% 98.94%
Maturity T 4.58 1.30 3.39 4.44 6.01
Stock Volatility σ 42.83% 21.42% 22.90% 36.10% 75.10%
Dividend Rate d 1.24% 2.70% 0.00% 0.61% 3.28%
Panel B: Sample for 1997
Stock n S 2.50% 6.01% 0.02% 0.28% 8.32%
Options n O 1.01% 1.35% 0.00% 0.56% 2.54%
Fixed Salary Φ $1,786 $4,454 $459 $1,141 $2,966
Value of Contract π $118,319 $1,046,636 $2,409 $15,528 $93,686
Non-firm Wealth W 0 $15,270 $67,782 $1,186 $4,253 $25,807
Firm Value P 0 $5,236,535 $11,209,383 $258,109 $1,540,377 $11,284,427
Strike Price K $3,777,856 $8,251,907 $192,662 $1,085,677 $8,186,544
Moneyness K /P 0 76.27% 22.43% 47.93% 77.15% 100.00%
Maturity T 5.58 1.86 4.10 5.22 7.34
Stock Volatility σ 29.28% 13.11% 16.20% 26.00% 47.40%
Dividend Rate d 1.83% 1.90% 0.00% 1.46% 4.42%
Variable
2005. We conduct our analysis for the 2005 dataset and provide the key results also for
the 1997 dataset as a robustness check.
Reference point. Prospect theory does not provide us with clear guidance with respect
to the reference point. The reference wage is the wage below which the CEO regards the
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payments she receives from the company as a loss. We therefore study alternative values
for the reference wage and assume that the reference wage reects expectations the CEO
forms based on her previous years (i.e. 2004) compensation package. It seems natural
that the CEO regards a total compensation (xed and variable) below the xed salary
of the previous year as a loss and we use this as a lower bound. In addition, she may
also build in some part of her deferred compensation into her reference wage. Most likely,
she will evaluate her securities at a substantial discount relative to their value for a well-
diversied investor. This discount depends on her attitude to risk and on her framing of
the wage-setting process. We therefore regard the market value of her existing contract
based on the current stock price and the number of shares and options she inherited from
the previous period as a (rather implausible) upper bound for the reference wage.20 We
denote the market value of her deferred compensation in 2005 based on the number of
shares and options she held in 2004 by MV and write:
wR2005 () = 2004 +  MV (nS2004; nO2004; P2005) ; (18)
The parameter  is an index of the discount the CEO applies to her deferred compensation.
If  = 0, then the reference wage for 2005 equals her base salary for 2004. If  = 1, then
the reference wage equals the market value of her total compensation in the previous year,
valued at current market prices and without a discount for risk. We will look at a grid
of alternative values for . The distribution of deferred compensation is highly skewed.
If CEOs set their reference points based on the median of the distribution, then CEOs
reference points will be below the market value, i.e.  < 1.
20De Meza and Webb (2007) develop a related argument why this discount may be substantial.
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Preference parameters. For the preference parameters , , and  we rely on the
experimental literature for guidance. We therefore use  =  = 0:88 and  = 2:25 as our
baseline values.21
5 Contracts with restricted stock and options
We now describe the piecewise-linear contracts predicted by the LA-model and compare
them to the contracts predicted by the standard RA-model. Minimization of program (13)
to (15) is subject to two additional constraints: First, option awards can become negative
(i.e. managers can be required to write options), but the managers short position in
options cannot exceed her stock holdings nSedT , so nO >  nSedT .22 This restricts the
wage function to be non-decreasing. Similarly, we assume limited liability, so the base
salary is limited by the managers non-rm wealth ( >  W0). For each CEO, we compare
the observed contract with the optimal piecewise-linear contract for the LA-model and
for the RA-model.
Table 3.2 Panel A summarizes the results for the LA-Model for seven di¤erent levels
of the reference wage as parameterized by  (see equation (18)). Panel B shows the results
for the RA-model for seven values of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion .23 Panel C
21See Tversky and Kahneman (1992). These values have become somewhat of a standard in the
literature, see for example Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Langer and Weber (2001), Berkelaar, Kouwenberg
and Post (2004), Barberis and Huang (2008). For experimental studies on the preference parameters
which yield parameter values in a comparable range see Abdellaoui (2000) and Abdellaoui, Vossmann,
and Weber (2005).
22If the dividend yield d = 0, then this constraint becomes nO >  nS . We abstract from dividends in
our theoretical analysis, but we do consider them in our empirical work.
23We do not consider values of  below 0:1 in Table 3.2 as they lead to numerical problems. When
the manager is risk neutral, then the optimal contract is indeterminate and the numerical problems for
low values of  reect this indeterminacy. The literature on executive compensation has often discussed
values for  in the range between 2 and 3. Hall and Murphy (2000) use these values that seem to go back
to Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991). Lambert and Larcker (2004) more recently proposed a value
as low as 0.5. A useful point of reference here is the portfolio behavior of the CEO, since very low levels
of risk aversion (below 1) imply that CEOs have implausibly highly leveraged investments in the stock
market. Ingersoll (2006) develops a parametrization of the RA-model that is su¢ ciently similar to ours
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shows the same results for the RA-model for constant-absolute-risk-aversion preferences
(equation (4)), where the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion is chosen so that relative
risk aversion corresponds to the values in Panel B.24 For each model we show the means
and medians of the contract parameters predicted by the models and the scaled mean
deviations of these predicted parameters from their observed counterparts (referred to as
errors in equation (17)).
Both parameterizations of the RA-model predict negative base salaries and negative
option holdings, so optimal RA-contracts are concave, conrming what we expected based
on the theoretical analysis above (see also Figure 3.1). Both versions of the RA-model
predict larger stock holdings, although the scaled deviations are smaller here because
the cross-sectional standard deviations of stockholdings is 5.2% and therefore almost four
times as large as the standard deviation of option holdings, which is 1.4% (see Table 3.1).
Given the similarity of the two parameterizations of the RA-model, we will focus on one
model from now on. The CRRA-model performs better than the CARA-model in terms
of the metric DLinS for all levels of risk aversion, and also better in terms of DLin for
lower levels of risk aversion. We want to make sure not to bias our analysis in favor of
the LA-model and therefore focus our analysis and all comparisons on the CRRA-version
from now on.
The performance of the LA-model is very sensitive to the assumed reference wage.
For lower values of the reference wage ( = 0 to  = 0:2) the LA-model predicts values for
all contract parameters that are broadly consistent with the data. The scaled deviations
but includes investments in the stock market. Using his equation (8) and assuming a risk premium on
the stock market as low as 4% and a standard deviation of the market return of 20% gives an investment
in the stock market (including exposure to the stock market through holding securities in his own rm)
equal to 1=. E.g.,  = 0:1, the lowest value considered in Table 3.2, would imply that the CEO invests
ten times her wealth in the stock market. We do not wish to take a restrictive stance in order not to bias
our analysis in favor of the LA-model and therefore allow for levels of risk aversion as low as 0:1, even
though we regard such values as highly implausible.
24The coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion  is calculated from  as:  = =(W0 + 0), where 0 is the
market value of the managers contract (i.e., the costs of the contract to the rm).
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are below 0:5 in absolute value for  = 0:1 and  = 0:2 for all three contract parameters.
While the option holdings are smaller than observed, the predicted magnitudes are similar
to the observed magnitudes and median option holdings are positive for all values of the
reference wage up to and including  = 0:4. Overall, the LA-model performs well as long
as we assume that managers have reference points that are closer to their xed salaries
(which, in our simplication, includes bonus payments) than to the market value of their
total compensation.
The t of the LA-model deteriorates markedly for high values of the reference point
( > 0:4). It then becomes similar to both parameterizations of the RA-model and
predicts negative median option holdings and negative median base salaries, with scaled
deviations in excess of 1 in absolute value. The reason is that options can limit losses
only if the reference wage wR is su¢ ciently low. Both models feature higher base salaries
if incentives are provided with options, and lower base salaries if incentives are provided
with shares because shares are worth more to the manager than options for the same
level of incentives, and the participation constraint then requires that base salaries are
adjusted accordingly. With a low reference wage, option compensation together with a
high base salary ensures that total compensation almost never falls below the reference
wage. However, with a high reference wage this is not the case and then the manager
incurs large losses when the options expire out of the money, and then incentive provision
through shares becomes optimal.
For very low reference wages any feasible contract will only pay o¤ in the gain space
and the loss space becomes irrelevant. As the manager is slightly risk-averse in the gain
space, the optimal contract would then contain no options and only stock (assuming this
is feasible) just as in the RA-model with a low value of . This is the reason why the
LA-model predicts the largest option holdings for  = 0:1, where it is also most accurate.
We can illustrate this point with the help of Figure 3.1 above. E¤ectively, the
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piecewise-linear contract attempts to approximate the general non-linear contract as well
as possible. As we increase the reference wage, the discontinuity of the general non-linear
contract moves to the right, i.e., P^ becomes larger and moves more towards the center
of the distribution. This is reected in the average probability of loss, Pr(w(PT )  wR),
in Table 3.2 Panel A. The optimal non-linear contract is locally concave at P^ : It jumps
discretely and then has a very small, positive slope. If the jump at bP is in the center
of the distribution, this local concavity is important and the best approximation with
a piecewise-linear contract is achieved through a concave contract with negative option
holdings. We further analyze the relationship between the optimal general contract and
the optimal piecewise-linear contract in Section 6 below.
These qualitative observations are also reected in the metric DLin computed from
equation (17). Its median is above one in absolute value for both versions of the RA-
model and for all parameterizations of the LA-model with high reference points (  0:6).
This conrms our conclusion that the LA-model works well for low reference wages. It
achieves the optimum at  = 0:1, whereas the RA-model works best if risk aversion is
either very low or very high. The lowest distances between observed contracts and RA-
model contracts occur for the highest levels of risk aversion. Recall that the RA-model
always replaces all options with shares. High risk aversion reduces the incentives from
options more than those from stock, so optimal contracts feature fewer additional shares
to replace the existing options compared to lower levels of risk aversion. The accuracy of
the model is therefore higher for higher levels of risk aversion.
The RA-model also becomes slightly more accurate if risk aversion decreases and
converges to zero. This reects the fact that any observed contract is optimal (i.e. cost
minimizing) if the agent is risk neutral ( = 0), because subjective values are then identical
to market values and all contracts that generate the same incentives are equally costly.
The values for the metric DLinS, which also considers base salaries, are larger than those
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for DLin by construction and the qualitative results are similar to those for DLin.
An important limitation of the analysis in Table 3.2 is the fact that it confounds two
aspects of our problem. First, we analyze and compare di¤erent approaches to modeling
attitudes to risk. Second, we also vary the overall attitude to risk as we change the
reference wage, respectively, the degree of relative risk aversion. It therefore does not seem
warranted to compare all parameterizations of the LA-model with all parameterizations of
the RA-model. Instead, it is more sensible to compare the two models based on comparable
parameterizations that hold the overall attitude to risk constant in a meaningful way.
Then we can be sure that di¤erences between the models do not reect implicit di¤erences
in the overall attitude to risk. We therefore compare parameterizations that generate
the same valuation of the observed contract by the same CEO. We dene the certainty
equivalent of modelM , CEM , from E
 
V M
 
wd (PT )

= V (CEM). We x  to determine
the reference wage of each CEO and then dene an equivalent degree of relative risk
aversion e from
CELA(wd; )  CERA(wd; e) : (19)
We refer to the value of e that satises (19) as the equivalent degree of relative risk
aversion, because it holds the certainty equivalent constant. A straightforward implication
of this step is that we also hold the risk premium paid by shareholders, E(wd)  C(wd),
constant for both models. For each CEO and for each  we calculate the equivalent e
and the optimal RA-contract with  = e. Table 3.3 compares the two models.
Table 3.3 Panel A reports the mean and the median di¤erence DRALin   DLALin of the
distance metric DLin between the two models (as of now the RA-model refers to the
CRRA-preferences). The verdict based on the mean and median of DLin as well as
that based on the median of DLinS is clear and independent of the overall attitude to
risk: The LA-model dominates the RA-model for the entire range of reference wages.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of loss-aversion model with matched risk-aversion model. This
table compares the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equivalent optimal (constant
relative) risk-aversion contract where each CEO has constant relative risk aversion with
parameter , which is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent
for the observed contract (equation (19)). Contracts are piecewise linear, and options
and salary can become negative (nO   nSedT ;    W0). Panel A shows the aver-
age equivalent  , mean and median of the di¤erence between the two distance metrics
DLin and DLinS between the RA-model and the LA-model, and the frequency of these
di¤erences being positive. ***, **, * denote signicance of the T-test for zero mean and,
respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Panel B shows the frequency of optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive opti-
mal salaries, and the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are
shown for eleven di¤erent reference wages parameterized by . Some observations are lost
because of numerical problems.
Panel A: Accuracy
0.0 594 0.21 96.63% 2.751 *** 0.923 *** 96.63% 9.682 *** 3.673 ***
0.1 578 0.28 97.23% 2.644 *** 0.875 *** 97.40% 9.424 *** 3.833 ***
0.2 571 0.41 91.77% 2.040 *** 0.625 *** 92.12% 6.499 *** 2.956 ***
0.3 577 0.52 87.69% 1.541 *** 0.441 *** 88.73% 0.909 1.552 ***
0.4 585 0.68 89.74% 1.196 *** 0.298 *** 88.72% -2.263 0.591 ***
0.5 586 0.83 90.96% 0.946 *** 0.271 *** 88.40% -4.111 0.248 ***
0.6 586 0.95 90.27% 0.720 *** 0.247 *** 86.01% -7.722 0.092 ***
0.7 582 1.04 88.66% 0.590 *** 0.235 *** 83.33% -11.767 0.070 ***
0.8 582 1.09 86.43% 0.589 *** 0.217 *** 79.04% -6.276 0.047 ***
0.9 579 1.06 84.11% 0.504 *** 0.183 *** 78.07% -0.207 0.033 ***
1.0 581 0.98 82.10% 0.380 *** 0.138 *** 76.94% -0.586 0.024 ***
Mean
Average
equivalent
γ
θ Obs.
MedianPercent> 0
Percent
> 0
D Lin (RA) - D Lin (LA)
Mean Median
D LinS (RA) - D LinS (LA)
Panel B: Positive option holdings and positive base salaries
RA LA RA LA RA LA
0.0 30.81% 83.33% 1.68% 59.60% 0.34% 52.53%
0.1 30.10% 91.00% 1.56% 77.51% 0.00% 74.22%
0.2 28.20% 81.96% 1.93% 62.70% 0.35% 60.25%
0.3 28.08% 68.28% 1.56% 46.79% 0.35% 44.02%
0.4 25.81% 56.92% 1.37% 32.65% 0.00% 30.60%
0.5 25.60% 48.29% 1.71% 20.65% 0.34% 19.28%
0.6 22.53% 41.30% 1.54% 12.80% 0.00% 11.09%
0.7 20.79% 36.60% 2.06% 8.59% 0.00% 6.36%
0.8 20.96% 33.68% 2.06% 6.53% 0.00% 4.12%
0.9 21.24% 32.47% 2.25% 4.15% 0.17% 2.59%
1.0 22.20% 31.50% 2.07% 3.27% 0.00% 1.89%
θ
Percent with positive options
and salary
Percent with positive fixed
salary
Percent with positive option
holdings
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The distribution of DLinS is skewed, so we sometimes obtain di¤erent indications for
means and medians. Note that the mean of DRALinS  DLALinS is never signicantly di¤erent
from zero when it is negative, so the RA-model never dominates the LA-model for any
parametrization and any test. However, the RA-model ts the data better than the LA-
model according to DLinS for a small number of observations (3% - 23% of the sample),
some of which generate extreme deviations for the LA-model. We investigate this in
more detail in Table 3.10 below and show that the large deviations occur primarily for
owner-CEOs who own a large fraction of their companies.
The equivalent es are generally very low and below the range we regard as plausible
(see Footnote 23). They are also non-monotonic in : As the reference wage increases
or decreases far enough, the kink of the value function moves into the tails of the payo¤
distribution for the CEO, so that overall risk aversion (which is captured by e) becomes
smaller.
Table 3.3 Panel B reports how successful the two models are in explaining the two
stylized facts that xed salaries and option holdings are almost always positive for observed
CEO pay contracts. The LA-model predicts positive option holdings for 91% of the sample
for  = 0:1, the value that also yields the best approximation overall. Moreover, the LA-
model predicts positive salaries for the majority of all CEOs when   0:2 and then it also
predicts simultaneously positive option holdings and positive base salaries. By contrast,
the number of cases where the RA-model predicts simultaneously positive option holdings
and positive salaries is virtually zero. The model reduces options and exchanges them
for more stock and lower salaries until either the restriction on salaries (   W0) or
the restriction on option holdings (nO   nSedT ) binds. This model can therefore never
explain positive option holdings and positive salaries simultaneously, while more than 99%
of the CEOs in our sample have such a contract. Altogether, the LA-model can generate
the qualitative characteristics of observed contracts for the majority of the CEOs in our
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Figure 3.2: The gure shows the observed contract, the LA-contract and the RA-contract
for the CEO with ExecID # 4550 for  = 0:1,  = 0:3, and  = 0:6. The horizontal
axis shows the terminal stock price PT as a percentage of the current stock price P0. The
vertical axis displays the total payo¤ w (PT ) for each type of contract.
sample, provided we parameterize the model appropriately. The RA-model is clearly
inferior on this dimension.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the results from Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for the case of a typical
CEO and provides also a visual impression of the distance metric and the corresponding
observed and predicted wage functions. The gure shows the optimal LA-contract, the
optimal RA-contract and the observed contract for the same CEO for  = 0:1,  = 0:3,
and for  = 0:6. For  = 0:1, the LA-contract and the observed contract are visually
indistinguishable with a value of DLALin = 0:04 for the distance metric. By contrast, the
corresponding RA-contract is concave and di¤ers substantially from the observed contract,
which is reected in a higher value of the distance metric of DRALin = 1:19. For  = 0:3, the
LA-model predicts a convex contract with positive option holdings, but with a negative
base salary. Here the LA-model still performs much better than the RA-model. For
 = 0:6 both models perform poorly, but the deterioration is somewhat stronger for the
LA-model than it is for the RA-model, even though the LA-model still dominates.
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Finally, we observe that our results on optimal contracts rely entirely on risk-sharing
considerations. In particular, shareholders objective to reduce the CEOs rents never
plays a role in our analysis. Both, the theoretical contract (11) and the observed contract
may provide the agent with a positive rent 25. Any rent the agent receives in the observed
contract is preserved in our calibrations, because the participation constraint in our nu-
merical work (14) ensures that the agents utility from the optimal contract is never lower
than her utility from the observed contract. Empirically, constraint (14) is always binding
in our sample, so the optimal contract provides the agent with exactly the same rent as
the observed contract.
6 General non-linear loss-aversion contracts
Our analysis in the previous section relies on a stylized piecewise linear representation of
contracts. However, our theoretical analysis above shows that the optimal contract is non-
linear. In this section we describe and analyze the optimal non-linear contracts generated
by the loss-aversion model in order to gain a better understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages of this model.
One feature of the optimal non-linear contract in the LA-model is the discrete jump
at the point P^ from w to some number above wR. This jump can be interpreted as
a dismissal of the manager, and we will also use the word "dismissal" in the tables for
brevity. In practice, however, dismissals do not always generate a sharp drop in the payo¤
function, for example when managers receive su¢ cient severance pay to compensate them
for their loss of compensation. We do not have data on severance pay and we therefore
abstract from this aspect.
25Our preference specication (2) implies that the agents lowest possible utility is bounded away
from minus innity, so rents cannot be precluded (see Proposition 2 in Grossman and Hart, 1983). In
the observed contract, rents could additionally be caused by rigid salaries (i.e. liquidity constraints) or
managerial power.
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We develop some heuristics that allow us to compare model contracts to observed
contracts. In particular, we look at the average slopes of the non-linear contract. We
dene:
Low 
Z K
0
@w (PT )
@PT
f (PT )
F (K)
dPT ; (20)
High 
Z 1
K
@w (PT )
@PT
f (PT )
1  F (K)dPT : (21)
Here Low is the average slope in the region below the strike price of the option, which
can be compared to the number of shares nS. High is the average slope in the region
above the strike price and can be compared to shares and options combined.
We are also interested in the convexity and the concavity of the optimal contracts
and we analyze this in two ways. First, we ask if the slope in the high range of terminal
stock prices, High, exceeds the slope in the lower range, Low. This would correspond
to positive option holdings. Second, from (11) we can determine the inection point PI
of each contract, so that the contract is convex for all terminal stock prices below PI and
concave above this point. We use the probability that the predicted contract pays o¤ in
the convex range, Pr (w (PT )  PI) as another descriptive statistic.26
Finally, we dene the dismissal probability p of the optimal model contract as
p(P^ ) 
Z P^
0
f (PT ) dPT : (22)
We have no reliable method to evaluate individual dismissal probabilities for CEOs. We
estimate the average probability of dismissal by calculating the frequency with which
CEOs in the ExecuComp database leave the company within a given four-year period,
26There are some CEOs where PI  P^ , so the LA-contract has a slope of zero up to the discontinuity
and then becomes concave. For these CEOs we calculate Pr

w (PT )  P^

.
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Table 3.4: This table describes the optimal non-linear loss-aversion contract. The table
shows the average slope of the wage function below the observed strike price Low, the
average slope of the wage function above the observed strike price High, and the fre-
quency with which High > Low. In addition, the table shows (i) the average dismissal
probability, dened as the probability with which the contract pays the minimum wage w,
(ii) the incentives from dismissals that are generated by the drop to the minimum wage
w, and (iii) the mean inection quantile, which is the quantile at which the curvature
of the optimal wage function changes from convex to concave. Results are shown for
eleven di¤erent reference wages parameterized by . Some observations are lost because
of numerical problems.
0.0 571 2.06% 2.58% 90.37% 0.65% 1.78% 85.54%
0.1 571 1.57% 2.50% 95.27% 1.46% 3.97% 92.84%
0.2 570 1.07% 2.29% 97.37% 2.84% 7.90% 96.19%
0.3 574 0.88% 2.32% 97.56% 4.46% 12.94% 97.00%
0.4 572 0.73% 1.97% 98.08% 6.60% 19.21% 97.60%
0.5 573 0.69% 2.11% 98.25% 8.80% 25.79% 97.94%
0.6 573 0.52% 1.93% 98.25% 11.42% 33.60% 98.12%
0.7 574 0.40% 1.78% 98.08% 13.96% 41.07% 98.07%
0.8 569 0.35% 1.59% 98.24% 16.44% 48.31% 98.21%
0.9 563 0.31% 1.54% 98.93% 18.83% 54.43% 98.68%
1.0 547 0.28% 1.36% 98.90% 21.08% 59.85% 98.41%
Percent
ΔHigh > ΔLow
Mean
Dismissal
Probability
Mean
Inflection
Quantile
Incentives from
DismissalsObs.
Mean
ΔHigh
θ
Mean
ΔLow
where the recorded reason is "resigned." we repeat this for all four-year periods between
1995 and 2004 and obtain an average dismissal probability of 7.4%. This number is
inferred from a cross-section and the ex ante probabilities may well vary across CEOs.
However, we have no reliable way of modeling this heterogeneity here, so we can only
compare the mean generated by the model with the mean in the data.
Table 3.4 reports the average slopes Low and High, the dismissal probability, and
the quantile of the inection point for di¤erent parameterizations. We also report the
percentage of those CEOs where High > Low. The contracts predicted by the LA-
model are mostly convex by both measures of convexity. The slope in the upper range,
High is almost always higher than the slope in the lower range, Low. Similarly, almost
all of the probability mass for this contract lies to the left of the inection point, rendering
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the concave part of the contract irrelevant.
The dismissal probabilities are unrealistically high for the LA-model once the ref-
erence point becomes su¢ ciently high ( values above 0:5). This aspect underlines our
earlier assessment that high parameterizations with high reference wages lead to poor
performance of the LA-model. As the reference wage increases, the threat of dismissals
becomes more important. Intuitively, CEOs with a higher reference wage demand a higher
compensation, and they receive it in the sense that their compensation while they are em-
ployed is larger. However, then incentives are provided to a lesser extent through the slope
of the wage function (note how Low and High both tend to decline as wR increases)
and to a larger extent through the threat of dismissals (column seven in Table 3.4).
In principle, the optimal non-linear contract (11) could be approximated with a
su¢ ciently large number of options with di¤erent strike prices, where option holdings are
negative for some strike prices to approximate the discrete jump and the concave part of
the wage function for very high wages. In practice however, we do not observe contracts
with negative option holdings. This raises the question how costly it is to restrict the
contract shape to being piecewise linear, i.e. implementable by xed salary, stock and
one option grant. In Table 3.5 we therefore compare the optimal non-linear contract (11)
with the optimal piecewise-linear contract. For both contracts, the table shows the average
slopes Low and High and the distance metric DNonLin, which parallels our denition of
DLin:27
DNonLin =
24Low  dLow
Low
2
+
 
High  dHigh
High
!2351=2 (23)
where : Low =
vuut 1
N
NX
i=1

d;iLow   dLow
2
; High =
vuut 1
N
NX
i=1

d;iHigh   dHigh
2
:
27Note that for the piecewise-linear contract, Low = nS exp (dT ) and High = nS exp (dT ) + nO.
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Here, d;iLow and 
d;i
High represent the slopes of the observed contract corresponding to (20)
and (21) and dLow and 
d
Low denote their sample averages. In addition, Table 3.5 shows
how much shareholders could save (as a proportion of total observed compensation) if
they could recontract and replace the observed contract with the contract predicted by
the models. These savings from recontracting are dened as
Savings =
E
 
wd (PT )
  E (w (PT ))
E (wd (PT ))
; (24)
or, in words, the percentage reduction in the costs of the optimal predicted contract com-
pared to those of the observed contract. These savings are e¤ectively what is maximized
when our algorithm searches for the optimal contract.
Table 3.5 shows that the accuracy (i.e. the negative of the average DNonLin) of the
general contract is higher than the accuracy of the piecewise-linear contract except for
 = 0. For low reference wages the di¤erence is small, but it increases as the reference
wage increases. By construction, the savings relative to the status-quo of the optimal
general contract are higher than the savings of the piecewise-linear contract.
The savings are not substantial for either version of the contract. This is important,
because it shows that even where the distance between the observed contracts and the
predicted contracts appears large in terms of the metrics developed above, the savings
are insubstantial, particularly for the piecewise-linear contract. The di¤erence in savings
between the piecewise-linear contract and the general non-linear contract is small: It
is 0:4% for  = 0 of total compensation costs and 4:6% for  = 0:4, or $1.37 million
for the median CEO with a pay package worth $29.8 million. This is about 0.06% of
the value of the median company. These savings have to be related to the costs of
writing and enforcing such a general contract. We conclude that the benets of incentive
provision through CEO dismissals with big drops in compensation rather than through
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Table 3.5: This table compares the optimal piecewise-linear loss-aversion contract with
the optimal non-linear loss-aversion contract. For piecewise-linear contracts, options and
salary can become negative (nO   nSedT ,    W0), while the minimum wage equals
minus the CEOs wealth (w =  W0erfT ) for non-linear contracts. For both models, the
table shows the average slope of the wage function below the observed strike price, nSedT
and Low , respectively, the average slope of the wage function above the observed strike
price, nSedT + nO and High, respectively, and the average distance metric DNonLin. In
addition, the table shows the savings [E(wd(PT ))   E(w(PT ))]=E(wd(PT )) the models
predict from switching from the observed contract to the optimal contract. Results are
shown for eleven di¤erent reference wages parameterized by . Some observations are lost
because of numerical problems.
0.0 570 0.0186 0.0273 0.0015 0.1517 0.0206 0.0259 0.0051 0.2208
0.1 557 0.0155 0.0283 0.0041 0.2012 0.0158 0.0252 0.0153 0.1942
0.2 547 0.0186 0.0277 0.0099 0.3859 0.0109 0.0230 0.0335 0.2469
0.3 559 0.0268 0.0290 0.0165 0.4622 0.0089 0.0233 0.0515 0.2787
0.4 567 0.0319 0.0258 0.0228 0.6343 0.0073 0.0197 0.0689 0.4309
0.5 571 0.0410 0.0282 0.0296 0.6233 0.0070 0.0211 0.0844 0.4338
0.6 570 0.0466 0.0266 0.0372 0.7047 0.0052 0.0194 0.1015 0.4855
0.7 573 0.0497 0.0251 0.0434 0.7373 0.0040 0.0178 0.1159 0.5243
0.8 569 0.0516 0.0245 0.0495 0.7384 0.0035 0.0159 0.1298 0.5415
0.9 561 0.0546 0.0255 0.0533 0.7178 0.0031 0.0155 0.1406 0.5566
1.0 546 0.0553 0.0253 0.0564 0.7353 0.0028 0.0136 0.1502 0.5918
Mean
ΔLow
Mean ΔHigh
Mean
Savings
Mean
DNonLin
General Nonlinear Contract
θ Mean
nS
Mean
nS + nO
Obs.
Linear Option Contract
Mean
Savings
Mean
DNonLin
high-powered wage functions is negligible for most companies.
7 Robustness checks
The measurement of wealth. The measurement of non-rm wealth cumulates the
CEOs past income and adjusts for purchases and sales of securities. The actual wealth
may be higher than this (e.g., if the CEO has saved income earned before she enters the
database) or lower (e.g., if the savings rate was less than 100% and some income was
consumed). We therefore check the robustness of our results for measurement errors in
CEO wealth.
Table 3.6 reports the main results of Table 3.3 if we reduce the estimate of wealth by
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Table 3.6: This table contains the main results from repeating our analysis shown in
Table 3.3 when we decrease or increase our wealth estimates by a factor of two. For
Panel A, our wealth estimate W0 is multiplied by 0.5. For Panel B, it is multiplied by 2.
Both panels show the average equivalent , mean and median of the di¤erence between
the two distance metrics DLin and DLinS between the RA-model and the LA-model, and
the frequencies that option holdings and salary are both positive. Results are shown for
eleven di¤erent reference wages parameterized by . Some observations are lost because
of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote signicance of the T-test for zero mean and,
respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A: Results if wealth is reduced by 50%
RA LA
0.0 594 0.17 1.699 *** 0.535 *** 5.149 *** 2.009 *** 0.34% 53.20%
0.1 577 0.23 1.609 *** 0.444 *** 4.880 *** 2.141 *** 0.00% 74.52%
0.2 572 0.33 1.098 *** 0.269 *** 2.660 *** 1.355 *** 0.00% 59.79%
0.3 574 0.42 0.708 *** 0.164 *** -2.406 0.452 *** 0.17% 44.25%
0.4 588 0.54 0.521 *** 0.125 *** -4.898 0.111 *** 0.34% 30.10%
0.5 586 0.66 0.496 *** 0.141 *** -6.259 0.074 *** 0.00% 18.94%
0.6 591 0.77 0.476 *** 0.165 *** -8.734 0.066 *** 0.00% 11.34%
0.7 585 0.84 0.433 *** 0.170 *** -12.122 0.057 *** 0.17% 6.32%
0.8 587 0.88 0.506 *** 0.174 *** -6.056 0.054 *** 0.00% 3.92%
0.9 583 0.86 0.504 *** 0.160 *** 0.320 *** 0.048 *** 0.00% 2.57%
1.0 585 0.81 0.434 *** 0.135 *** 0.140 0.037 *** 0.00% 1.88%
Panel B: Results if wealth is increased by 100%
RA LA
0.0 592 0.27 4.004 *** 1.566 *** 16.516 *** 6.323 *** 0.51% 52.53%
0.1 576 0.38 3.853 *** 1.590 *** 16.151 *** 6.353 *** 0.17% 74.48%
0.2 568 0.57 3.117 *** 1.181 *** 12.290 *** 4.867 *** 0.00% 60.21%
0.3 577 0.71 2.476 *** 0.883 *** 6.270 ** 3.378 *** 0.17% 44.02%
0.4 585 0.93 1.867 *** 0.650 *** 1.745 1.824 *** 0.34% 30.43%
0.5 579 1.14 1.472 *** 0.520 *** -1.197 0.730 *** 0.00% 19.34%
0.6 587 1.31 1.036 *** 0.370 *** -6.131 0.200 *** 0.17% 11.24%
0.7 581 1.42 0.778 *** 0.306 *** -11.383 0.062 *** 0.00% 6.37%
0.8 578 1.48 0.698 *** 0.256 *** -6.242 0.024 0.17% 4.15%
0.9 577 1.43 0.461 *** 0.188 *** -1.660 0.012 0.00% 2.60%
1.0 575 1.33 0.206 ** 0.142 *** -2.376 ** 0.006 ** 0.00% 1.91%
Average
equivalent
γ
θ Obs.
Percent with positive
options and salary
D Lin (RA) - D Lin (LA)
Mean Median
D LinS (RA) - D LinS (LA)
Mean Median
Percent with positive
options and salary
Mean Median
θ Obs.
Average
equivalent
γ
D Lin (RA) - D Lin (LA) D LinS (RA) - D LinS (LA)
Mean Median
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50% (Panel A) and if we increase it by 100% (Panel B). The results are qualitatively very
similar to those reported in Table 3.3 for the base case. The mean and median di¤erence
of DRALin   DLALin is signicantly positive for all levels of the reference wage. The results
are more pronounced compared to those in Table 3.3 if wealth is higher and somewhat
less strong but statistically still highly signicant if wealth is lower. This is so because
the values for the average equivalent  are increased if wealth is higher and reduced if
wealth is lower. In the CRRA-model absolute risk aversion is lower if wealth is higher,
so the equivalent  must be higher with higher wealth, and we observe already in the
discussion of Table 3.2 that very low levels of risk aversion improve the performance of
the RA-model. The mean and median di¤erences of DLinS exhibit the same patterns as
in the base case and the median di¤erence favors the LA-model in all cases. Also, the
percentage of CEOs for whom the xed salary as well as option holdings are positive is
hardly a¤ected by the changes in wealth considered. Overall, none of our results seems
to be a¤ected by measurement errors of CEO wealth.
Restrictions on the wage function. Our analysis of the base case allows for negative
salaries and option holdings. However, many previous authors have imposed tighter re-
strictions and we therefore repeat our analysis and require that salary and option holdings
cannot become negative, i.e.   0 and nO  0.
Table 3.7 reports the results for the model with tighter restrictions and has the same
structure as Table 3.3. Comparison of the restricted model with the unrestricted base
case from Panel B of Tables 3.3 shows that the restrictions have a much stronger impact
on the RA-model than they have on the LA-model. This is not surprising given that
the LA-model already generates non-negative base salaries and option holdings in most
cases, so that tightening the constraints has no impact. However, the RA-model is still
not able to generate positive salaries and positive option holdings simultaneously. One
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Table 3.7: This table contains the results from repeating the analysis shown in Table
3.3 with the stricter constraints that option holdings and salaries must be non-negative
(nO  0,   0). The table compares the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equiv-
alent optimal (constant relative) risk-aversion contract where each CEOs risk aversion
parameter  is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for
the observed contract (equation (19)). Panel A shows the average equivalent , mean and
median of the di¤erence between the two distance metrics DLin and DLinS between the
RA-model and the LA-model, and the frequency of these di¤erences being positive. ***,
**, * denote signicance of the T-test for zero mean and, respectively, the Wilcoxon signed
rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Panel B shows the frequency
of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive optimal salaries, and the
frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are shown for eleven di¤er-
ent reference wages parameterized by . Some observations are lost because of numerical
problems.
Panel A: Accuracy
0.0 588 0.21 49.49% -0.024 0.000 *** 52.04% 0.076 0.024 ***
0.1 574 0.28 50.87% -0.221 *** 0.001 52.96% -0.763 ** 0.030 ***
0.2 569 0.41 39.02% -0.537 *** -0.004 *** 41.12% -2.186 *** -0.001 ***
0.3 573 0.53 50.26% -0.682 *** 0.000 *** 51.13% -6.587 ** 0.000 ***
0.4 584 0.68 61.47% -0.612 *** 0.003 61.99% -8.148 * 0.000
0.5 584 0.83 74.14% -0.465 *** 0.010 *** 73.63% -8.740 0.002 ***
0.6 586 0.95 78.50% -0.394 *** 0.017 *** 77.65% -10.436 0.003 ***
0.7 585 1.05 82.39% -0.354 *** 0.022 *** 81.37% -13.130 0.004 ***
0.8 582 1.09 83.16% -0.189 *** 0.024 *** 81.96% -6.626 0.005 ***
0.9 583 1.06 82.85% -0.111 ** 0.022 *** 82.16% -0.156 *** 0.004 ***
1.0 577 0.98 82.32% -0.110 ** 0.018 *** 81.98% -0.159 *** 0.003 ***
MedianPercent> 0
Percent
> 0
D Lin (RA) - D Lin (LA)
Mean Median
D LinS (RA) - D LinS (LA)
Mean
Average
equivalent
γ
θ Obs.
Panel B: Positive option holdings and positive base salaries
RA LA RA LA RA LA
0.0 84.18% 89.80% 15.82% 65.31% 0.34% 58.33%
0.1 82.93% 94.43% 16.55% 81.71% 0.00% 78.22%
0.2 81.37% 94.73% 17.93% 67.14% 0.18% 64.50%
0.3 81.33% 92.50% 17.45% 53.23% 0.00% 49.91%
0.4 79.79% 90.58% 19.01% 39.73% 0.00% 37.33%
0.5 79.45% 89.55% 19.52% 29.11% 0.17% 27.05%
0.6 78.84% 87.71% 19.97% 20.48% 0.00% 18.09%
0.7 78.80% 87.01% 20.17% 15.21% 0.00% 12.65%
0.8 79.04% 86.08% 20.10% 14.78% 0.00% 12.20%
0.9 78.90% 85.59% 20.41% 12.18% 0.00% 9.61%
1.0 80.94% 85.10% 18.72% 9.01% 0.35% 6.93%
θ
Percent with positive options
and salary
Percent with positive
fixed salary
Percent with positive option
holdings
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of the two new constraints always binds: Either option holdings are equal to zero, then
salary is positive, or the predicted salary is zero and option holdings are positive. The
median values of DLin and DLinS in Table 3.7, Panel A show that for most CEOs the
LA-model still dominates the RA-model for almost all values of the reference wage wR.
In terms of the means of DRALin   DLALin the accuracy of the RA-model increases and is
higher than the accuracy of the LA-model on average in most cases. This shows that
ruling out concave contracts and negative base salaries improves the performance of the
RA-model signicantly and for a minority of cases the RA-model now dominates. We
conclude that the RA-model is only able to generate positive salaries or positive option
holdings if we impose this as a restriction on the maximization problem, but even with
these assumptions the LA-model still dominates the RA-model for the typical CEO.
Data from 1997. The data for the 2005 cross-section of CEOs on ExecuComp may be
special. As a robustness check we repeat our analysis for 1997 (see Table 3.1 Panel B for
descriptive statistics on these CEOs).
Table 3.8 shows the results for 1997, which are very similar to those for the 2005
sample in Table 3.3. The percentage of CEOs where DRALin > D
LA
Lin and D
RA
LinS > D
LA
LinS
depend less on the reference wage than they do for the 2005 sample. Both models are now
better at predicting positive option holdings and positive xed salaries, but the RA-model
still cannot predict both contract features simultaneously, while the results for the LA-
model are better for the 1997 dataset than they are for the 2005 dataset in this respect.
The 1997 data therefore lead to very similar conclusions and, if anything, strengthen the
case for the LA-model.
Preference parameters. We check to what extent our results are sensitive to our
assumptions on the preference parameters. We have based our discussion on the estimates
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Table 3.8: This table contains the results from repeating the analysis shown in Table 3.3
for data for 1997. The table compares the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equiv-
alent optimal (constant relative) risk-aversion contract where each CEOs risk aversion
parameter  is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for the
observed contract (equation (19)). Contracts are piecewise linear, and options and salary
can become negative (nO   nSedT ,    W0). Panel A shows the average equivalent
, mean and median of the di¤erence between the two distance metrics DLin and DLinS
between the RA-model and the LA-model, and the frequency of these di¤erences being
positive. ***, **, * denote signicance of the T-test for zero mean and, respectively,
the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Panel B
shows the frequency of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive opti-
mal salaries, and the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are
shown for eleven di¤erent reference wages parameterized by . Some observations are lost
because of numerical problems.
Panel A: Accuracy
0.0 569 0.20 95.08% 1.830 *** 0.430 *** 95.08% 6.031 *** 2.451 ***
0.1 545 0.22 97.43% 1.795 *** 0.511 *** 97.80% 3.604 *** 1.458 ***
0.2 547 0.26 92.87% 1.705 *** 0.406 *** 93.24% 3.058 *** 1.333 ***
0.3 557 0.33 89.23% 1.222 *** 0.306 *** 89.41% 0.905 1.058 ***
0.4 555 0.42 85.95% 0.769 *** 0.221 *** 85.77% -1.168 0.681 ***
0.5 557 0.53 84.20% 0.445 *** 0.180 *** 83.84% -3.182 0.389 ***
0.6 565 0.64 85.84% 0.469 *** 0.154 *** 85.84% -4.526 0.279 ***
0.7 558 0.76 89.61% 0.674 *** 0.163 *** 89.43% -4.755 0.194 ***
0.8 564 0.89 93.26% 0.922 *** 0.175 *** 92.20% -1.749 0.209 ***
0.9 564 1.01 94.86% 1.023 *** 0.185 *** 93.79% 0.931 *** 0.184 ***
1.0 567 1.10 94.18% 0.920 *** 0.177 *** 93.47% 0.839 *** 0.138 ***
MedianPercent> 0
Percent
> 0
D Lin (RA) - D Lin (LA)
Mean Median
D LinS (RA) - D LinS (LA)
Mean
Average
equivalent
γ
θ Obs.
Panel B: Positive option holdings and positive base salaries
RA LA RA LA RA LA
0.0 27.07% 70.47% 6.33% 50.26% 0.00% 37.79%
0.1 27.71% 86.61% 6.97% 85.87% 0.18% 74.31%
0.2 26.14% 88.30% 6.95% 88.85% 0.18% 80.07%
0.3 26.21% 84.38% 7.18% 82.23% 0.54% 75.04%
0.4 25.05% 77.84% 6.85% 70.09% 0.18% 63.78%
0.5 24.78% 70.74% 6.82% 59.25% 0.00% 53.50%
0.6 24.60% 63.72% 6.90% 47.96% 0.18% 41.95%
0.7 24.37% 57.53% 6.81% 39.07% 0.18% 33.69%
0.8 23.40% 51.06% 6.91% 30.85% 0.35% 26.06%
0.9 23.05% 44.86% 6.74% 22.70% 0.00% 18.26%
1.0 21.52% 40.74% 6.88% 18.34% 0.18% 13.93%
θ
Percent with positive options
and salary
Percent with positive
fixed salary
Percent with positive option
holdings
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of , , and  from the experimental literature. These estimates might be inappropriate
for the study of CEOs, so we check the robustness of our results with respect to di¤erent
values for the preference parameters.
Table 3.9 reports the results of a comparative static analysis in terms of the preference
parameters where the reference wage wR is set to last years xed salary plus 10% of the
risk-neutral value of last years stock and option holdings (i.e.  = 0:1). We report
only the results for the piecewise-linear model. From the metric DLin we can see that
the LA-model performs better if we increase the loss-aversion parameter , whereas the
performance of the model deteriorates for increases in the curvature of the value function,
i.e., for reductions in  and . Increases in  and  make the value function locally risk
neutral, so this result is similar to the improvement with convergence to risk neutrality
noted earlier. For high -values and -values the attitude to risk depends then only on
the degree of loss aversion , but unlike risk aversion loss aversion is a local property of
the value function in the neighborhood of the reference point. The results of Table 3.9
therefore show that it is this local property that is responsible for the better performance
of the LA-model, which improves further if this aspect is emphasized (higher ,  and ).
Conversely, for a lower degree of loss aversion and stronger curvature of the value function
(lower ,  and ) the value function becomes more similar to that of the standard CRRA-
model with  = 1  in the gain space, where more than 95% of the probability mass lies
for the base scenario in Table 3.9 (Table 3.2 Panel A). The performance of the LA-model
deteriorates accordingly and becomes more similar to that of the RA-model.
Owners versus managers. As a last robustness check we try to identify those ob-
servations where the LA-model performs consistently poorly. We split the sample into a
subsample with the 54 owner-executives who own 5% or more of the shares of their rm
and a subsample with the remaining 541 CEOs who own less than 5% of their rm. Table
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Table 3.9: This table describes the optimal piecewise-linear loss-aversion contract for
di¤erent values of the parameters , , and  of the value function. The reference wage
wR is set equal to last years xed salary plus 10% of the risk-neutral value of last years
stock and option holdings, i.e.  = 0:1 in equation (18). Panel A shows the results for the
parameter , Panel B for , and Panel C for . Options and salary can become negative
(nO   nSedT ,    W0). The table shows mean and median of the three contract
parameters base salary , stock holdings nS, and option holdings n

O. In addition, it
displays mean and median of the distance metricDLin. Some observations are lost because
of numerical problems.
Panel A: Loss-aversion parameter λ
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1.00 413 -2,285 260 0.0404 0.0074 -0.0132 0.0035 2.0505 0.1673
1.50 452 1,533 1,342 0.0258 0.0058 0.0070 0.0075 0.7650 0.1344
2.00 459 2,364 1,581 0.0219 0.0051 0.0128 0.0093 0.5513 0.1259
2.25 578 3,597 1,468 0.0191 0.0047 0.0141 0.0095 0.7132 0.1478
2.50 471 2,607 1,628 0.0209 0.0055 0.0155 0.0099 0.6176 0.1242
3.00 465 2,825 1,684 0.0205 0.0048 0.0154 0.0098 0.6278 0.1271
4.00 466 2,972 1,770 0.0200 0.0051 0.0171 0.0102 0.6821 0.1292
D Linλ Obs. Salary Stock Options
Panel B: Gain-space curvature α
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
0.60 312 -1,303 505 0.0235 0.0059 -0.0037 0.0022 1.2413 0.2759
0.70 362 -984 389 0.0231 0.0070 -0.0034 0.0031 1.3861 0.2581
0.80 394 87 809 0.0281 0.0070 0.0026 0.0062 1.0471 0.1800
0.88 578 3,597 1,468 0.0191 0.0047 0.0141 0.0095 0.7132 0.1478
0.95 546 2,974 1,930 0.0193 0.0035 0.0159 0.0107 0.7649 0.1122
α Obs. Salary Stock Options D Lin
Panel C: Loss-space curvature β
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
0.60 267 -4,585 -1329 0.0224 0.0070 -0.0016 0.0018 1.1690 0.2942
0.70 349 -6,244 -1,396 0.0341 0.0092 -0.0142 0.0015 2.3636 0.3923
0.80 388 163 940 0.0356 0.0057 -0.0053 0.0068 1.6406 0.1434
0.88 578 3,597 1,468 0.0191 0.0047 0.0141 0.0095 0.7132 0.1478
0.95 508 2,584 1,636 0.0204 0.0053 0.0153 0.0097 0.6294 0.1297
β Obs. Salary Stock Options D Lin
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Table 3.10: This table contains the main results from repeating our analysis shown in
Table 3.3 when we split our sample according to the stock ownership of the CEOs. Panel
A displays the results for CEOs who own more than 5% of their rms equity, while
Panel B displays the corresponding results for the remaining CEOs in our sample. Both
panels show the average equivalent , mean and median of the di¤erence between the
two distance metrics DLin and DLinS between the RA-model and the LA-model, and the
frequencies that option holdings and salaries are both positive. Results are shown for
eleven di¤erent reference wages parameterized by . Some observations are lost because
of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote signicance of the T-test for zero mean and,
respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A: Results for owner-managers (nS >= 5%)
RA LA
0.0 54 0.16 11.057 *** 6.602 *** 25.808 *** 14.819 *** 0.00% 5.56%
0.1 51 0.19 11.025 *** 6.793 *** 26.889 *** 14.483 *** 0.00% 82.35%
0.2 54 0.26 7.241 *** 6.015 *** 20.333 *** 11.565 *** 0.00% 90.74%
0.3 53 0.34 6.197 *** 4.001 *** -16.935 9.197 *** 0.00% 79.25%
0.4 54 0.46 5.130 *** 1.650 *** -42.166 4.189 *** 0.00% 57.41%
0.5 54 0.62 4.291 *** 3.011 *** -63.667 1.659 *** 0.00% 38.89%
0.6 54 0.77 3.049 ** 3.426 *** -99.527 2.047 ** 0.00% 24.07%
0.7 54 0.86 2.718 * 3.322 *** -131.139 2.875 ** 0.00% 12.96%
0.8 54 0.92 3.492 *** 2.794 *** -67.172 1.607 ** 0.00% 9.26%
0.9 53 0.92 3.436 *** 1.811 *** -0.343 0.711 ** 0.00% 1.89%
1.0 54 0.86 2.759 *** 1.837 *** -3.687 0.422 ** 0.00% 0.00%
Average
equivalent
γ
θ Obs.
Percent with positive
options and salary
D Lin (RA) - D Lin (LA)
Mean Median
D LinS (RA) - D LinS (LA)
Mean Median
Panel B: Results for non-owner managers (nS < 5%)
RA LA
0.0 540 0.21 1.920 *** 0.792 *** 8.070 *** 3.516 *** 0.37% 57.22%
0.1 527 0.29 1.833 *** 0.766 *** 7.734 *** 3.541 *** 0.00% 73.43%
0.2 517 0.43 1.497 *** 0.560 *** 5.054 *** 2.764 *** 0.39% 57.06%
0.3 524 0.54 1.070 *** 0.414 *** 2.713 *** 1.486 *** 0.38% 40.46%
0.4 531 0.70 0.796 *** 0.277 *** 1.795 *** 0.504 *** 0.00% 27.87%
0.5 532 0.85 0.607 *** 0.235 *** 1.934 *** 0.177 *** 0.38% 17.29%
0.6 532 0.97 0.484 *** 0.226 *** 1.597 * 0.078 *** 0.00% 9.77%
0.7 528 1.06 0.373 *** 0.213 *** 0.442 *** 0.057 *** 0.00% 5.68%
0.8 528 1.11 0.292 *** 0.190 *** -0.048 0.038 *** 0.00% 3.60%
0.9 526 1.07 0.209 *** 0.158 *** -0.194 * 0.025 *** 0.19% 2.66%
1.0 527 1.00 0.136 *** 0.124 *** -0.269 *** 0.019 *** 0.00% 2.09%
Percent with positive
options and salary
Mean Median
θ Obs.
Average
equivalent
γ
D Lin (RA) - D Lin (LA) D LinS (RA) - D LinS (LA)
Mean Median
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3.10 displays the results for the two subsamples; it provides a breakdown of the results
shown in Table 3.3.
For both subsamples the LA-model performs better than the RA-model and the
median results are not strongly a¤ected. However, for the metric DLinS, which also
accounts for prediction errors of the base salary, the average di¤erence DRALinS   DLALinS
becomes negative and very large in magnitude in Panel A, for a large range of values of
the reference wage. Closer inspection of the data shows that these results are driven by
those owner-manager CEOs who have no options (one example in our dataset is Warren
Bu¤ett). We conclude from this that the LA-model should not be applied to these CEOs.
Their relationship to the rm cannot be described by a principal-agent relationship as
they are not salaried agents of outside shareholders.28
8 Conclusion
We develop a principal-agent model with a loss-averse agent in order to explain observed
executive compensation contracts. We derive the optimal contract and show that it can
be characterized by an upward sloping function that is convex over the relevant region for
plausible parameterizations and by a ring rule for the manager. We parameterize this
model in a way that is standard in the literature and calibrate it to observed contracts.
We nd that the loss-aversion model performs better on several dimensions compared
to the risk-aversion model.
 Contracts predicted by the loss-aversion model are much closer to observed contracts
than contracts predicted by the risk-aversion model.
28The agency problem in these companies is more likely that between the inside blockholder and
minority shareholders, and this problem cannot be captured by a model based on e¤ort aversion.
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 The loss-aversion model predicts positive option holdings in line with observed con-
tracts for most CEOs, whereas the risk-aversion model always predicts concave
contracts with negative option holdings.
 The loss-aversion model predicts positive base salaries, whereas the risk-aversion
model implies that the majority of CEOs should invest some of their private wealth
in their rms without receiving a base salary.
Our results are of particular importance to the substantial literature on the design
and the valuation of executive stock options that relies on variants of the risk-aversion
model. Our analysis suggests that for these applications the loss-aversion model is more
relevant than the risk-aversion model. Our analysis also gives some guidance regarding
relevant ranges of the reference wage: predicted contracts most closely resemble observed
contracts for relatively low reference wages that are set close to the previous xed salary.
Our analysis relies on stylized contracts that abstract from a number of features
of observed contracts. The simplest and probably most innocuous assumption restricts
the number of option grants to one. Multiple strike prices would allow for a better
approximation of the piecewise-linear contract to the optimal non-linear contract, and we
have shown that the benets from such a better approximation are small. We also ignore
pension commitments, the use of perks, and loans the corporation extends to its o¢ cers,
largely because we do not have data on these items. These compensation items are not
related to stock price performance, so they only bias our estimate of xed compensation
downward. The risk-aversion model predicts lower levels of xed compensation compared
to the loss-aversion model, so such a downward bias in estimating xed compensation
biases our results against the loss-aversion model. Finally, we ignore severance provisions,
again for lack of data, but our discussion in Section 6 suggests that our analysis can
potentially help to explain the widespread use of severance arrangements. If we assume
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that the loss-aversion model is correct, then the benets from threatening the CEO with
dismissal and an associated drop in compensation are small and probably outweighed by
the costs of a governance structure that could enforce such a contract.
While our results demonstrate that the loss-aversion model is better at explaining
the structure of observed CEO compensation contracts than the risk-aversion model, it
is still subject to important limitations. The most crucial aspect of both models may be
the fact that they are both static, whereas shareholders and CEOs typically revise their
contracts repeatedly over a number of periods. Research in contract theory shows that
in such a context the surplus may be appropriated by the agent even when the principal
has all of the bargaining power (Ray, 2002). Then the contractual structure may serve
to allocate the surplus of the contractual relationship between the CEO and shareholders
over time, an aspect that is absent from static models. Exploration of these aspects of
the structure of compensation contracts is left for future research.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: We prove the proposition in three steps. In the rst step,
Lemma 1 shows that the contract never pays out in the interior of the loss space. So
whenever the agent realizes a loss, it will be the largest possible loss w. Lemma 2 then
shows that the optimal contract pays out w for all realized stock prices below some
threshold. If the stock price exceeds this threshold, the contract always pays out wages
that are perceived as gains by the agent. Lemma 2 greatly reduces the set of contracts
from which we have to nd the optimal contract. In the third step, we write down the
Lagrangian for the simplied problem and derive the solutions to the rst-order condition.
For Lemma 1, we extend the set of permissible contracts to contracts that pay out
lotteries. The agent is risk-seeking over losses, so lotteries might be part of the optimal
contract. Lemma 2 shows, however, that the optimal contract does not contain lotteries.
Lemma 1. (Lotteries): Consider a contract w (PT ) that, for some realized stock price
PT , pays o¤ w0 in the interior of the loss space with some positive probability, such that
w < w0 < wR. Then there always exists an alternative contract that improves on the
contract w (PT ) where the manager receives instead of w0 the reference wage wR with
probability g and the minimum wage w with the remaining probability 1  g.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider rst the contract w (PT ) that pays o¤w < w (PT ) <
wR at some price PT with certainty. Since the value function in the loss space is monoton-
ically increasing in w (PT ), there exists a unique number g (PT ) 2 (0; 1) for each w (PT )
such that
g (PT )
 
wR   wR + (1  g (PT ))  wR   w =   wR   w (PT ) : (25)
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Note that since 0 < ;  < 1;
g (PT )
 
wR   wR = g (PT )  wR   wR = 0:
This implies that replacing the payo¤w (PT ) with the lottery

g (PT ) ; w
R; 1  g (PT ) ; w
	
leaves the participation constraint (6) and the incentive compatibility constraint (7) un-
changed. From equation (25) and the strict concavity of 
 
wR   w (PT )

we have:

 
wR   w (PT )

= (1  g (PT ))
 
wR   w
< 
 
wR    g (PT )wR + (1  g (PT ))w ;
which implies that
g (PT )w
R + (1  g (PT ))w < w (PT ) :
Hence the lottery

g (PT ) ; w
R; 1  g (PT ) ; w
	
improves on the original contract w (PT ) in
the sense that it provides the same incentives and utility to the manager and costs less
to the rm.
Finally, consider a contract that pays o¤w0 with w < w0 < wR with some probability
p less than one. Then we can use the same argument as above, but we replace the random
payo¤ w0 with the lottery

g (PT ) p; w
R; (1  g (PT )) p; w
	
. 
Note that due to the concavity of the agents preferences over gains, lotteries among
payouts in the gain space are never optimal.
Lemma 2. (Shape of the loss space): There exists a uniquely dened cut-o¤ value bP
such that the optimal contract w(PT ) pays out in the loss space for all PT  bP and in
the gain space for all PT > bP . When the contract pays out in the loss space, it always
pays the minimum feasible wage: w(PT jPT  bP ) = w.
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Proof of Lemma 2: According to Lemma 1, we can represent the optimal contract
by three functions: ew(PT ) = (g(PT ); w(PT ); w(PT )), where w(PT )  wR and w(PT ) = w
are non-random wage functions and g(PT ) 2 [0; 1] is the probability that w(PT ) is paid.
With probability 1  g(PT ) the wage w(PT ) is paid.
We prove Lemma 2 by contradiction. If there is no cut-o¤ value that separates the
loss space from the gain space, then there exists a unique point eP 2 [0;1) such that the
probability that the contract pays out in the gain space below eP is positive and equal to
the probability that the contract pays out in the loss space above eP . More formally:
R eP
0
g(PT )f(PT je)dPT =
R1eP (1  g(PT ))f(PT je)dPT =: s > 0: (26)
eP exists because the distribution of PT is continuous. We then construct an alternative
contract, where we exchange the "wrong" gains to the left of eP with the "wrong" losses
to the right of eP . More precisely, we replace the gains below eP by the lowest possible
loss w, and all losses above eP by a constant payout in the gain space that is chosen such
that the costs of the two contracts to the rm are identical. This constant payout is
equal to the expected payout across the "removed" gains below eP . We then show that
this alternative contract strictly relaxes the participation constraint and the incentive
compatibility constraint. This implies that the agent is better o¤ with the new contract
and has stronger incentives to exert high e¤ort. This alternative contract is obviously not
optimal, but its existence shows that the initial contract cannot be optimal.
Consider the alternative contract ew0(PT ) = (g0(PT ); w0(PT ); w0(PT )) which is dened
as follows:
g0(PT ) = g(PT ) (27)
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w0(PT ) =
8><>: w, if PT 
eP
w(PT ), if PT > eP (28)
w0(PT ) =
8><>: w(PT ) = w, if PT 
eP
1
s
R eP
0
g(PT )w(PT )f(PT je)dPT  wR, if PT > eP (29)
By construction, the costs of ew(PT ) and ew0(PT ) are identical for the principal. In the
remaining part of the proof, we show that the new contract ew0(PT ) relaxes both, the
participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint. Therefore, the initially
considered contract ew(PT ) cannot be optimal. Note that the ew0(PT ) is also not optimal
as it pays a lottery in the gain space where the agents preferences are concave. So the
contract can further be improved by replacing these lotteries pointwise with sure payo¤s.
Note that this does not interfere with the argument in the proof, as this is a pointwise
change in the contract, whereas the proof is concerned with a shift of payouts between
states of the world.
Participation Constraint: We need to show that the following di¤erence is positive:
R
[g0(PT )V (w0(PT )) + (1  g0(PT ))V (w0(PT ))] f(PT je)dPT (30)
  R [g(PT )V (w(PT )) + (1  g(PT ))V (w(PT ))] f(PT je)dPT
Substituting in the denitions (27) to (29) and rearranging gives:
R eP
0
g(PT ) [V (w)  V (w(PT ))] f(PT je)dPT (31)
+
R1eP (1  g(PT )) [V (w0(PT ))  V (w))] f(PT je)dPT
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With the denition of the agents preferences (2) and further rearranging we obtain:
R1eP (1  g(PT )) h w0(PT )  wR +   wR   wi f(PT je)dPT (32)
  R eP
0
g(PT )
h 
w(PT )  wR

+ 
 
wR   wi f(PT je)dPT
Note that w0(PT ) is constant and does not depend on PT . With the denitions of eP and
s in equation (26) we get the following simplication:
s
 
w0(PT )  wR
   R eP
0
g(PT )
 
w(PT )  wR

f(PT je)dPT (33)
Substitution in the denition of w0(PT ) from equation (29) and recognizing that 1sg(PT )f(PT je)
is a density function on [0; eP ] gives
s

1
s
R eP
0
g(PT )
 
w(PT )  wR

f(PT je)dPT

(34)
  R eP
0
g(PT )
 
w(PT )  wR

f(PT je)dPT
If we divide this expression by s and move the factor 1=s into the integrands, the integrands
become expectations because 1
s
g(PT )f(PT je) is a density function on [0; eP ]. From Jensens
inequality and the strict concavity of the agents preferences in the gain space, it follows
that (34) and therefore (30) is strictly positive.
Incentive Compatibility Constraint: When the contract ew(PT ) is replaced by our
candidate contract ew0(PT ), the agent gains for some realized stock prices above eP and
loses for some realized stock prices below eP . In expectation, the utility gains are higher
than the utility losses, which is just a restatement of our result that expression (30) is
strictly positive. We assume that the likelihood ratio f(PT je)=f(PT je) is monotonic.
So if we multiply the integrands in (30) with the likelihood ratio, gains are multiplied by
122
bigger numbers than losses. Consequently, the new expression is also strictly positive:
R
[g0(PT )V (w0(PT )) + (1  g0(PT ))V (w0(PT ))] f(PT je)
f(PT je) f(PT je)dPT (35)
  R [g(PT )V (w(PT )) + (1  g(PT ))V (w(PT ))] f(PT je)
f(PT je) f(PT je)dPT > 0
Hence, switching from the initial contract ew(PT ) to the alternative contract ew0(PT ) also
relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint. 
Lemma 2 allows us to rewrite the principals program (5) to (7) as follows:
minbP ;w(PT )wR
Z 1
bP w (PT ) f(PT je)dPT + wF ( bP je) (36)
s:t:
Z 1
bP V (w (PT )) f(PT je)dPT + V (w)F ( bP je)  V + C (e) ; (37)Z 1
bP V (w (PT ))f(PT je)dPTV (w)
h
F ( bP je)  F ( bP je)i  C : (38)
The contract space that is dened by the constraints is not quasi convex, because
the lower bound of the integral is a parameter of the problem and because w(PT ) is not
dened for PT < bP . Therefore, the Lagrangian approach only yields necessary conditions
for an optimum. We cannot show su¢ ciency.
The derivative of the Lagrangian function with respect to w (PT ) is:
@L
@w(PT )
= f(PT je)  PC  
 
w (PT )  wR
 1
f(PT je)  IC  
 
w (PT )  wR
 1
f(PT je)
= 
 
w (PT )  wR
 1
f(PT je)

1

 
w (PT )  wR
1    PC   ICf(PT je)
f(PT je)

:
(39)
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Setting this equal to zero and solving for w (PT ) yields the expression for PT > bP in (8):
w (PT ) = w
R +



PC + IC
f (PT je)
f (PT je)
 1
1 
(40)
The derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to bP is:
@L
@ bP =

w   w( bP ) f( bP je) + PC w( bP )  wR) +   wR   w f( bP je)
+ IC

w( bP )  wR) +   wR   wf( bP je) (41)
= 

w( bP )  wR) +   wR   w f( bP je) (42)24

w( bP )  w
w( bP )  wR) +  (wR   w)   PC   ICf(
bP je)
f( bP je)
35 : (43)
This derivative is zero if the term in the brackets is zero. Substituting in equation (40)
for PT = bP yields:

w( bP )  w
w( bP )  wR) +  (wR   w)   1

w( bP )  wR1  = 0 (44)
, 

w( bP )  wRa 1 w( bP )  w    wR   w   w( bP )  wRa = 0 (45)
The left hand side of equation (45) is strictly decreasing in w( bP ). This can be shown by
taking the rst derivative of the LHS of (45) with respect to w( bP ). As w(P ) is strictly
increasing in P from (40), the left hand side of equation (45) is strictly decreasing in bP .
Therefore, there can never be more than one solution to equation (45).
Proof of Proposition 2: The shareholdersproblem if they wish to minimize the
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contracting costs for implementing e¤ort level e^ can be written as:
min
w(PT )w
Z
w (PT ) f(PT je^)dPT (46)
s:t:
Z
V (w (PT )) f(PT je^)dPT  V + C (e^) ; (47)Z
V (w (PT )) fe(PT je^)dPT  C 0 ; (48)
where C 0 denotes the rst derivative of C and fe denotes the rst derivative of f with
respect to e. Since optimization of program (46) to (48) is pointwise, the only changes
with respect to program (5) to (7) are: replaceC with C 0, which is a constant for a given
level of e¤ort in both programs; replace f(PT je) with f(PT je^), which is just a density that
has the same properties in both programs; replace f(PT je) with fe(PT je^), which also
has the same properties in both programs as we assume MLRP in both cases. Hence, the
same arguments as in Proposition 1 go through as before. 
B The optimal contract when PT is lognormal and
e¤ort is continuous
From our parametric form of PT in equation (10), we have that ln (PT ) is normally dis-
tributed with mean  (e) = ln (P0 (e)) +

rf   22

T and standard deviation 
p
T . The
density f (PT je) of the lognormal distribution is then:
f (PT je) = 1
PT
p
2T
exp
(
  [lnPT    (e)]
2
22T
)
; (49)
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and the likelihood ratio is
@f (PT je) =@e
f (PT je) =
P 00 (e)
P0 (e)
lnPT    (e)
2T
: (50)
Using the continuous e¤ort analogue of the optimal contract as given in equation (8), and
dening
1 = IC
P 00 (e)
P0 (e)2T
; (51)
0 = 

PC   ICP
0
0 (e)
P0 (e)
 (e)
2T

= PC   1 (e) ; (52)
allows us to write:


PC + IC
P 00 (e)
P0 (e)
lnPT    (e)
2T

= 0 + 1 lnPT . (53)
From this and equation (8), equation (11) follows immediately.
The optimal cut-o¤ point is derived in the proof of Proposition 1, equation (45).
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Chapter IV
The Optimal Design of Stock
Options: A Loss-Aversion Approach
1 Introduction
In this chapter we investigate the gap between the recommendations of academics as well
as practitioners on one side and common practice in most countries on the other side with
respect to the design of executive stock options.1 Common sense concurs with economic
theory that two types of options would be particularly desirable, namely premium options
and indexed options. Yet, premium options and indexed options are rarely observed
in practice, and most options are granted at the money. We build a simple e¢ cient-
contracting model where we analyze optimal strike prices and then calibrate the model
to a sample of CEOs. We show that there is in fact little mystery here: Companies could
reduce their compensation costs by less than 0.5% if they replaced at the money options
with premium options, so setting strike prices optimally is a secondary consideration from
the point of view of designing e¢ cient pay packages.
The case for premium options rests on the notion that CEOs and senior executives
should only be rewarded for the value they help to generate. Consider a typical option
1This chapter is based on joint work with Ernst Maug. I therefore retain the personal pronoun
"we", which is used in the original paper, throughout this chapter. We thank Stefan Hirth and seminar
participants at the University of Aarhus for helpful comments. We are grateful to the collaborative
research center SFB 504 "Rationality Concepts, Decision Making and Economic Modeling" for nancial
support.
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grant with a maturity of 10 years, where options are typically exercised after about 7
years. If the stock price appreciates by 7% p.a., then the expected price in 7 years will
be 61% above the current price, so at the money options by far the most common type
of option issued in the U.S.  provide the CEO with a signicant windfall prot. By
contrast, for a typical rm in our sample, a premium option, struck at the expected stock
price in 7 years, would cost the rm almost 30% less than an otherwise identical at the
money option.2 If we adjust for the fact that premium options provide less incentives,
by increasing the number of premium options, then the rm could still save 12% by
replacing at the money options with premium options.3 Given that the typical CEO in
our sample has option grants worth about $11 million, this is a substantial component
of compensation costs, which the boards of directors and their compensation committees
should be concerned about. The argument for indexed options follows a similar line of
reasoning and argues that CEOs should be paid only for performance and not for luck.4
We do not investigate indexed options in this chapter and argue in the conclusion why
we expect that the logic of our analysis in this chapter carries over to the case of indexed
options as well.
Two views have emerged that explain the gap between observed practice and rec-
ommendations based on the argument outlined above. The rent-extraction view takes
the absence of indexed options and premium options as evidence for the hypothesis that
managers capture the pay-setting process and extract unearned rents.5 The e¢ cient-
2We use the following parameters: normalize the price and strike price to 100, set the dividend yield
to zero, a risk-free rate of 4%, maturity of 7 years and a volatility of 40%. Then the Black-Scholes value
of the option is 48.73. With a strike-price of 161 (the expected stock price after 7 years) the Black-Scholes
value drops to 34.63.
3In this example, we dene incentives in terms of pay-performance sensitivity. The value of the CEOs
options change for a small change in the stock price by noN (d1) ; where no is the number of options
granted and N (d1) is the option delta. The option delta is 0.79 for at the money options and 0.64
for premium options. Hence, the number of options has to be increased by a factor of 1.248 to keep
pay-performance sensitivity constant.
4See for example, Rappaport (1999) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
5Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Bebchuk and Fried (2004), particularly pp. 142-146.
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contracting view holds that this reading of the evidence is one-sided. In particular, it is
not clear why the U.S., which is held to be the country with the best developed corporate
governance practices, should deviate furthest from the best practice for setting executive
pay.6
The debate between these two views su¤ers from the fact that there is no accepted
model of e¢ cient contracting that can serve as a normative benchmark and that can
also accommodate the use of stock options as part of the optimal contract. The standard
principal-agent model with e¤ort aversion, lognormal stock prices, and CRRA-preferences,
which was conventionally used in the literature, cannot accommodate stock options.7 Our
analysis here relies on the loss-aversion model introduced in Chapter III, which yields
combinations of stock and options that correspond broadly to the proportions observed
in practice. Our contribution to the literature is that we are the rst to analyze optimal
strike prices in an e¢ cient-contracting model that can endogenously generate positive
option holdings and positive base salaries.
We apply the model to a sample of 724 U.S. CEOs. We calibrate the model individ-
ually and compute the optimal strike price for each CEO. We present comparative static
analyses for a representative CEO as well as for the whole sample, where we also vary our
assumptions about the reference wage in the loss-aversion model. We nd that premium
options are optimal for higher values of the reference wage but not for the lower values
suggested by the results in Chapter III. We nd that premium options are optimal for
volatile rms and for rms that rely heavily on options as a form of incentive compensa-
tion. We then compare the costs to shareholders of contracts with optimal strike prices
6See Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2007) for a recent cross-country study on corporate
governance quality.
7To the best of our knowledge the earliest use of this model for the analysis of compensation contracts
is Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991). The model was used for the analysis of optimal strike prices
by Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002). Dittmann and Maug (2007) show that this model cannot accommodate
stock options and that it generally predicts concave contracts.
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according to the model with the costs of observed contracts. The savings from setting
strike prices optimally are always small, even for those parameterizations where premium
options become optimal for most companies.
The savings from switching from the observed contracts to the contracts prescribed
by the model also admit another interpretation, where we adopt the model as a normative
benchmark and regard the savings from recontracting as a measure of the ine¢ ciency of
pay-setting. According to the rent-extraction view, these savings should be related to
indicators of the quality of corporate governance. We nd that the CEOs pay slice, sug-
gested by Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2007) as a measure of CEO power, is consistently
related to the savings from recontracting. There is also weak evidence that savings are
higher in rms with higher agency costs, such as R&D intensive rms and rms with high
Tobins Q. The governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) has no predictive
power. While there is some evidence that internal governance is statistically signicant,
the economic signicance is small. Hence, there is no evidence from our approach to sug-
gest that there are large ine¢ ciencies in the structure of CEO compensation contracts.
The reason why our results are di¤erent from those in the simple numerical example
above is that our model looks at all components of the compensation package. Recon-
tracting then does not just lead to a redesign of the option component of the contract in
which a given number of options with low strike prices is replaced with more options that
have higher strike prices. Instead, contemporaneous with a change in the strike price, the
optimal portion of incentives from options and shares is adjusted (to meet the incentive
compatibility constraint), and the base salary is changed accordingly (to meet the CEOs
participation constraint).
We develop our analytic approach in the next Section 2. Section 3 describes the
data set used in our empirical analysis and Section 4 contains our main results. Section
5 provides some robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.
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2 The analytic approach
We develop an e¢ cient-contracting model to analyze optimal strike prices on the basis
of the loss-aversion model in Chapter III.8 The strategy is to calibrate the model and
numerically derive optimal contracts for each individual CEO in a large cross-sectional
data set. In solving for the optimal contract, we endogenize the number of shares, the
number of options, the base salary, and the strike price of the option. We can thus
explicitly analyze how a change in one contract parameter inuences the optimal choice
of the other parameters.
2.1 The model
The model is a version of the static hidden action principal-agent model (Holmström,
1979). At time t = 0 a risk-neutral rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of a contract
to a loss-averse and e¤ort-averse CEO. The CEO accepts the contract if it provides her
with at least the same value (net of e¤ort costs) as her exogenous outside opportunity.9
If the CEO accepts the contract, she can exert non-contractible and costly e¤ort, which
enhances the expected value of the rm at time t = T . Any uncertainty about the rm
value is resolved at time T and the CEO is paid according to the contract.
The non-contractibility of CEO e¤ort introduces a trade-o¤ for the rm between
e¢ cient risk-sharing and providing the CEO with an incentive to exert e¤ort by making
her pay contingent on rm value.10 Under standard technical assumptions, the optimal
contract can be shown to be a monotonically increasing function of the time T rm value
8The exposition of the model in this paper will focus on the essential parts. For further details
and some methodological choices (such as using risk-neutral valuation or the validity of the rst-order
approach) see the detailed discussion in Chapter III. For details on risk-neutral pricing see also Dittmann
and Maug (2007) and Cai and Vijh (2005).
9We do not use the term "utility" here because we are working in a loss-aversion framework.
10This is strictly true for risk-averse CEOs. The argument also holds empirically for the loss-averse
CEOs in our set-up, since all are e¤ectively risk averse in the sense that their certainty equivalent for the
observed contract is lower than the expected value of the contract.
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PT .
To make this model operational, we assume specic functional forms for the technol-
ogy, admissible contracts, and CEO preferences. For the technology, we assume that
the value of the rm at time t = T , denoted by PT , is lognormally distributed and that
CEO e¤ort, denoted by e; shifts the mean of the distribution of stock prices:
PT (u; e) = P0 (e) exp

rf   
2
2

T + u
p
T

; u  N (0; 1) ; (1)
where rf is the risk-free rate of interest,  is the annualized standard deviation of stock
returns, u is a standard normal random variate, and P0 (e) = e rfTE [PT ] is a strictly
increasing and concave function.11 To guarantee internal consistency of our approach,
we use risk-neutral pricing throughout. Hence, the stock price is expected to appreciate
annually at the risk-free rate. Note that in any rational-expectations equilibrium, P0 is
equal to the market value of equity at the e¤ort level e chosen by the manager under the
observed contract. We assume rational expectations, so P0 (e) is equal to the observed
market capitalization of the rm.
Admissible contracts are denoted by w (PT ) and specify the pay-o¤ to the CEO at
time T as a function of rm value. As is standard in the literature, we restrict ourselves
to stylized linear contracts that consist of stock, options, and base salary
w (PT ) = e
rfT + nSPT + nOmax (PT  K; 0) ; (2)
where  denotes xed salary (which in our formulation we assume to be paid at t = 0),
nS is the number of shares, expressed as a fraction of all shares outstanding, nO is the
number of stock options (where the number of shares outstanding is normalized to one),
11For ease of the exposition, we will submerge reference to u and e. We also do not include dividend
yields here. Dividend yields will, however, be integrated into our numerical implementation.
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and K is the strike price of the option. We use the superscript "d" to denote observed
contract parameters ("data") and superscript "" to denote optimal contract parameters
chosen by our model.
Regarding preferences, CEOs are assumed to be loss averse, so they evaluate out-
comes of risky gambles relative to a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 and
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Following the literature, we assume the following para-
metric form:
V (w (PT )) =
8><>:
 
w (PT )  wR

if w (PT )  wR
   wR   w (PT ) if w (PT ) < wR ; where 0 < ;  < 1 and   1:
(3)
Here wR is the reference point and outcomes above the reference point are coded as
gains and outcomes below the reference point are coded as losses. The reference point
is assumed to be exogenous in what follows.12 The parameters  and  determine the
curvature of the value function over the gain space and the loss space, respectively. CEOs
are risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses. Finally,   1 is the coe¢ cient of
loss aversion, which governs the steepness of the value function over losses. For values of
 > 1 the aversion to losses of all sizes is higher than the attraction to equal-sized gains.
In the absence of clear guidance from the literature, we assume that the reference
point wR is based on last years pay package. More specically we assume
wRt () = t 1 +  MV (nSt 1; nOt 1; Pt): (4)
Hence, the reference point equals last years base salary plus  times the market value of
the share and option portion of last years contract evaluated at todays stock price. For
 = 0; the reference point equals last years base salary, while for  = 1, the reference
12For a treatment of endogenous reference points see for example de Meza and Webb (2007).
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point equals the risk-neutral value of last years contract evaluated today.
We do not incorporate probability weighting. This is primarily a technical assumption
to keep the underlying theoretical model tractable. However, there is also some research
from decision scientists which suggests that individuals can "learn their way out" of
distorting probabilities (van de Kuilen and Wakker, 2006, van de Kuilen, 2008). For
loss aversion, on the other hand, there is strong evidence that professional traders are
not less, and, if anything, more loss averse than inexperienced subjects (Haigh and List,
2005, Coval and Shumway, 2005). Hence there seems to be at least some support for the
assumptions used here that CEO loss aversion is a stable e¤ect for most professionals,
whereas probability weighting may not be.
2.2 Analyzing optimal contracts
It is our aim to analyze optimal strike prices in a model where they have to be jointly
determined with base salaries, the number of shares, and the number of stock options.
Following Dittmann and Maug (2007) and the treatment in Chapter III, we use the set-
up developed in the previous section to show that the optimal structure of compensation
contracts can be derived numerically for individual CEOs based on observable contracts.
We proceed under the null hypothesis that observed contracts wd (PT ) are indeed optimal.
Then it should not be possible to replace wd (PT ) by a contract w (PT ) that gives the
same value and incentives to the CEO and costs less to the rm. Formally, both, the rm
and the CEO would agree to replace wd (PT ) with a new contract w (PT ) that solves
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min
f;nS ;nO;Kg
 (w (PT ))  + nSP0 + nOBS0 (K) (5)
such that
Z
V [w (PT )] f (PT ) dPT 
Z
V

wd (PT )

f (PT ) dPT (6)Z
V [w (PT )]
@f (PT )
@P0
dPT 
Z
V

wd (PT )
 @f (PT )
@P0
dPT (7)
   W0; nS  0; nO  0: (8)
The cost of the contract to the company,  (w (PT )) ; is approximated by the value a
risk-neutral investor would pay for the contract. This value is given in (5). In our model
the value of stock options is given by their Black-Scholes value, which we denote by BS.
Since the CEO is not allowed to hedge the risk imposed on her by the stock and
options in her contract, the value of the contract to the CEO depends on the CEOs
preferences. By equation (6), the new contract has to provide at least the same expected
value to the CEO as the old one.
Incentives are the sensitivity of the CEOs expected utility with respect to the ob-
served market value P0. Equation (7) states that the algorithm should only consider
contracts where the e¤ort incentives of the CEO are at least as high as those under the
observed contract wd (PT ). For a risk-neutral CEO ( =  =  = 1), this denition of
incentives becomes the widely-studied pay-performance sensitivity.
We further assume that stock options and shares in the contract are bounded by
zero, which means that the CEO cannot write options on her company and that she
cannot short her companys stock. We allow for negative base salaries, which can be
interpreted as the CEO investing in her own company from her own non-rm-related
wealth. A conservative lower bound on  is thus her total outside wealth W0: There are
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no negative base salaries in observed contracts. We argue, however, that a good model
should endogenously generate positive base salaries. Imposing   0 does not change
anything material as we show in Section 5.
Given our assumptions about technology, admissible contracts, and CEO preferences,
and given the fact that we can observe actual CEO pay contracts, we can numerically
solve program (5) to (8) for individual CEOs. The solution to the program is a tuple
(; nS; n

O; K
) ; consisting of the optimal base salary, the optimal numbers of shares and
options, and the optimal strike price of the option.
The optimal contracts generated by the model can then be compared to observed
contracts
 
d; ndS; n
d
O; K
d

. We dene total savings as the reduction in expected compen-
sation costs to the rm from switching from observed to optimal contracts as:
Total savings  
 
wd (PT )
   (w (PT ))
 (wd (PT ))
: (9)
If total savings are positive, wd (PT ) has an ine¢ cient structure and cannot be optimal.
Clearly, we do not expect a contract suggested by a highly stylized model to conform to
contracts observed in reality. However, we use the savings from (9) as a metric for the
di¤erence between observed contracts and optimal contracts suggested by the model. It
is these savings, which our numerical procedure maximizes.
Solving program (5) to (8) is numerically demanding because it involves searching
over four dimensions (; nS; nO; K) : Our numerical routine reliably solves problems with
up to three parameters.13 We therefore solve for (; nS; n

O) using a minimization routine
given a strike price K; and then let K vary over a grid of strike prices. For su¢ ciently
ne grids this approach is equivalent to the one-step search over four dimensions.14 We
13We use a sequential quadratic programming method implemented in the Matlab routine "fmincon."
14The neness of the grid is bounded by the available computing power. Solving the model for our
sample of 724 CEOs takes about 8 hours for one single value of K.
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dene our grid relative to the actual market value of the rm according to
K   P0: (10)
In our benchmark specication we use steps of 0.125 for  2 [0; 4]: Hence, we solve 33
optimization problems for each CEO.
If premium options are indeed optimal, then we should expect   > 1 for most CEOs
in our sample. If in addition, actual pay contracts are grossly ine¢ cient, savings from (9)
should be substantial. We will test these implications on our dataset.
3 Data
3.1 Observed contracts
We identify all CEOs in the ExecuComp database who are CEO at least from January 2004
to December 2005. We restrict ourselves to CEOs in order to avoid multiple observations
from one rm that are likely to be correlated. We also delete all CEOs who were executives
in more than one company in either 2004 or 2005. We estimate the CEOscontracts in
2005. We also evaluate their contracts for 2004 separately in order to construct the
reference wage for 2005. We set P0 equal to the market capitalization at the end of 2004
and take the dividend yield d, the stock price volatility 2, and the proportion of shares
owned by the CEO nS from the 2004 data, while the xed salary  is calculated from
2005 data.15 The numbers of shares and options, nS and nO, include the CEOs total
holdings of stock-based compensation, and not just the most current grant of stock and
options. This is important because Hall and Liebman (1998) have shown that almost all
15 is the sum of the following four ExecuComp data types: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, and All
Other Total. We do not include LTIP (long-term incentive pay), as these are typically not awarded
annually.
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incentives for CEOs come from their holdings of stock and options and not merely from
current grants.
We estimate the option portfolio held by the CEO from 2004 data using the pro-
cedure proposed by Core and Guay (2002). We then map this option portfolio into one
representative option by rst setting the number of options nO equal to the sum of the
options in the option portfolio. Then we determine the strike price K and the maturity
T of the representative option such that nO representative options have the same market
value and the same Black-Scholes option delta as the estimated option portfolio. We take
into account the fact that most CEOs exercise their stock options before maturity by
multiplying the maturity of the individual options in the estimated portfolio by 0.7 before
calculating the representative option (see Huddart and Lang, 1996, and Carpenter, 1998).
The maturity T determines the contracting period and the risk-free rate rf is the U.S.
government bond rate from January 2005 with maturity closest to T . After deleting 4
CEOs with stock volatility exceeding 250% and 2 companies with a dividend yield greater
than 20% the raw data set contains 913 CEOs.
We estimate the portion of each CEOs wealth that is not tied up in securities of his
or her company from historical data for a subsample of 496 CEOs who have a history of at
least ve years (as executive of any rm) in the ExecuComp database. We cumulate the
CEOs income from salary, bonus, and other compensation payments, add the proceeds
from sales of securities, and subtract the costs from exercising options. For this subsample,
the median ratio of non-rm wealth to the risk-neutral value of the CEOs pay package
(including xed salary, stock and options) is 0.34. We therefore estimate each CEOs
non-rm wealth W0 by calculating the risk-neutral value of the CEOs pay package and
then set W0 equal to 34% of this value. This procedure introduces some noise into the
estimation of wealth.16 However, we will show below that for the majority of CEOs and
16It is therefore not di¤erent from (or indeed likely to be more accurate than) other procedures such as,
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optimal contracts, the lower bound on base salaries are not binding, which is why we are
not concerned about small measurement errors in wealth.17
3.2 Preference parameters
To specify the preference parameters in equation (3), we use the experimental evidence in
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and set  = 2:25,  = 0:88; and  = 0:88: To specify the
reference wage, we use results from Chapter III, in which the model used here is calibrated
to the cross-section of a subset of our 913 CEOs, where it is shown that the model ts
the data well for  = 0:1. We then perform robustness checks to demonstrate that our
results are not sensitive to this choice of the reference wage.
3.3 Measures of agency costs and managerial discretion
In order to test the hypothesis that ine¢ cient structures of executive compensation con-
tracts are systematically related to agency costs or managerial discretion, we use a range
of di¤erent indicators. As a rst set of measures, we hypothesize that managerial power
and agency costs are likely to be higher in rms where a substantial part of the value is
tied up in growth options. We use Tobins Q, which we dene as market value of equity
(Compustat data item 25  data item 199) plus the book value of assets (data item 6)
minus book equity (data item 60 + data item 74), as well as expenses for research and
development (R&D, data item 43) as our proxies for growth options. All variables are
scaled by the book value of assets.
A second hypothesis is that managers can more easily divert cash if it is abundant
(Jensen, 1986). Moreover, excess cash ow could be a sign of organizational slack, which
for example, Hall and Knox (2004) who estimate wealth as the greater of six times annual compensation
or $3 million.
17Unlike for models with constant relative risk aversion utility functions, loss aversion does not imply a
relationship between wealth and the attitude to risk from compensation, so measurement errors of wealth
are less important for our model.
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is also likely to be associated with contractual ine¢ ciencies. We use cash ow shortfall as
a measure of cash ow available to management and dene it as common plus preferred
dividends (data item 19 + data item 21) plus cash ow from investing activities (data
item 311) less cash ow from operating activities (data item 308). Again, all variables
are scaled by the book value of assets. We argue that this internally generated cash is
controlled by insiders and not accessible to outsiders which makes it valuable as a measure
of managerial discretion.18
A third set of measures are measures of governance problems. Bebchuk, Cremers,
and Peyer (2007) provide evidence that governance problems regarding contracting about
compensation are related to the CEO pay slice. This measure is dened as the percentage
of total compensation of the top 5 managers paid to the CEO. They dene this as "the
relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, con-
tribution, or power."19 Hence, we would expect contractual ine¢ ciencies detected in our
model to be positively correlated to the CEO pay slice, which we compute using the total
compensation ("TDC1") reported in ExecuComp for the top 5 executives.20 As another
measure of potential governance problems, we use the corporate governance index pro-
posed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), the "GIM-Index", from Andrew Metricks
website.
Lastly, we control for size. It may be easier for managers to entrench themselves
in larger rms. At the same time, larger rms may be under particular scrutiny from
institutional investors, analysts, and the press, and they are more likely to rely on the
services of specialized pay consultants. We therefore have no strong prior about the sign
of the relation between assets and contractual ine¢ ciency. We use the log of lagged total
18See also Core and Guay (2001) and Bergman and Jenter (2007) for similar uses of this measure.
19Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2007), p. 1.
20We disregard all rms with less than 5 reported executives and use only the top 5 highest paid o¢ cers
for companies that report compensation for more than 5 o¢ cers.
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book assets in our regressions to control for size.
By using the method of Core and Guay (2002), we look at total holdings of stock and
options at time t = 0 (2005 in our implementation), which are made up of the current
tranche of stock and options and several tranches received in the past. To reect this in
our agency and managerial discretion controls, we take three-year averages for all these
variables. We also winsorize all variables at the 1% and the 99% level. For the GIM-Index,
which is only available biannually, we take the average of the 2002 and 2004 values.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
From the raw data set with 913 companies, we drop 142 nancial companies (SIC code
6000 to 6999) and 43 observations for which at least one variable (assets, Q, cash ow
shortfall, or one of their components) was missing. Of the remaining 724 companies we
have a value for the CEO pay slice for 607 companies, the GIM-Index for 597 companies,
and R&D for 424 companies.
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics. In Panel A, the median CEO in the sample
holds 0.31% of the shares and stock options on 1.05% of the shares. The xed salary for
2005 (including most bonus components) is about 1.5 million dollars and the total value
of the contract (including all current holdings of stock and stock options) is 27.4 million
dollars. The market value of equity is about 2 billion dollars for the median rm. These
variables are skewed and means are considerably larger than medians. The moneyness
of the observed contract, Kd=P0; is 0.7, which reects the fact that stock prices tend
to appreciate over our sample period. Panel B shows three-year averages of the agency
and managerial discretion proxies. Total book assets of the median rm in the sample
is about 1.5 billion dollars and Tobins Q is 1.53. Cash ow shortfall is negative, which
means that the median rm spends less cash on dividends and investments than its net
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics. The table shows descriptive statistics for our dataset
of 724 managers who were CEO in 2005. Stock and options are the total number of
shares and options the CEO holds at the beginning of the year, normalized by rm value.
Moneyness and maturity report the strike price and maturity of a hypothetical option
grant with the same value and option delta as the actual option portfolio held by the
CEO. Stock volatility and dividend yield are taken directly from ExecuComp. Tobins Q
is dened as market value of equity plus book assets minus book equity all over assets.
Cash ow shortfall is common plus preferred dividends plus cash ow from investing
activities less cash ow from operating activities all over assets. All dollar amounts are
given in thousands.
Mean Std. Dev. 10% Quantile Median 90% Quantile N
Panel A: Observed contracts
Stock 1.93% 5.12% 0.03% 0.31% 4.34% 724
Options 1.45% 1.58% 0.15% 1.05% 3.21% 724
Fixed Salary $2,209 $2,698 $558 $1,503 $4,108 724
BS-value of options $23,694 $43,806 $1,103 $11,036 $52,925 724
Value of Contract $166,033 $1,751,514 $4,939 $27,352 $153,591 724
Firm Value $9,243,453 $29,800,000 $357,345 $1,983,262 $17,300,000 724
Kd / P0 69.22% 21.45% 38.73% 70.17% 99.11% 724
Maturity 4.59 1.23 3.39 4.48 6.04 724
Stock Volatility 45.65% 22.17% 24.70% 39.10% 78.30% 724
Dividend Yield 0.96% 1.36% 0.00% 0.40% 2.80% 724
Panel B: Agency and Managerial Discretion Proxies
3-year avg. of Assetst-1 $6,830,569 $17,300,000 $263,397 $1,490,352 $15,500,000 724
3-year avg. of Tobin's Qt-1 1.86 1.06 1.04 1.53 3.18 724
3-year avg. of Cash flow shortfallt-1 -1.83% 6.87% -9.02% -2.11% 5.46% 724
3-year avg. of CEO pay slice 39.14% 8.96% 27.84% 39.13% 50.92% 607
3-year avg. of R&Dt-1/Assetst-1 4.76% 5.65% 0.00% 2.50% 12.60% 424
Avg. over GIM-Index 2002 and 2004 9.46 2.52 6.00 9.00 13.00 597
cash ow from operations. The median CEO pay slice is 39.1% and expenses for research
and development amount to 2.5% of book assets for the median rm. The median value
for the GIM-Index is 9, which is the same as in the sample used by Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003). Our sample is thus not biased towards either better or worse governed
rms.
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Figure 4.1: This gure shows a histogram of individually optimal strike prices K relative
to the actual market value of the rm P0 across all CEOs in the sample.
4 Results
4.1 Are premium options optimal?
We analyze the optimality of premium options by solving program (5) to (8) over a grid of
candidate strike prices for each CEO. Optimal contracts from this procedure give the same
incentives and value to the CEO as the observed contract. E¤ectively, we are analyzing
the optimal structure of the contract the rm would o¤er if it could renegotiate the entire
contract of the CEO including all holdings of stock-based pay granted in the past. If
premium options are optimal, then the optimal strike price in the renegotiated contract
should be above the current stock price.
Figure 4.1 shows a histogram of the resulting optimal strike prices, K; scaled by
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Table 4.2: Optimal strike prices and savings. The table shows the distribution of optimal
strike prices when the model is individually optimized for all CEOs in the sample. P0 is
the observed stock price. K is the derived optimal strike price. The table also reports
total savings the rm can generate by switching from observed contract to derived optimal
contract. "Savings with at the money options" is the component of total savings that could
be realized by optimizing over stocks, options and xed salaries for observed strike prices.
"Savings from endogenous strike price" are incremental savings that can be realized by
endogenizing the strike price. Number of observations: 705.
10% 90%
Quantile Quantile
Panel A: Optimal strike prices
K* / P0 105.3% 77.5% 25.0% 87.5% 200.0%
Percent with K* not larger than P0 68.2% - - - -
Panel B: Potential savings
Total savings 0.79% 1.35% 0.01% 0.17% 2.51%
Savings with at the money options 0.46% 1.12% 0.00% 0.06% 1.22%
Savings from endogenous strike price 0.34% 0.61% 0.00% 0.03% 1.25%
MedianMean Std. Dev.
rm value, P0; across our sample of CEOs.21 Optimal strike prices cluster heavily at or
slightly below the current stock price, and for a large majority of CEOs, K is smaller
than P0. The distribution is skewed to the right with only a minority of strike prices
above the current stock price. Hence, there is no support from our model for the view
that premium options are generally optimal. To the contrary, if our model is correct,
Figure 4.1 suggests that at the money options are optimal for the average company.
Table 4.2 further analyzes the evidence from Figure 4.1. Panel A shows that the
median strike price is at 87.5% of the current strike price and that the average is slightly
higher at 105.3%. Almost 70% of rms should grant options with strike prices not higher
than P0:22
21We lose 19 CEOs (2.6 percent of our sample) because of numerical problems.
22The model predicts all-share contracts for a small number (about 7 percent) of CEOs and companies.
Interestingly, this includes Warren Bu¤ett at Berkshire Heathaway, who neither holds options in the
predicted, nor in the observed contract.
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While there is strong evidence that premium options are not optimal for most com-
panies, they seem to be optimal for some. In general, Figure 4.1 suggests some dispersion
in optimal strike prices. We therefore ask why we do not see more dispersion in strike
prices across observed contracts. Panel B of Table 4.2 provides a potential answer. The
savings that a rm could generate by replacing the observed contract with the optimal
contract are small. On average, rms could save only 0.79%, or about $218,000 of the
$27.35 million granted to the median CEO. The median rm could save as little as 0.17%.
These savings can be broken down into two components. The rst component are the
savings the rm could realize by adjusting only the structure of the contract (base salary,
stock, and options) without also adjusting the strike prices of the options (we call this
component "savings from at the money options"). These savings would be on average
0.46%, which is about 60% of the total savings with endogenous strike price. The second
component are the incremental savings from endogenizing the strike price. We nd that
on average savings of only 0.34%, or $93,000 for the median CEO, can properly be at-
tributed to premium options. As a consequence, the costs of implementing a contract with
a tailor-made strike price are very likely to outweigh the benets in terms of more e¢ cient
contracts. Examples for such costs include direct costs for compensation consultants and
indirect costs related to negotiating the magnitude of the premium.
4.2 Comparative static analysis
In our model optimal strike prices cannot be considered independently of the other con-
tract parameters. Changing the strike price also induces a change in all other contract
parameters, because the CEO has to be kept at her reservation value while maintaining
incentives. In particular, tougher performance goals through higher strike prices will have
to come with some form of additional compensation, because increasing the strike price
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Table 4.3: Representative CEO. This table presents the characteristics of the observed
contract of the representative CEO in our sample. The CEO is representative on the
dimensions: rm volatility, moneyness of the options, base salary, and incentives from
options as a fraction of total incentives.
Name: Hans Helmerich ExecuComp execid: 462
Company: HELMERICH & PAYNE INC ExecuComp permid: 5581
Stock 0.53%
Options 1.95%
Fixed Salary $1,376
Value of Contract $21,627
Firm Value $1,447,267
Kd / P0 71.57%
Maturity 4.00
Stock Volatility 40.60%
Dividend Yield 1.12%
of options reduces their value to the CEO. We explore these trade-o¤s by analyzing the
comparative statics of our model.
To demonstrate the workings of the model we will make use of a representative CEO in
our sample. The representative CEO is chosen to match as closely as possible the medians
of rm volatility, base salary, moneyness of the options, and incentives granted by options
as a fraction of total incentives. Incentives from options ("IncOpt") are calculated on a
risk-neutral basis as
IncOpt =
nON (d1)
nON (d1) + nSedT
; (11)
where N (d1) is the Black-Scholes delta of the option. There is exactly one CEO in our
sample who is in the third quintile of each of these four variables (volatility, base salary,
moneyness, and IncOpt). We provide statistics of this "representative" CEO in Table 4.3.
The representative CEO is below the median CEO in terms of the value of the contract
and his base salary compared to the respective sample medians, and has somewhat higher-
powered incentives.
We rst conduct a comparative static analysis for the representative CEO. Using only
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Figure 4.2: This gure shows how total savings, base salary, shares, and options predicted
by the model change with a change in the strike price for the representative CEO in our
sample (see Table 4.3 for parameters). The observed strike price is at Kd=P0 = 0:72. The
optimal strike price is at K=P0 = 0:88.
one CEO allows us to use a ner grid for our strike prices and we choose 100 equally spaced
values for K=P0 between zero and two. Figure 4.2 shows total savings and predicted base
salaries, stock, and options at each candidate strike price K=P0: The top left plot presents
the total savings at each candidate strike price. There is a unique value of K=P0 = 0:88
that maximizes savings. This value is slightly above the observed strike price, which is
0.72. For 0:72  K=P0  1:08, there exist contracts with positive savings, outside this
interval no contract can make both the rm and the CEO better o¤, thus reinforcing our
claim that our model is consistent with observed strike prices being optimal.
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Base salaries (top right plot) are always declining and predicted share holdings (bot-
tom left) are always increasing as K=P0 increases. For values of K=P0  0:9 we see that
predicted stock option holdings (bottom right) are increasing. This is intuitive: increasing
the strike price decreases incentives per option because it reduces the probability to see
the options in the money at maturity. Hence, to keep the CEO at the incentive level
of the observed contract, the number of options has to increase. Simultaneously, since
stock options with higher strike prices are riskier, shares get relatively more attractive in
terms of providing incentives per unit of risk. Hence, there is a substitution e¤ect between
shares and options, which is why increasing the strike price leads to both higher stock
and higher option holdings. Finally, the CEO has to be kept at her reservation value, and
more shares and options are granted with higher strike prices of the option, so the base
salary has to be lower to satisfy the participation constraint.
For values of K=P0 < 0:9 predicted stock option holdings are decreasing with the
strike price. To understand this we show in Figure 4.3 the optimal non-linear contract
for our representative CEO (solid line), which was derived in Chapter III. The horizontal
axis depicts the stock price at maturity relative to the current stock price and the vertical
axis is the total pay-o¤ from the pay package at maturity. Above a unique cut-o¤ value,
the optimal non-linear contract is monotonically increasing and convex.23 The optimal
linear contract we derive by solving program (5) to (8) tries to approximate the non-linear
contract as closely as possible over the relevant range of possible realizations of the stock
price at maturity.24 Figure 4.3 shows this for three di¤erent linear contracts, which are
optimal conditional on the candidate strike pricesK=P0 = 0:5; K=P0 = 1 andK=P0 = 1:5;
respectively. Increasing the strike price to stock price ratio from 1 (dashed line) to 1.5
23As was shown in Chapter III, the optimal non-linear contract becomes eventually concave. This
concave region is not empirically relevant for the representative CEO over the range considered here.
Still, for su¢ ciently high share prices, optimal stock option holdings might decrease again.
24The expected value of the stock at maturity is 109.77, the median is 78.94, and the mode is 66.94.
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Figure 4.3: This gure shows the optimal contract for the non-linear loss-aversion model
and the optimal linear contract for three di¤erent values of K=P0 for the representative
CEO in our sample (see Table 4.3 for parameters).
(dashed line with diamonds) leads to more options, more stock, and lower base salaries.
Decreasing the ratio from 1 to 0.5 (dashed line with plus-sign) decreases predicted stock
holdings, increases bases salary, and increases predicted options, consistent with Figure
4.2.
We have restricted the range for which we present base salaries, stock, and options
in Figure 4.2 and show only values of K=P0  0:5. The reason is that for very low strike
prices the option delta N (d1) approaches unity and stock options become e¤ectively like
restricted stock. For the representative CEO, N (d1) is 0.92 at K=P0 = 0:5 and our
numerical routines cannot reliably distinguish between stock and options for lower strike
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prices. The algorithm can still reliably compute total savings, which approach those for
an all-stock contract for lower strike prices.
We check the validity of the conclusions reached for a single representative CEO
for the whole sample. Table 4.4 shows total savings and mean and median contract
parameters if we uniformly set the ratio of strike price to stock price K=P0 to the same
value for the entire cross-section of CEOs. We report the percentage of rms for which
our lower bounds on base salary, stock and options are binding, as well as the percentage
of rms with negative predicted base salaries.
Savings are highest when strike prices are at or slightly above the current stock price,
consistent with what was observed in Figure 4.1. Savings get smaller for both, higher
and lower strike prices, and they are even negative, for the median rm, for options that
are far in the money. Savings are negative whenever it is not possible to nd an optimal
contract at the given strike price that satises both the participation constraint and the
incentive constraint and costs less to the rm than the observed contract. E¤ectively,
by stipulating a certain strike price rather than solving for it, we impose an additional
constraint on program (5) to (8) that can sometimes not be satised by the observed
contract.
Over most of the range considered here, higher strike prices are associated with both
a higher number of shares and a higher number of options. Base salaries increase with
the strike price for strike prices below the current stock price and decrease for higher
strike prices. For both very low and very high strike prices, the percentage of CEOs who
should receive negative base salaries (invest into their own company) increases. Note that
the lower bounds on the contract parameters rarely bind and that our model generates
interior solutions.
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4.3 Which companies should use premium options?
We now turn to the question which companies should use premium options. We conduct
two types of regressions to investigate which company characteristics and which char-
acteristics of the CEO explain the optimal moneyness of the options. First, we run a
logit regression of an indicator function for premium options predicted by our model,
on all observed contract characteristics. The indicator is one if K > P0 and zero else.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.5 present results. Second, we use the relative premium 
K  Kd =P0 itself as an independent variable (columns (3) and (4)).
In regression (1), premium options are positively associated with observed option
holdings and negatively associated with observed stock holdings. Column (2) adds the
fraction of incentives granted through options, IncOpt; as an additional regressor. IncOpt
is highly signicant and positively related to premium options. Introducing IncOpt also
changes the sign on both stock and option holdings, which may well be due to collinearity
of IncOpt with observed stock holdings (Spearmans  = 0:79) and its negative correlation
with option holdings ( = 0:34): Running specication (2) without shares and options as
independent variables leaves the sign and signicance of IncOpt unchanged. Moneyness
(Kd=P0), which was insignicant before, becomes signicant when controlling for incen-
tives. In both regressions, rm volatility is signicantly positive, indicating that premium
options are predicted predominantly for riskier rms. Since high volatility rms are also
rms with a substantial upside potential for stock options payo¤s, they lose less incentives
from granting stock options with high strike prices.
The distribution of
 
K  Kd =P0 is very skewed, so we use median regressions in
specications (3) and (4).25 The results are consistent with the results from the logit
model. However, the coe¢ cient on moneyness is now negative and highly signicant. In
25Using OLS regressions does not materially a¤ect our results.
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Table 4.5: Regression of predicted premium on observed contract parameters. The table
shows the result of a logit regression of an indicator of a predicted premium option (K >
P0) and a median regression of the di¤erence between the observed and predicted strike
price scaled by the current market value of the rm on observed contract parameters. The
interest rate is the U.S. government bond rate from January 2005 with maturity closest
to the maturity of the representative options of each CEO. Maturity (T ) is the calculated
maturity of the representative option. IncOpt is the fraction of incentives that come from
stock options and is calculated as in equation (11). P-values are given in parentheses.
Coe¢ cients are multiplied by 1,000. Number of observations: 705.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock -80.68 *** 10.52 *** -4.45 *** -0.11
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.68)
Options 18.77 ** -22.61 *** 3.15 *** -0.92
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.13)
Base salary 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 **
(0.43) (0.15) (0.80) (0.03)
Firm volatilityt-1 2.30 *** 2.72 *** 0.25 *** 0.59 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dividend yieldt-1 -38.61 *** -37.13 *** -4.56 *** -2.48 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Interest rate -30.96 -189.36 9.56 3.98
(0.82) (0.28) (0.69) (0.80)
Maturity 0.11 0.43 -0.01 0.00
(0.64) (0.17) (0.76) (0.96)
Kd / P0 0.71 1.21 ** -0.73 *** -0.80 ***
(0.12) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)
IncOpt 8.14 *** 1.16 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Pseudo R-squared 0.19 0.37 0.15 0.32
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Dependent variable
IK* > P0 (K*-Kd) / P0
specication (4), stock and stock options become insignicant when IncOpt is included
in the regression, consistent with IncOpt capturing the information about incentives in
the number of shares and options, respectively. The results from specications (3) and
(4) suggest that rms with options far in the money should increase strike prices in order
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Table 4.6: Cross-sectional variation of contracts. The table shows the means, medians
and interquartile ranges of important contract characteristics. It also shows the median
change between observed and optimal value when the variable of interest was in the rst
or the fth quintile, respectively, of its distribution over all observed contracts. IncOpt is
the fraction of incentives that come from stock options and is calculated as in equation
(11). The change in IncOpt, moneyness, share holdings, and options are calculated as
di¤erence between optimal and observed value. Changes in base salary are dened as
percentage changes relative to observed base salaries.
Observed Optimal Observed Optimal Observed Optimal Quintile 1 Quintile 5
K / P0 69.15% 105.32% 70.11% 87.50% 31.29% 50.00% 43.67% -6.43%
IncOpt 56.74% 64.42% 73.00% 62.85% 41.47% 24.36% 28.49% -22.94%
Base salary $2,204 $4,857 $1,491 $1,324 $1,586 $2,136 25.61% -38.39%
Stock 1.79% 1.61% 0.31% 0.56% 0.86% 1.00% 0.13% -0.85%
Options 1.47% 1.96% 1.07% 1.17% 1.38% 1.84% 0.03% 0.22%
Variable
Mean Median change if
observed value in…
Median Interquartile range
to re-incentivize the CEO. They also suggest that rms that grant incentives primarily
through stock options should decrease this fraction by increasing strike prices.
The regressions in Table 4.5 have to be interpreted with caution because the ob-
servations for each rm are already at an internal optimum. In order to support the
conclusions from the previous regressions, we also look at the cross-sectional variation of
contract parameters in Table 4.6. The table shows that our model predicts a relatively
homogenous mix of incentives from options and shares across executives. The median
rm should decrease incentives from stock options, while on average rms should increase
option incentives. Overall, the distribution of incentives from options is less dispersed for
optimal contracts than for observed contracts, and on average about 60% of incentives
should be granted by stock options. The last columns show that rms with the highest
option incentives in observed contracts should reduce these incentives, while the rms
with the lowest option incentives in observed contracts should increase them. The same
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tendency for extreme rms to revert back to the median is also observed for the moneyness
of options. A possible interpretation is that changes in the environment have moved the
parameter K=P0 away from the optimum. Since stock prices tended to increase over the
period we consider, we would expect the predicted change to be larger for rms with low
moneyness than for rms with high moneyness, which is consistent with the last column
in Table 4.6.
Our model thus prescribes a more homogenous mix of incentives between stock and
options across CEOs. Our results are therefore more consistent with a "one size ts all"-
approach to compensation, where rms use at the money strike prices and adjust stock
and option holdings in line with those of the median company.
4.4 Governance implications
If the di¤erence between observed contracts and optimal contracts from the model reects
ine¢ ciencies in pay-setting, then we should see a relationship between these and measures
of agency costs and managerial discretion.
We run median regressions of total savings on Tobins Q, cash ow shortfall, the
fraction of total top 5 compensation that goes to the CEO ("CEO pay slice"), research
and development, and the corporate governance index proposed by Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003). We control for rm volatility, dividend yield, and rm size. We run
median regressions to address concerns about outliers in the savings variable and the
independent variables. We also include industry dummies based on 30 Fama-French
industries.
Table 4.7 shows that savings generated by our model are indeed systematically re-
lated to measures of agency problems and managerial power. Savings are higher in rms
with higher Q, higher free cash ows, higher CEO pay slice, and higher R&D spending.
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Table 4.7: Agency costs and contractual ine¢ ciency. Median regression of total savings
on stock volatility, dividend yield, and proxies for agency costs and managerial discretion.
Tobins Q, assets, cash ow shortfall, and research and development (R&D) are three-year
averages. CEO pay slice is the fraction of pay to top 5 executives that goes to the CEO.
GIM-Index is an average over the years 2002 and 2004. Industry dummies are based 30
Fama-French industries for all specications. P-values are reported in parentheses. All
coe¢ cients are multiplied by 1,000.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm volatilityt-1 12.32 *** 11.97 *** 9.60 *** 12.62 *** 18.09 *** 11.84 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dividend yieldt-1 -9.62 -7.98 -11.42 -10.77 -41.21 3.89
(0.55) (0.47) (0.33) (0.34) (0.22) (0.59)
Log of Assetst-1 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10 0.42 ** 0.04
(0.85) (0.47) (0.61) (0.27) (0.03) (0.49)
Log of Tobin's Qt-1 1.68 *** 1.20 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
Cash flow shortfallt-1 -7.36 *** -10.71 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
CEO pay slice 3.57 ** 5.10 ***
(0.03) (0.00)
R&Dt-1 20.04 ***
(0.00)
GIM-Index 0.04
(0.13)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.101 0.098 0.101 0.110 0.107 0.106
N 705 705 590 590 415 582
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Dependent variable:   Log  (1 + savings )
All coe¢ cients on these variables are statistically signicant, although economic signi-
cance is small, as was expected given the very low levels of total savings for the sample.
For example, increasing Tobins Q by one standard deviation (1.06) increases savings by
0.25%.
While there may be other possible explanations, agency costs and managerial power
are consistent with all observed e¤ects. Managers are harder to monitor and likely to
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have more leeway if more of their company value is attributed to future cash ows (high
Tobins Q and high R&D). Moreover, the negative coe¢ cient on cash ow shortfall (the
di¤erence between cash dividends and net cash ow from investment and net cash ow
from operating activities all over assets) is consistent with Jensens (1986) agency cost
of cash ow hypothesis: the less cash from operations is used to invest or to pay div-
idends, the more is available for managers to divert and the higher is the likelihood of
organizational slack.
Among the governance variables, CEO pay slice is highly signicant, while the GIM-
Index has the correct sign but is insignicant. This suggests a particular role for internal
governance. The GIM-Index predominantly measures external governance, which is rel-
evant for takeovers and may inuence managers tendency to extract rents from their
investment policy or acquisition policy. CEO pay slice, on the other hand, is related to
internal governance and measures the balance of power between the CEO and the board.
The pay-setting process is likely to depend on this balance of power and the sign and
signicance of CEO pay slice lends additional support to the empirical validity of our
model.
5 Robustness checks
We perform a number of robustness checks on our model specication as well as on our
sample. We rst solve program (5) to (8) but impose the tighter restriction   0. Table
4.8, which has the same structure as Table 4.2, shows the resulting distribution of optimal
strike prices. The results are essentially unchanged. The mean strike price is now at 108%
and the median is now at precisely 100%. Savings from recontracting are 0.77% compared
to 0.79% before. Since base salaries are restricted, adjusting the level of xed pay is not
as e¤ective anymore, and a larger fraction of savings are due to e¢ cient setting of the
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Table 4.8: Optimal strike prices and savings for the model with restricted base salary.
The table shows the distribution of optimal strike prices when the model is individually
optimized for all CEOs in the sample. The base salary is restricted to be positive (  0).
P0 is the observed stock price. K is the derived optimal strike price. The table also
reports total savings the rm can generate by switching from observed contract to derived
optimal contract. "Savings with at the money options" is the component of total savings
that could be realized by optimizing over stock, options, and xed salaries for observed
strike prices. "Savings from endogenous strike price" are incremental savings that can be
realized by endogenizing the strike price. Number of observations: 704.
10% 90%
Quantile Quantile
Panel A: Optimal strike prices
K* / P0 108.0% 76.5% 25.0% 100.0% 200.0%
Percent with K* not larger than P0 70.7% - - - -
Panel B: Potential savings
Total savings 0.77% 1.29% 0.01% 0.16% 2.49%
Savings with at the money options 0.15% 0.53% 0.00% 0.00% 0.37%
Savings from endogenous strike price 0.62% 1.16% 0.00% 0.09% 2.10%
MedianMean Std. Dev.
strike price. We also repeat the analysis of Table 4.7 with the additional restriction on
base salaries and nd similar results (not tabulated).
In a second check we want to know how much our results depend on the assumed
reference wage. We therefore change the parameter  in equation (4) and investigate higher
levels of the reference wage. We perform this analysis for the representative CEO rst.
Figure 4.4 shows that savings tend to increase with the reference wage and that premium
options become more attractive for higher reference wages. For the representative CEO
K=P0 = 1:64 for  = 0:3, but total savings and the savings from endogenizing the strike
price are still small. For higher levels of the reference wage savings from recontracting are
higher overall, but become less dependent on the strike price. For  = 0:7, savings are
in the range of 4%, but incremental savings from endogenizing the strike price essentially
disappear and almost all savings can be generated by optimizing the structure of the
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Figure 4.4: This gure shows the savings the rms could generate for a given strike price
by switching from the observed to the optimal contract for the representative CEO. Four
di¤erent reference point parameterizations () are considered.
contracts (salary, stock, and options) alone.
In Table 4.9 Panel A, we repeat this analysis for the whole sample of CEOs. We
calculate optimal contracts for a strike price equal to the current stock price (P0), for
a strike price equal to the expected stock price E (PT ) for each CEO, and, as a basis
for comparison, for the observed strike price. We report mean values for total savings,
salary, stock, and options. The results show that total savings increase with the reference
point, and that the level of savings is even smaller for the whole sample than for the
representative CEO. Incremental savings from endogenizing the strike price are largest
for  = 0:3 and decrease with higher reference points. The optimal levels of salary, stock,
and options change with the reference point specication. For high reference points,
predicted contracts do not resemble observed contracts anymore and the model predicts
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low base salaries, more stock, and less options.26
Table 4.9 also shows robustness checks with respect to the other preference para-
meters. In Panel B, we vary the loss-aversion parameter : For higher degrees of loss
aversion, savings increase slightly and exchanging stock for higher base salary and more
stock options becomes attractive. This is the core of our model: loss-averse CEOs value
downside protection. Panel C shows that increasing the degree of diminishing sensitivity,
by increasing the curvature parameters  and  in the value function, diminishes the
attractiveness of stock options. The payo¤ distribution from options is skewed to the
right and a higher curvature of the value function makes these payo¤s less attractive to
the CEO. Overall, it seems save to conclude that our claim, that the absence of premium
options is not a puzzle in terms of e¢ ciency, is not a¤ected by changing our assumptions
about the preference parameters.
As a last robustness check we generate a dataset for the year 1997, which is otherwise
identical to the dataset we used before. Table 4.10 presents descriptive statistics. Com-
pared to 2005, base salaries and stock option holdings are lower for the 1997 sample, while
stock holdings are larger. Firm value, book assets and stock price volatility are also lower
in the 1997 sample compared to 2005. Among the managerial discretion proxies, cash
ow shortfall is now positive: the median rm spends more on dividends and investment
than its cash ow from operations (0.99% of book assets). In 2005, cash ow shortfall
was negative (-2.11% of book assets).
Optimal strike prices for the 1997 sample are slightly lower than for the 2005 sample,
as can be seen from Table 4.11.27 The mean and the median rm should optimally grant
stock options with a strike price at about 75% of the current 1997 stock price and premium
26See Chapter III for a more detailed analysis and discussion of the relationship between the reference
point and the t of the model.
27The results presented here are based on a slightly coarser grid with 17 equally-spaced values of  
between 0 and 4 (steps of 0:25).
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Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics for the 1997 sample. The table shows descriptive sta-
tistics for our dataset of 887 managers who were CEO in 1997. Stock and options are
the total number of shares and options the CEO holds at the beginning of the year, nor-
malized by rm value. Moneyness and maturity report the strike price and maturity of
a hypothetical option grant with the same value and option delta as the actual option
portfolio held by the CEO. Stock volatility and dividend yield are taken directly from
ExecuComp. Tobins Q is dened as market value of equity plus book assets minus book
equity all over assets. Cash ow shortfall is common plus preferred dividends plus cash
ow from investing activities less cash ow from operating activities all over assets. All
dollar amounts are given in thousands.
Mean Std. Dev. 10% Quantile Median 90% Quantile N
Panel A: Observed contracts
Stock 3.33% 6.95% 0.03% 0.43% 11.05% 887
Options 1.07% 1.34% 0.00% 0.64% 2.67% 887
Fixed Salary $1,461 $3,619 $421 $964 $2,474 887
BS-value of options $10,433 $26,746 $0 $3,332 $24,217 887
Value of Contract $95,473 $847,607 $2,466 $14,253 $99,496 887
Firm Value $4,268,301 $11,600,000 $203,112 $992,527 $8,073,254 887
Kd / P0 76.14% 24.00% 43.35% 77.75% 100.00% 887
Maturity 5.45 1.78 4.03 5.18 7.00 887
Stock Volatility 32.03% 13.83% 17.30% 29.10% 51.60% 887
Dividend Yield 1.50% 1.81% 0.00% 0.96% 4.10% 887
Panel B: Agency and Managerial Discretion Proxies
3-year avg. of Assetst-1 $3,288,462 $6,923,044 $161,038 $850,169 $8,406,138 887
3-year avg. of Tobin's Qt-1 1.90 1.19 1.02 1.54 3.20 887
3-year avg. of Cash flow shortfallt-1 2.01% 8.16% -5.80% 0.99% 10.65% 887
3-year avg. of CEO pay slice 35.96% 8.10% 26.52% 35.73% 45.28% 707
3-year avg. of R&Dt-1/Assetst-1 5.54% 8.21% 0.00% 2.60% 14.14% 470
GIM-Index 1995 9.05 2.75 5.00 9.00 13.00 591
options should be granted only for a minority of 12.6%. This reinforces our claim that
premium options are not generally optimal. Savings are even smaller and the average rm
could save less than 0.2% from switching to optimal contracts. Hence, the results from
the 1997 sample are also consistent with optimal strike prices being a second-order issue
in terms of e¢ ciency.
In Table 4.12 we use median regressions to investigate whether our corporate gover-
nance results are robust. As before in Table 4.7, CEO pay slice and R&D are positively
associated with possible savings. The GIM-Index, for which we use the value of the
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Table 4.11: Optimal strike prices and savings for the 1997 sample. The table shows
the distribution of optimal strike prices when the model is individually optimized for all
CEOs in the 1997 sample. P0 is the observed stock price. K is the derived optimal
strike price. The table also reports total savings the rm can generate by switching from
observed contract to derived optimal contract. "Savings with at the money options" is
the component of total savings that could be realized by optimizing over stock, options,
and xed salaries for observed strike prices. "Savings from endogenous strike price" are
incremental savings that can be realized by endogenizing the strike price. Number of
observations: 866.
10% 90%
Quantile Quantile
Panel A: Optimal strike prices
K* / P0 75.8% 48.6% 0.0% 75.0% 125.0%
Percent with K* not larger than P0 87.4% - - - -
Panel B: Potential savings
Total savings 0.18% 0.49% 0.00% 0.03% 0.39%
Savings with at the money options 0.09% 0.28% 0.00% 0.01% 0.21%
Savings from endogenous strike price 0.10% 0.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.20%
MedianMean Std. Dev.
GIM-Index of 1995 (because the index is not available for either 1996 or 1994), has the
correct sign, but is insignicant (p-value 0.12). Tobins Q is positively related to possible
savings in specication (1), indicating that ine¢ ciencies are more pronounced for rms
with more growth options, but insignicant (p-value 0.15) in specication (4). A notable
di¤erence to Table 4.7 is that cash ow shortfall is now positive and signicant, which
implies that rms with less cash ow have less e¢ cient contracts. We have seen in Table
4.10 that overall cash ow shortfall was much higher in 1997 and it may be possible that
this inuences our results.
Overall, Table 4.12 supports our results from the 2005 sample, which suggest that
internal governance matters. Our results regarding proxies for agency problems are either
weaker or inconsistent with those for the later period.
163
Table 4.12: Agency costs and contractual ine¢ ciency for the 1997 sample. Median re-
gression of total savings on stock volatility, dividend yield, and proxies for agency costs
and managerial discretion. Tobins Q, assets, cash ow shortfall, and research and de-
velopment (R&D) are three-year averages. CEO pay slice is the fraction of pay to top 5
executives that goes to the CEO. GIM-Index is the value of the GIM-Index in the year
1995. Industry dummies are based on 30 Fama-French industries for all specications.
P-values are reported in parentheses. All coe¢ cients are multiplied by 1,000.
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm volatilityt-1 4.79 *** 4.50 *** 4.07 *** 4.22 *** 4.21 *** 4.44 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Dividend yieldt-1 3.12 * 2.14 1.52 2.37 -1.10 5.01
(0.10) (0.30) (0.53) (0.35) (0.77) (0.18)
Log of Assetst-1 0.13 *** 0.11 *** 0.10 *** 0.13 *** 0.10 *** 0.12 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log of Tobin's Qt-1 0.15 ** 0.12
(0.01) (0.15)
Cash flow shortfallt-1 0.84 *** 0.97 **
(0.01) (0.01)
CEO pay slice 0.92 ** 0.74 **
(0.01) (0.04)
R&Dt-1 3.82 ***
(0.00)
GIM-Index 0.02
(0.12)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.078 0.078 0.071 0.073 0.091 0.083
N 866 866 689 689 458 575
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Dependent variable:   Log  (1 + savings )
6 Conclusion
This chapter calibrates a principal-agent model with a loss-averse manager to a sample
of U.S. CEOs and nds that premium options are optimal for higher assumed levels of
the reference wage, but not for lower values of the reference wage. The model predicts
that options granted in the past that are now deep in the money should be replaced by
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at the money options. Overall, the case for premium options is only weak, because the
savings these options would generate for shareholders through more e¢ cient compensation
contracts are small: generally, they are less than 0.5% for our benchmark model and less
than 2% for most alternative specications we consider. Hence, the size of the ine¢ ciency
from not using premium options if there is any is small.
We calibrate the model to each individual CEO in our sample, which gives us the
opportunity to also analyze the cross-sectional variation in compensation practice. Sur-
prisingly, this variation should be less than observed rather than more. Firms in the lowest
quintile with respect to the moneyness of their options should increase it, whereas those
in the top quintile should reduce it. Similar conclusions also hold for other parameters of
the compensation contract, like the use of stock or the size of base salaries. The model
is therefore consistent with the conclusion that "one size ts all" and that pay practices
should be even more similar across companies rather than more diverse.
We also interpret the savings from recontracting as an indication of potentially in-
e¢ cient corporate governance and nd mixed evidence. While potential savings from
switching to another contract are consistently related to measures of CEO power, and
therefore suggest that internal governance matters to some extent, they are small. With
the exception of R&D expenses, other measures of the quality of governance and agency
problems were either not consistently related to these savings over time, or not signicant
at all.
This chapter only investigates premium options, but we believe that similar results
hold also for other types of options, such as indexed options. The fundamental intuition
behind our results is that the costs of the contract are largely determined by the outside
option of the CEO and by the need to provide incentives to the CEO. Any change in the
contract that reduces the value of stock options to the CEO forces an increase in another
component of pay. Similarly, any change in the design of stock options that reduces the
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incentives they provide has to be o¤set by increasing the number of either options or
shares.
We caution the reader that we cannot conclude from this exercise that CEOs do not
extract rents in the pay-setting process. We take the observed compensation as a reection
of CEOsoutside options and can therefore not address the question whether the size of
total compensation is adequate, which is the subject of another literature.28 However we
do conclude that there is little indication that the structure of observed compensation
contracts reects ine¢ cient governance.
28For example, Gabaix and Landier (2008).
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